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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Crew Equipment Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation 0_ FMEA and CIL° Chanqe 2, 6 April 1987. The IOA
approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter crew
equipment hardware.
The analysis was performed on only a subset of the crew
equipment. This subset was agreed upon during negotiation
between MDAC and the STS Orbiter and GFE Projects Offices. The
subset includes crew equipment which meets the following
criteria: (i) normally manifested on every flight; (2) has
received final design approval; and (3) is covered by a NASA
FMEA/CIL.
The IOA analysis process utilized available crew equipment
hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware
assemblies, components, and hardware items. A complete list of
reference documents and drawings can be found in Section 5.0.
Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible
failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon
the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the six major subdivisions of the crew equipment. A summary of
the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented
below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
Summary of CREW EQUIPMENT Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality: 1/l 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
Number: 33 42 1 19 67 190 352
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
1
Summary of CREW EQUIPMENT Potential
Criticality:
Number:
l/l
33
2/IR
42
2/2
1
Critical Items (HW/F)
3/IR
2
3/2R
0
TOTAL
78
Of the 352 failure modes analyzed, 78 were determined to be PCIs.
UJ
ili:
Figure i: Crew Equipment Overview Analysis Summary
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
Office has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
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2.4 Crew Equipment Ground Rules and Assumptions
The crew equipment ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B. The subsystem specifiq ground rules were
defined to provide necessary additions and clarifications to the
ground rules and assumptions contained in NSTS 22206.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
3.1 Design and Function
The crew equipment items examined during the Independent Orbiter
Assessment project comprise a subset of the total list of crew
equipment. The items were chosen through MDAC/NASA negotiation and
meet the following criteria: (i) normally manifested on every
flight; (2) in a final approved design configuration; (3) have a
NASA performed FMEA/CIL.
Once the total list of crew equipment items was determined, a
logical grouping of the items was made. These groupings are
based on usage or location during usage. The overall
distribution of the crew equipment is shown in Figure 2.
Detailed system breakdowns are included in the following
sections.
3.1.1 EVA EQUIPMENT
EMU Scissors
The EMU scissors are modified stainless steel surgical scissors
used to cut thermal blankets, wires, tethers, etc. They are
stowed in a pocket on the right leg of the lower torso and are
tethered in place. Once removed from the EMU pocket they are
extremely difficult for the EMU crewmember to replace.
The EMU scissors are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: EMU Scissors
In
°I°°_o
O_
0
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Figure 2: Crew Equipment Distribution
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EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
The Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) light assembly provides a
crewmember with portable lighting during an EVA task. These lights
are useful in providing illumination during the 45 minutes of
darkness of each orbit. The assembly contains two independent lamp
modules connected by a cross member as shown in Figure 4.
//
Figure 4: EMU Light Assembly
Each side contains a battery module, two lamps, a switch, and a
sequencing circuit (powered by four small watch-sized batteries).
The EMU lights attach to the helmet with simple latches. On the EMU
lights, each lamp module has a left-right swing angle of 85 degrees
(5 degrees towards the helmet and 80 degrees away from the helmet)
and an up-down swing angle of 60 degrees (30 degrees up and 30
degrees down). The switch and sequencing circuit provide one-hand
operation of the lamp module. Repeatedly depressing the switch
sequences the upper lamp on, the lower lamp on, both lamps on, both
lamps off. Battery thermal constraints limit dual lamp operation to
short periods of time.
Two EMU light battery modules are required to supply the power
for the EMU lights (one per side). Each EMU light battery module
provides 5 watts to power two bulbs on one side of the EMU light
assembly for 3 hours or 2.5 watts to power one bulb on one side
for 6 hours. A built-in fuse protects against inadvertent
shorting of the contacts. Twelve EMU light batteries are stored
on-board for each flight. Each battery module is replaced prior
to each EVA.
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
The Operational Bioinstrumentation System (OBS) provides an
amplified electrocardiogram analog signal from crewmembers aboard
the Orbiter to the Orbiter avionics multiplexer/demultiplexer
where it is converted from analog to digital data. It is then
transmitted to the ground in real time or stored on tape for dump
or postflight return. The major components of the OBS are a
biomed belt with signal conditioner, electrode harness, cables
and electrode donning kit as shown in Figure 5.
ELECTRODE DONNING KIT
EVA BIOMED CABLE
ELECTRODE HARNESS
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
Figure 5: Operational Bioinstrumentation System
Use of the OBS is limited to extravehicular activity unless
intravehicular activity use is requested by the Flight Surgeon.
In case of illness, the Flight Surgeon may request that the OBS
be donned for a period of time. In this event, the OBS will be
donned and the data will be transmitted in real time or recorded
and dumped in near-real time. A spare OBS including an Orbiter
panel cable is always flown in the medical kit locker.
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EVA PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
The portable foot restraint (PFR) is a working platform which
restrains the crewmember during the performance of EVA tasks.
The platform consists of a system of toe guides and heel clips
which interface with the EMU boots. The PFR is shown in Figure
6. A two-axis (roll and pitch) gimbal system with lock knobs is
provided for adjustment and positioning. A probe enables the PFR
assembly to interface with the worksite at the PFR socket, where
yaw adjustment is available.
The PFR was originally designed to provide Space Shuttle EVA
crewmembers with a contingency restraint system for performing
EVA work tasks and door latch repairs on or about the forward and
aft bulkhead and along the centerline door latches of the payload
bay. As EVA operations increased in frequency, new applications
for its use were identified and improvements were made in the
design to minimize set-up and adjustment times as well as to
increase the operational work load limits from 25 to I00 pounds.
Spring-loaded lock knobs have been incorporated to prevent
inadvertent unlocking of the gimbal system.
Figure 6: Portable Foot Restraint
i0
3.1.2 EV_ TETHERS
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY
The EVA slidewire assembly consists of a Kevlar rope attached to
support structures at the forward and aft ends of the payload bay
doors. See Figure 7. There are slidewire assemblies on both the
port and starboard sides of the Orbiter.
Figure 7: EVA Slidewire
The purpose of the slidewire assembly is to provide a method of
connecting an EVA crewmember to the Orbiter, for safety
considerations, but still allow freedom of movement throughout
the payload bay. To accomplish this purpose, the slidewire is
equipped with "slides" which are attached to the rope. The EVA
crewman attaches a tether hook, usually one end of the 35-foot
waist tether, to the slide which then moves back and forth along
the slidewire. This allows the crewman to manuever around the
payload bay, but still remain attached to the Orbiter structure.
The slidewire assembly support structure consists of a yoke, a
link, a support, and various fastenings designed to equalize the
loads. In the event of a jam in the support mechanism, a quick
disconnect pin provides a method of releasing the structure and
releasing the jam.
End fittings attach the slidewire to the support structure. The
slides are prevented from contacting these end fittings by means
of stops which are permanently mounted on the slidewire.
35-FOOT SAFETY TETHER
The 35-foot safety tether connects the crewmember to a slide wire
along the cargo bay sill longeron during EVA. The tether
consists of a reel case with an integral D-ring, a take-up reel,
a 35-foot cable, and a locking hook as shown in Figure 8. A
selector on the reel case can be set to lock the take-up reel or
to unlock it to allow the tether to reel out and retract. The
locking hook on the tether incorporates a lock-lock feature to
prevent accidental opening.
Ii
Figure 8: 35-Foot Safety Tether
For launch and entry, the port and starboard safety tethers are
stowed in a cloth-covered stowage container which is secured to
the bulkhead above the airlock in the cargo bay. While still in
the airlock, after opening the airlock hatch, a crewmember
attaches a waist tether to the D-ring of the 35-foot safety
tether. The other end of the waist tether is hooked to a ring
on the EMU waist bearing.
A series of straps, clips, and a small capstan secures the 35-
foot tether between the slidewire and airlock during launch and
entry. The tether is secured near handrails to allow the
crewmember to unstow it while moving to the work area and to
restow it while returning to the airlock after finishing the
extravehicular task.
WAIST TETHER
The waist tether consists of a strip of Nomex webbing material
with an aluminum EVA hook on each end (one hook is larger than
the other). See Figure 9. The fully extended tether is
approximately 44 inches long including the hooks. The tether
incorporates a load-limiting feature which allows no more than 75
pounds to be imparted to the EMU until full extension of the
tether occurs. If this load is exceeded, the tether will break
and the shock will be absorbed by the additional segment of
webbing which allows the tether to accept loads of up to 585
pounds.
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Figure 9: Waist Tether
Waist tethers are used to attach the crewmember to a worksite or
to tether an otherwise unrestrained tool to the crewmember. The
large hook is attached to handrails, and the small hook is
attached to an EMU waist tether ring. Opening of an EVA hook
requires that push-to-open buttons on each side of the hook be
depressed simultaneously while the hook is squeezed. The hook
will spring closed as soon as it is released. The small hook
opens 3/4-inch and the large hook opens 1-inch. Two waist
tethers are normally attached to each EMU.
3.1.3 EVA 'IM)OL8
TUBE CUTTER
The tube cutter consists of spring-loaded retention rollers, a
cutting wheel mounted on a slide, a small ratchet handle that
moves the slide, and a large ratchet handle which turns the
cutting mechanism around the tube being cut as shown in Figure
i0. The tube cutter is designed to cut the Inconel 718 drive
tubes which open and close the payload bay doors. The tool is
preset to cut tubes with 1/2 to 3/4-inch diameters but can be
readjusted to cut 3/4 to 1-inch diameter tubes by flipping the
slide 180 degrees and moving the cutter blade to the second screw
hole. i
....................
I
...................
Figure I0 : Tube Cutter
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During use the tool is pushed on the tube to be cut and is held
in place by the retention rollers. The cutting wheel (mounted on
a slide) is ratcheted down with the small ratchet handle until it
contacts the tube. The large ratchet handle is then used to
rotate the entire tube cutter around the tube. The cutting wheel
is then tightened, as required, to provide the cutting action.
Only a minimal force is required by the operator to cut the drive
tube.
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOD
The centerline latch bypass tool consists of spring-loaded and
fixed-load pickup points, a reversible ratchet with stowable
handle, and release triggers which have a safety to prevent
accidental release. See Figure ii.
, , =,,
Figure Ii: Centerline Latch Bypass Tool
The centerline latch tool is used to bypass a failed cargo bay
door centerline latch. The tool is designed to exactly
duplicate the nominal latch loads on the latch hook and roller.
The frame of the tool fits over the latch hook pivot. With the
frame held firmly in place, the tool latch is released, which in
turn captures the latch roller. The tool handle is rotated to an
upright position, and the drive is ratcheted to a hard stop,
loading the tool and securing the latch.
THREE-POINT LATCH TOOL
The three-point latch tool consists of one spring-loaded and two
fixed-load pickup points, a reversible ratchet with stowable
handle, two installation handles, and a latch, Figure 12. The
tool duplicates the loading on a latch roller produced by a latch
hook in nominal condition, transferring loads to the hook pivot,
the locking bellcrank, and the latch roller, which secures the
forward and aft payload bulkhead latches.
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Figure 12: Three Point Latch Tool
The three-point latch tool is a Shuttle-unique device designed to
substitute for the payload bay door forward and aft bulkhead latches
if a failure occurs in one of these latches. The tool cannot be
installed on a bulkhead latch that has failed with the hook open
less than 37 degrees due to interference with the latch hook.
Detachable installation handles allow installation of the tool
on either side of the bulkhead.
EVA WINCH AND MOUNTING ASSEMBLY
The EVA winch consists of a Kevlar rope, a rope housing, a reel,
a stowable ratchet handle, and a mounting adapter. A rope guide
with rollers to prevent fraying is mounted on the housing. The
ratchet lever is used to select reverse, neutral, and engage
positions, while the control handle selects ratchet in, ratchet
out, reel out, or gear release positions. The winch has 24 feet
of 3/8-inch diameter Kevlar rope with a hook attached to the end.
The winch is used to close the payload bay doors manually in the
event the door drive system fails. One winch is mounted on each
of the forward and aft cargo bay bulkheads. After all apparent
obstructions to door movement have been removed and any necessary
disconnect and/or cutting operations have been completed, the
crewmember routes the rope over the number 4 hook roller and
attaches the rope hook to the number 4 latch bellcrank at the top
of the door. A load of 600 pounds can be applied on the rope by
placing the control to "ratchet in", engaging, and cranking the
ratchet handle.
The EVA winch and mounting assembly are shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: EVA Winch and Mounting Assembly
RMS EVA WINCH ADApTER ASSEMBLY
The remote manipulator system (RMS) EVA winch adapter assembly is
comprised of a rope spool with handle, spool bracket, rope guide
and rollers, and cam cleats as shown in Figure 14. The RMS winch
adapter assembly holds 65 feet of 3/8-inch diameter rope. The
rope has a 7 3/4-inch hook on the end, with a spring clip for
secure attachment.
/
Figure 14: RMS EVA Winch Adapter
The RMS EVA winch adapter assembly is used in conjunction with
the snatch blocks in the event of RMS joint failure. The rope is
routed through the snatch blocks and attached to the handrail on
the tip of the RMS. The crewmember then backdrives the RMS into
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the stowed position using the RMSEVA winch adapter assembly.
The spool bracket and the rope spool both have handles. Two cam
cleats on the rope reel clamp down on the rope to prevent it from
being pulled off the reel.
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE
The Payload Retention Device (PRD) is used as a contingency
tiedown for payloads that cannot be properly restowed in their
launch positions for reentry. It consists of a Kevlar webbing
strap with French hooks on the ends and a stainless steel and
aluminum ratchet mechanism for tightening as shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15: Payload Retention Device
The PRD can be attached with French hooks to tether points in the
cargo bay, on the equipment to be secured, or to another PRD.
After both ends of the PRD are hooked in place, the crewmember
pulls the handle to operate the ratchet, tightening the strap
until the payload is secure. The ratchet mechanism reels in the
strap at a sufficiently slow rate that the article being secured
repositions itself, thereby preventing inadvertent damage. The
PRD does not allow a controlled release of tension; it is
intended only as a tiedown device.
As of this writing, the PRD has not been certified for tie-down
of payloads during re-entry. The device has been certified only
to load levels which permit RMS retention.
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EVA CABLE CUTTER
The cable cutter is a standard cutter modified for EVA use. It
is equipped with large handles to fit the EVA glove. The tool
handles are covered with Velcro and a tether point is provided.
When fully open, the cutter jaw opening measures 5/16-inch wide
and 5/16-inch deep. See Figure 16.
i// / / / / / ;
I// / /iJ 
Figure 16: EVA Cable Cutter
The cable cutter is initially operated with two hands in order to
close the cutting jaws and capture the cable. After capture, the
handles may then be operated with one hand to cut the cable.
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBly
The snatch block is a common marine device modified for EVA use.
It is used with a 3/8-inch diameter rope. The snatch block hook
has a snap lock to provide a more secure attachment. The hook
has an opening of 3/4-inch and is attached by a swivel shaft
allowing 360 degrees rotation. See Figure 17.
Figure 17: Snatch Block Assembly
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The snatch block is used to route the cargo bay winch line to
support payload tasks. In the event of an RMS failure, it can be
used with the RMS EVA winch adapter assembly to backdrive the RMS
to a stowed position. Additionally, if a failure should occur in
the Airborne Support Equipment (ASE) drive system, the snatch
block can be used to stow and/or deploy the Inertial Upper Stage
(IUS).
3.1.4 I_A TOOLS
TURNBUCKLE
The turnbuckle consists of three adjustable length links joined
by pin and hole connections as shown in Figure 18. After being
placed in position between the mid-deck lockers the crewman can
manually adjust the threaded lengthening knobs to provide a snug
fit.
Figure 18: Turnbuckle
The turnbuckle is designed to maintain the positions of the mid-
deck stowage lockers after (a maximum of) three lockers have been
removed. Mid-deck lockers are normally removed to gain access to
the forward avionics bay for a variety of in-flight maintenance
tasks, including GPC changeout.
19
LOCKER REMOVAL TOOL
The locker removal tool is a combination ratchet/torque wrench
with an extension terminating in a hex drive head as shown in
Figure 19. Two locker tools are flown as a part of the IVA tool
kit. The extension portion of the tool is designed to fit
through the installation/removal tool guides at the four corners
of the middeck lockers so that the hex head drive can make
contact with the four structural attach fasteners at the rear of
the lockers. The ratchet portion of the tool is then used to
either loosen or tighten these fasteners so that the locker can
either be removed or reinstalled.
Figure 19: Locker Removal Tool
IFM BREAKOUT BO_
The IFM breakout box is designed to provide 1.5 - 28 V dc
variable power to support any contingency procedure which may
occur during on orbit operations and require electrical power. A
standard orbiter power cord connects the breakout box with one of
the shuttle utility power panels to provide the 28 V dc input.
See Figure 20.
Figure 20: IFM Breakout Box
2O
There are three power output connections on the IFM breakout box.
One is an outlet for another standard power cord at 28 V dc and
is used when two IFM breakout boxes are required to complete a
contingency procedure.
The "B" outlet is also 28 V dc but allows the choice and
connection of one of four wire gauges (12, 16, 20, or 22). The
choice of wire gauge will be dictated by the requirements of the
particular piece of equipment under repair. The wires used to
connect the IFM breakout box to the equipment being powered are
found in the IFM pin kit. In addition to the pre-made pin/wire
combinations, the kit provides the capability for the crew to
manufacture any other required options on orbit.
The "A" outlet provides the choice of wire gauges plus the
selection of either 28 V dc or a variable voltage between 1.5 and
28 V dc. This selection is made by means of a selection switch.
If the variable voltage is required, a multimeter (also carried
on board) is connected to the test ports of the IFM breakout box
and the potentiometer (built into the IFM breakout box) is used
to set the desired voltage level. Note: All power outlets of
the breakout box may be used simultaneously.
There are a number of safety options built into the IFM breakout
box. In addition to the selection switch position, the active
options on the breakout box are displayed by means of LEDs
directly above the operational options. Built-in fuses protect
the circuit from over-current conditions. Temperature
sensing/display strips are mounted on all sides of the breakout
box for crew safety purposes.
3 • 1.5 FOOD A88EKBLZE8
GALLEY ASSEMBDY
The galley is used by crewmembers during meal preparation. The
galley consists of an inlet water supply system, a water
dispensing mechanism, a water heater, and an oven. Space on the
galley is also allocated for storage and dispensing of items such
as trays, silverware, condiments, and vitamins.
The water system consists of an inlet side which feeds water
directly into the water heater and into the water dispensing
system. The water heater has a twelve pound capacity and is
located under the galley. Six heaters provide the heat to
control the water temperature between 165 and 185 degrees F.
Whenever hot water is dispensed, or the water drops below a given
temperature, a recirculation pump will start to run so that the
water will be heated in an efficient manner.
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The galley has an electronic water dispensing system which allows
the crewmember to select the amount of water to be fed through
the needle. This amount can vary from 0.5 to 8.0 ounces in 0.5
ounce increments. In case of a failure of the electronic system,
the galley is equipped with a water bypass system.
The galley oven consists of a set of heaters and three
circulating fans to control the temperature and heat the food.
The bottom of the oven depends upon this method of convective
heating, while the top portion of the oven places the food
packets into direct contact with the heaters and relies upon
conductive heating.
The galley is shown in Figure 21.
Figure 21: Galley
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
The Operational Water Dispenser Assembly (OWDA) is a compact
system that provides the crew with ambient and chilled water
sources for food rehydration, drinking, and hygiene purposes by
interfacing with the Orbiter ambient and chilled potable water
systems whenever the galley is not flown.
The major component of interest in the OWDA is the rehydration
unit w_ich is an electronic system for dispensing 2, 3, 4, and 8
ounces of water into the operational food and beverage containers
requiring hydration. The water is introduced via a replaceable
needle with two spare needles being flown.
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Water dispensing is performed by a pressure regulator/solenoid
valve arrangement. Inlet water with a nominal system pressure
range of 12.0 to 22.0 psi is reduced to a constant pressure of
12.0 psi by the regulator. Downstream of the solenoid valve, an
electronic controller governs the time of flow. This timed shut-
off after constant flow translates to specific water quantities
for accurate rehydration.
Additional components of interest include: (I) the power switch
(the OWDA requires 28 V dc power); (2) the quantity select rotary
switch and fill initiation switch combination; (3) a bypass fill
valve to be used in case of a failure in (2); (4) various water
lines; (5) a microbial check valve to prevent back contamination;
and (6) a water selection switch for selecting either ambient or
chilled water.
Additionally, the OWDA provides personal hygiene water. The
water dispenser provides ambient water through a quick disconnect
(QD) on its left side. The crewmember obtains water from this QD
by attaching a 12-foot flex hose with a mating QD. On the
opposite end of the flex hose ia a valve and nozzle.
The OWDA is shown in Figure 22.
Figure 22: Operational Water Dispenser Assembly
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CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
The contingency water dispenser is an extremely simple
valve/needle combination which connects directly into the orbiter
potable water supply and is used in the event of an OWDA or
galley failure. See Figure 23.
Figure 23: Contingency Water Dispenser Assembly
3 • Z. 6 ORBITER H,%RDW_RE
PASSENGER SEATS AND RESTRAINTS
The passenger seats and restraints are under redesign due to the
requirement for a crew escape system. The final approved design
configuration is anticipated mid to late September. These items
cannot be examined by the IOA contractor until this data has been
received.
SLEEP STATIONS AND RESTRAINTS
The four-tier bunk sleep station consists of four sleep stations
in which the crewmembers enter sleep restraints that are similar
to the sleeping bags, except that the restraints are fastened to
rigid pallets. The sleep stations provide for light and sound
attenuation and privacy by means of end/slide panels and sliding
doors made of machined aluminum and Kevlar materials. The
sliding doors allow ingress/egress into the sleep stations. The
panels/door and support for the bottom station are removable for
under-floor stowage access. To gain access to floor compartment
Volume E, the crewmember needs to remove the bottom sleep station
side panel and door. The door is physically attached to the side
panel structure.
Lights are provided at the head of each sleep station.
Ventilating air enters through a grille at the foot of each
station into the Orbiter cabin. An adjustable air diffuser will
permit a ventilation airflow of up to 20 cubic feet per minute.
The sleep stations and restraints are shown in Figure 24.
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4-TIER BANK SLEEP STATION
AVIONICS
BAY III
ORBITER MIDDECK
REVERSlBLE/REMOVABLE
HEAD RESTRAINT
REVERSIBLE/REMOVABLE PILLOW (lO0 PERCENT
COTTON "MOUNTAIN" CLOTH AND PYRELL FOAM)
r-PERSONAL SLEEPING BAG
/(I00 PERCENT COTTON
ELASTIC BODY __-"_ ]_ / "MOUNTAIN" CLOTH)
RESTRA INT _L'_..._
_U=,TrA, _DOT_ ,__'_--_ _ADJUSTABLE
BUCKLE FLAP - _O÷H_UNNEL"_3i'_" 7 _ STRAPS
(SNAP-FASTENED_ / _ _ _'--'PAD'NOMEX FELT AND
ovERBUCKLE>
')--_ / _'_ I00 PERCENT COTTON
RANGEMENT_ "MOUNTAIN" CLOTH)
OPERATIONAL SLEEPING BAG
Figure 24 : Sleep stations and Restraints
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SIDE HATCH SAFETY LOCK
The side hatch safety lock consists of two aluminum clamps held
together with a steel cap and pip pin. The safety lock protects
the side hatch lock lever from becoming inadvertently unlocked
while the vehicle is on-orbit. The aluminum clamps are placed
on each side of the crank handle. The steel cap is placed on the
clamps such that the pip pin may be placed through the clamps and
cap. The side hatch safety lock is removed by reversing the
procedure. The safety lock is installed during the orbital phase
of the mission and removed during deorbit procedures.
The side hatch safety lock is shown in Figure 25.
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Figure 25: Side Hatch Safety Lock
LOCKERS
Modular lockers provide the middeck stowage space. Each modular
locker provides 2 cubic feet of stowage volume. The lockers are
locked to the avioncs bay by four attach fasteners and can be
removed in flight by the use of an extension drive and ratchet
assembly.
The lockers have hinged doors with two magnetic on-orbit latches
and two captive wingnut locks for securing the doors during
launch and entry/landing. The doors have a friction hinge for
zero-g positioning. The door can be opened a full 180 degrees.
When 90 degrees open, the door's inner surface is flush with the
bottom of the lockers.
The lockers are configured with a standard hole pattern for
attaching straps and brackets to restrain stowed equipment.
Three standard sizes of reusable trays are available. To hold
the stowed items, foam inserts are available. An avionics bay
closeout panel is used for structural continuity when modular
lockers are not flown. As many as 42 modular lockers can be
flown.
A typical locker is shown in Figure 26.
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Figure 26: Lockers
TREADMILL
The treadmill consists of a conveyor running track contained in a
metal housing. The treadmill base has quick disconnect attachment
fittings that fit onto the mid-deck floor deck studs. The
running track itself is coupled to a rapid onset braking system
which is regulated by a speed control knob. When the preset
speed is attained, the rapid onset braking system applies
increased drag to the running track and consequently limits the
speed of the runner.
To exercise in zero-g, a restraint system is used to apply near
one-g forces to the body. Four force cords are routed near the
four corners of the treadmill to restrain the body to the running
track. The force cords are routed through a series of pulley
wheels to provide a more constant force delivered to the body.
The force cords attach to the slip buckles which are attached to
the adjustment straps on a waistbelt.
The treadmill and the associated restraint cords are shown in
Figure 27.
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BSHOULDER STRAP SHOULDER STRAP
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ADJUSTMENT STRAP WITH
SLIP BUCKLE
WAISTBELT
Figure 27 : Treadmill
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COAS ASSEMBLY
The COAS is a collimator device similar to an aircraft gunsight.
It consists of a lamp with an intensity control, reticle, barrel-
shaped housing, mount, combiner assembly, and a power cable.
The COAS is designed for use in the right-hand overhead window
and in the left-hand forward window. The overhead window
position is the primary use location and the forward window
position is the secondary location. The COAS is installed in the
primary position and in the secondary position by using a
mounting bracket which is locked in position by two COAS
thumbscrews. In the forward position a forward mounting adapter
is installed prior to COAS installation. This adapter is locked
into position with a single thumbscrew. The COAS is utilized in
the right-hand overhead window to provide range and range rate
for rendezvous/docking, for IMUbackup alignment, and Z-axis
sighting. In the left-hand forward window the COAS is used for
stationkeeping/tracking, miscellaneous Orbiter alignment tasks,
and as a backup location for IMU alignment. The COAS provides
the crewman a fixed line-of-sight attitude reference image that
appears to be the same distance away as the target. This image
is boresighted (by means of a sight mount) parallel to the X-axis
(centerline of the Orbiter).
The COAS and the associated brackets are shown in Figure 28.
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S-79-39339
a
S-79-39254
COAS INTENSITY CONTROL
S-79-39327
FILTER
COAS WITH FILTER
APERTURE
COAS WITH APERTURE STOP
Figure 28 :
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3.2 Locations And Interfaces
The crew equipment items are located in both the crew compartment
and the payload bay. Refer to the preceeding descriptions for details.
3.3 Hierarchy
The overall hierarchy for crew equipment is shown in Figure 29.
Detailed breakdowns are presented in Figures 30 through 39.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS - CREW EQUIPMENT
The crew equipment analysis identified 352 failure modes and 78
potential critical items. The failure modes are divided into
categories in Table I and the PCIs are presented in Table II.
TABLE I: Summary of CREW EQUIPMENT Failure Modes and
Criticalities
Criticality i/l 2/IR 2/2 3/2R 3/3
EVA Equipment
EVA Tethers
EVA Tools
IVA Tools
Food
Assemblies
Orbiter
Hardware
12
21
33
4
37
1
42
3/IR
1 1
3
i0
5
1 19
40
2
4
21
67
23
ii
23
i0
86
37
190
TOTAL
63
31
88
21
107
42
352
TABLE II: Summary of CREW EQUIPMENT Potential Critical Items
EVA Equipment
EVA Tethers
EVA Tools
IVA Tools
Food
Assemblies
Orbiter
Hardware
1/t
12
21
33
2/IR 2/2 3/IR
4
37
1
1
2
42 1 2
3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
17
60
1
78
Each major category is discussed in the following sections.
Additionally, a comprehensive listing of the items and associated
failure modes are presented at the beginning of Appendix C and
the list of potential critical items is given in Appendix D.
4.1 Analysis Results - EVA Equipment
The EVA Equipment Analysis identified 63 failure modes. The
number of failure modes for the individual items of equipment is
given in Table III.
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TABLE III: Summary of EVA Equipment Failure Modes
and Criticalities
i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAl
3 2 5EVA Scissors
EMU Light
Assembly
OBS
PFR
17
2O
15
4
2
15
21
22
TOTALS 40 23 63
Of the 63 failure modes, none was judged to be a potential critical
item.
4.2 Analysis Results - EVA Tethers
The EVA tether analysis identified 31 failure modes, which are
divided among the individual items in Table IV. Of the 31
failure modes, 17 were determined to be potential critical items,
as shown on Table V. Of these 17 PCIs, 12 had a I/i criticality.
The i/I criticalities were assigned mainly to failures resulting
in an unrestrained, or untethered crewman. All 17 PCIs are
listed in Appendix D.
TABLE IV: Summary of EVA Tether Failure Modes
and Criticalities
i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAI
EVA Slidewire 2 4 1 1 2 i0
ERCM Tether 5 9 14
Waist Tether 5 2 7
12 4 1 1 2 ii 31
TABLE V: Summary of EVA Tether Potential Critical Items
I/I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTA_
EVA Slidewire 2 4 1 7
ERCM Tether 5 5
Waist Tether 5 5
TOTALS 12 4 1 17
44
4.3 Analysis Results - EVA Tools
The EVA tools analysis identified 88 failure modes, which are
divided among the EVA tools as given in Table VI. Of the 88
failure modes, 60 were judged to be potential critical items with
21 having i/i criticalities. These high criticalities are due
mainly to the designed use of the tools for contingency payload
bay operations. The PCIs are divided into categories in Table VII
and listed in Appendix D.
TABLE VI: Summary of EVA Tool Failure
Modes and Criticalities
i/1 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3
9 2Tube Cutter
Centerline
Latch Bypass
Tool
3 Point Latch
Tool
EVA Winch &
Mount Asm.
EVA Winch
Adapter
PRD
EVA Cable
Cutter
Snatch Block
Assembly
TOTAL
i0
21
14
7
3
4
37
1
3
3 4
TOTAL
3 14
5 9
1 9
4 18
3 I0
3 17
3
4 8
23 88
45
TABLE VII: Summary of EVA Tool Potential
Critical Items
i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
9 2Tube Cutter
Centerline
Latch
3 Point Latch
EVA Winch &
Mount
EVA Winch
Adapter
PRD
EVA Cable
Cutter
Snatch Block
TOTAL
3
8
I0
21
14
7
3
4
37 2
Ii
3
8
14
7
13
4
60
4.4 Analysis Results - IVA Tools
The IVA tools analysis identified 21 failure modes. Of the 21,
only one, a failure of the locker removal tool, was judged to be
a potential critical item. The failure modes are distributed
among the three categories in Table VIII.
TABLE VIII: Summary of IVA Tool Failure Modes
and Criticalities
I/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
2Turnbuckle
Locker
Removal Tool
IFM Breakout
Box
TOTALS
1
1
2
1
18I0 8
i0 I0 21
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4.5 Analysis Results - Food Assemblies
The analysis of the food assemblies identified 107 failure modes,
none of which was found to be a potential critical item. The
failure modes are distributed between the three items of
equipment in Table IX.
TABLE IX: Summary of Food Assembly Failure Modes
and Criticalities
i/I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
Galley 3 78 81
OWDA 16 7 23
CWDA 2 1 3
TOTALS 21 86 107
4.6 Analysis Results - Orbiter Hardware
Analysis of the orbiter hardware identified 42 failure modes,
none of which was found to be a potential critical item. The
failure modes are distributed among the five items of equipment
in Table X.
TABLE X: Summary of Orbiter Hardware Failure
Modes and Criticalities
Sleep Station/
Restraints
Side Hatch
Safety Lock
Locker
Treadmill
COAS
TOTALS
i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR
2
2
1
5
3/2R 3/3
15
2
8
12
37
TOTAL
15
2
4
9
12
42
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
A-I
APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AOA
ASE
ATO
C&W
CIL
COAS
CWDA
dc
EMU
ERCM
EVA
F
F
FMEA
FSSR
GFE
GPC
HW
IFM
IMU
IOA
IUS
IVA
JSC
LED
MDAC
NA
NSTS
OBS
OWDA
PCI
PFR
PHS
PLBD
PRCBD
PRD
PSA
psi
QD
RHS
RMS
RTLS
- Abort-Once-Around
- Aerospace Support Equipment
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Caution and Warning
- Critical Items List
- Crew Optical Alignment Sight
- Contingency Water Dispenser Assembly
- Direct Current
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit
- Extended Range Crew Member
- Extravehicular Activity
- Fahrenheit
- Functional
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Flight Systems Software Requirements
- Government Furnished Equipment
- General Purpose Computer
- Hardware
- In-Flight Maintenance
- Inertial Measurement Unit
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Inertial Upper Stage
- Intravehicular Activity
- Johnson Space Center
- Light Emitting Diode
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Not Applicable
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Bioinstrumentation System
- Operational Water Dispenser Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Portable Foot Restraint
- Personal Hygene Station
- Payload Bay Door
- Program Requirements Control Board Directive
- Payload Retention Device
- Provision Stowage Assembly
- Pounds per Square Inch
- Quick Disconnect
- Rehydration Station
- Remote Manipulator System
- Return-to-Launch Site
A-2
SFOM
SM
SOP
SSSH
STS
TAL
V
- Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
- Systems Management
- Secondary Oxygen Pack
- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
- Space Transportation System
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Volt
A-3

APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
B-I
B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, chanqe 2, 6 April 1987, were used
with the following amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AO__AA- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AT___OO- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRIT_CADITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM} - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(oPs)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
pRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION pHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 .(Synonymous with ASCENT)
0NORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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B.2 ZOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, change 2, 6 April 1987
was employed with the following amplifications and additions.
.
•
,
.
,
Q
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any dataemployed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
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ii.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics•
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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B.3 Crew Equipment Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the crew equipment subsystem. The analysis considered the
worst case effects of the hardware or functional failure on the
subsystem, mission, and crew and vehicle safety.
i. Waist tether is used to fasten a crewmember to either a
workstation or to the ERCM safety tether. It is not
used to restrain tools.
RATIONALE: Worst case possibility•
• The Operational Bioinstrumentation System (OBS) will be
considered as a non-mandatory item for EVA operations.
Failure of the OBS while monitoring an IVA crewmember
can require the Flight Surgeon to terminate the mission•
Thus, IVA usage is more critical•
RATIONALE: IVA crewmembers are hooked to the OBS
only at the request of the Flight Surgeon.
If a crewmember's health cannot be
monitored, the Flight Surgeon has the option
of terminating the mission•
• Crew actions, planned and unplanned, are considered viable
alternatives for overcoming failures and reducing
criticalities.
RATIONALE: Crew equipment is designed to permit this
capability.
•
"Normally expected environmental conditions" precludes the
existence of contamination in all water lines.
RATIONALE: Interpretation and application of
redundancy screen C.
• Lockers are assumed to contain emergency, lifesaving, or IFM
critical equipment.
RATIONALE: Worst case possibility.
1 Crew equipment failures discovered prior to launch will be
corrected prelaunch.
RATIONALE: Interpretation of flight rules.
7. RMS jettison is considered unlike redundancy to RMS stowing.
RATIONALE: Definition of redundancy.
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• The EMU lights are not designated as mandatory items during
EVA.
RATIONALE: Definition of mandatory versus
non-mandatory requirements.
•
The failure of an EVA tether such that the crewmember is
unrestrained will be assigned a "i/I" criticality.
RATIONALE: Worst case possibility
i0. Certain galley and OWDA failures can result in free water in
the cabin• It is not a part of this task to identify the
hazards that free water can pose to other on-board systems.
RATIONALE: This should be addressed by a "hazard
analysis".
Ii. Complete loss of the galley will not terminate a mission
as long as alternate water sources are available.
RATIONALE". The FDF contains procedures to bypass
the galley for water if required. Other
galley functions are not required for
completion of mission•
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APPENDIX C
ANALYSIS WORKSHEETSAND SUMMARY TABLES
C-I
_,PPENDIX C
DET_,ILED JLN_,LYS I S
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets employed during
the analysis of the Crew Equipment subsystem. The information on
these worksheets is intentionally similar to the FMEA's written
by Rockwell and the NASA. Each of these sheets identifies the
item being analyzed, and parent assembly, as well as the
function. For each failure mode, the possible causes are
outlined, and the assessed hardware and functional criticality
for each mission phase is listed, as described in the Rockwell
Desk Instructions 100-2G. Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities :
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission
3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission
Functional Criticalities :
IR = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A :
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
4 = Do Not Know
Redundancy Screens B and C :
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
Preceding the analysis worksheets are summary tables containing a
listing of all identified failures and associated criticalities.
These summary tables can be used as a quick reference to identify
the desired failure number, then the analysis worksheet can be
referenced for more complete information.
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MDAC-ID
1100
Ii01
1102
1103
1104
1200
1201
1202
1203
1204
1205
1206
1207
1208
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1300
1301
1302
1303
1304
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310
1311
1312
1313
1314
1315
1316
1317
1318
1319
1320
EVA EQUIPMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F a B C ITEM NAME
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
3/2R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
/NA
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
/NA
/NA P P P
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA
/NA
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
/NA P N P
EVA SCISSORS - SPRING
EVA SCISSORS - BLADE
EVA SCISSORS - BLADES
EVA SCISSORS LOCKING BAR
EVA SCISSORS HINGE PIN
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQNCING.
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQNCING.
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQNCING.
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQNCING.
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQNCING.
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - BULB
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-GIMBAL
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-GIMBAL
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-GIMBAL
EMU LIGHT ASMBLY-HELMET LATCH
EMU LIGHT ASMBLY-HELMET LATCH
EMU LIGHT ASMBLY-CROSS MEMBER
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-BATTERY
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-BATTERY
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-BATTERY
OBS-SIGNAL CONDITIONER
OBS-SGNL. COND.-BATTERY
OBS-SGNL. COND.-ON/OFF SW.
OBS-SGNL. COND.-GAIN
OBS-SGNL. COND.-INPUT PORT
OBS-SGNL. COND.-OUTPUT PORT
OBS-SGNL. COND.-ESP
OBS - BIOMED BELT
OBS - ELECTRODE HARNESS WIRES
OBS - ELECTRODES
OBS - ELECTRODE HARNESS
OBS - ELECTRODE HARNESS - PIN
OBS - EVA BIOMED CABLE
OBS - EVA BIOMED CABLE - PINS
OBS - IrA BIOMED CABLE
OBS - IVA BIOMED CABLE - PINS
BIOMED CHANNEL SWITCH
BIOMED CHANNEL SWITCH
BIOMED PANEL CABLE
BIOMED PANEL CABLE - PINS
BIOMED PANEL CABLE-SHTL. INTER.
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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MDAC-ID
1400
1401
1402
1403
1404
1410
1411
1412
1413
1414
1415
1416
1417
1418
1420
1421
1422
1423
1424
1430
1431
1432
EVA EQUIPMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /HA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
PFR-PLATFORM ASMBLY. KNOB
PFR-PLATFORM ASMBLY. PLATES
PFR-PLATFORM ASMBLY. TOE BAR
PFR-PLATFORM ASMBLY. HEEL LOCK
PFR-PLATFORM ASMBLY. HEEL LOCK
PFR-BOOM ASMBLY. INBOARD CLAMP
PFR-BOOM ASMBLY. OUTBOARD CLAMP
PFR-BOOM ASMBLY. PLTFRM. CLAMP
PFR-BOOM ASMBLY. PLTFRM. CLAMP
PFR-BOOM ASMBLY. QUICK REL. PIN
PFR-BOOM ASMBLY. QUICK REL. PIN
PFR-BOOM ASMBLY. TUBES
PFR-BOOM ASMBLY. TORQUE LIMIT.
PFR-BOOM ASMBLY. TORQUE LIMIT.
PFR-CNTRLINE CLAMP ASMBLY. PIN
PFR-CNTRLINE CLAMP ASMBLY. PIN
PFR-CNTRLINE CLAMP ASMBLY TABS
PFR-CNTRLINE CLAMP ASMBLY JAWS
PFR-CNTRLINE CLAMP ASMBLY KNOB
PFR-ART. SOCKET KNOB
PFR-ART. SOCKET PLATES
PFR-ART. SOCKET QUICK REL. PIN
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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EVA TETHERSANALYSIS WORKSHEETSUMMARY
MDAC-ID
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
2100 3/2R /NA
2101 * i/I /NA
2102 3/2R /NA
2103 * 2/2 /NA
2104 * 2/1R /NA
2105 * 2/IR /NA
2106 3/IR /NA
2107 * 2/IR /NA
2108 * 2/IR /NA
2109 * I/I /NA
2200 * I/i /NA
2201 3/3 /NA
2202 3/3 /NA
2203 * I/I /NA
2204 * i/i /NA
2205 * i/i /NA
2206 3/3 /NA
2207 3/3 /NA
2208 3/3 /NA
2209 3/3 /NA
2210 3/3 /NA
2211 3/3 /NA
2212 * I/I /NA
2213 3/3 /NA
2300 * i/i /NA
2301 3/3 /NA
2302 3/3 /NA
2303 * I/i /NA
2304 * 1/1 /NA
2305 * i/i /NA
2306 * I/i /NA
P P P
PNP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PP P
PPP
ITEM NAME
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SLIDE
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SLIDE
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SLIDE
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-STOP
EVA SLIDEWIRE-END FITTINGS
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASMBLY-COTTR PIN
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-QD PIN
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-QD PIN
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SUPPORT
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ERCM TETHER - SMALL HOOK
ERCM TETHER - SMALL HOOK
ERCM TETHER - sMALL HOOK
ERCM TETHER - CABLE
ERCM TETHER-CABLE ATTACH PTS.
ERCM TETHER - REEL CASE
ERCM TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASM.
ERCM TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASM.
ERCM TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASM.
ERCM TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASM.
ERCM TETHER-LOCK/UNLOCK SEL SW
ERCM TETHER-LOCK/UNLOCK SEL SW
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-"D" RING
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-"D" RING
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX WEBBING
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX WEBBING
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX WEBBING
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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EVA TOOLS ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
MDAC-ID
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
3100 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3101 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3102 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3103 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3104 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3105 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3106 * 3/IR /NA P F P
3107 * 3/IR /NA P F P
3108 3/3 /NA
3109 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3110 3/3 /NA
3111 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3112 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3113 3/3 /NA
3200 3/3 /NA
3201 3/3 /NA
3202 3/IR /NA P P P
3203 * 1/1 /NA
3204 * i/I /NA
3205 3/3 /NA
3206 * 1/1 /NA
3207 3/3 /NA
3208 3/3 /NA
3300 * i/i /NA
3301 * i/i /NA
3302 * i/I /NA
3303 * 1/1 /NA
3304 * i/i /NA
3305 3/3 /NA
3306 * I/i /NA
3307 * i/i /NA
3308 * 1/1 /NA
3400 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3401 * 2/1R /NA P P P
3402 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3403 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3404 * 2/1R /NA P P P
3405 * 2/1R /NA P P P
3406 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3407 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3408 3/3 /NA
3409 * 2/1R /NA P P P
3410 3/3 /NA
ITEM NAME
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING WHEEL
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING WHEEL
TUBE CUTTER CUTNG. WHEEL SLIDE
TUBE CUTTER RATCHET WHEEL
TUBE CUTTER SMALL RATCHET ASMB
TUBE CUTTER SMALL RATCHET ASMB
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
TUBE CUTTER SPRING-ASTD. ROLLER
TUBE CUTTER ROLLER LINK
TUBE CUTTER IDLER ROLLER
TUBE CUTTER LRG RATCHET HANDLE
TUBE CUTTER SML RATCHET HANDLE
TUBE CUTTER SOFT-TIP SET SCREW
CNTRLN LATCH BYPASS TOOL REL
CNTRLN LATCH BYPASS TOOL LATCH
CNTRLN LATCH BYPASS TOOL LATCH
CNTRLN LATCH BYPASS TOOL LATCH
CNTRLN LATCH BYPASS TOOL WHEEL
CNTRLN LATCH BYPASS REL TRIGGER
CNTRLN LATCH BYPASS RATCHET HND
CNTRLN LATCH BYPASS REL CATCH
CNTRLN LATCH BYPASS REL TAB
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RTCHT HANDL
3-POINT LATCH TOOL HOOK
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RTCHT WHEEL
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RTCHT WHEEL
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RTCHT WHEEL
3-POINT LATCH TOOL ROLLER SHOE
3-POINT LATCH TOOL ROLLER SHOE
3-POINT LATCH TOOL COMPENSATOR
3-POINT LATCH TOOL ROLLER SHOE
EVA WINCH & MOUNT ASMBLY HANDLE
EVA WINCH & MOUNT ASMBLY RTCHT
EVA WINCH & MOUNT ASMBLY RTCHT
EVA WINCH & MNT ASM LRG CON HND
EVA WINCH & MNT ASM LRG CON HND
EVA WINCH & MNT RATCHET HANDI_
EVA WINCH & MNT ASMBLY ROPE
EVA WINCH & MOUNT ASMBLY ROPE
EVA WINCH & MNT ASMBLY TORQ i_T
EVA WINCH & MNT ASM RTCHT WHEEL
EVA WINCH & MNT ASM ROPE ROLLER
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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EVA TOOLS ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
3411 3/3 /NA
3412 3/3 /NA
3413 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3414 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3415 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3416 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
3417 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3500 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3501 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3502 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3503 3/3 /NA
3504 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3505 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3506 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3507 3/3 /NA
3508 3/3 /NA
3509 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3600 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3601 * I/I /NA
3602 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3603 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3604 * i/i /NA
3605 * I/i /NA
3606 * i/i /NA
3607 3/3 /NA
3608 * i/I /NA
3609 3/3 /NA
3610 3/3 /NA
3611 3/2R /NA P P P
3612 * i/i /NA
3613 * i/i /NA
3614 * i/i /NA
3615 * I/i /NA
3616 * I/i /NA
3700 3/2R /NA P P P
3701 3/2R /NA P P P
3702 3/2R /NA P P P
3800 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3801 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3802 3/3 /NA
3803 3/3 /NA
3804 3/3 /NA
3805 * 2/IR /NA P P P
3806 3/3 /NA
3807 * 2/IR /NA P P P
ITEM NAME
EVA WINCH & MNT ASM ROPE ROLLER
EVA WINCH & MNT ASM HANDLE
EVA WINCH & MNT ASM MNTG PLATE
EVA WINCH & MNT ASM GEARS
EVA WINCH & MTG ASM GEARS
EVA WINCH & MNT ASM PIP PIN
EVA WINCH & MNT ASM ROPE SPOOL
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASM ROPE
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASM ROPE
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASM HOOK
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASM HOOK LTC
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASM ROPE CAM
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASM ROPE CAM
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASM ROPE PLT
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASM ROPE RLLR
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASM ROPE RLLR
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASM ROPE SPL
PRD ASM RATCHET HANDLE
PRD ASM HOOK
PRD ASM HOOK LATCH
PRD ASM HOOK LATCH
PRD ASM RATCHET GEAR
PRD ASM RATCHET GEAR
PRD ASM KEVLAR WEB STRAP
PRD ASM REACTION HANDLE
PRD ASM RATCHET SHAFT PIN
PRD ASM WEB ROLLER
PRD ASM WEB ROLLER
PRD ASM SPRING STORAGE REEL
PRD ASM RATCHET LATCH
PRD ASM RATCHET LATCH
PRD ASM RATCHET ASM RELEASE
PRD ASM RATCHET ASM RELEASE
PRD ASM HOOK/WEB CONNECT PIN
EVA CABLE CUTTER
EVA CABLE CUTTER
EVA CABLE CUTTER
SNATCH BLOCK ASM HOOK LATCH
SNATCH BLOCK ASM HOOK SWIVEL
SNATCH BLOCK ASM R SPRG PLUNGER
SNATCH BLOCK ASM L SPRG PLUNGER
SNATCH BLOCK ASM PULL WIRE END
SNATCH BLOCK ASM HOOK LATCH BLK
SNATCH BLOCK ASM PULLEY WHEEL
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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MDAC-I D
IVA TOOLS ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
4100 3/3 /NA
4101 3/3 /NA
4200 * 2/IR /NA P P P
4300 3/IR /NA P P P
4301 3/IR /NA P P P
4302 3/3 /NA
4303 3/3 /NA
4304 3/3 /NA
4305 3/3 /NA
4306 3/IR /NA P P P
4307 3/IR /NA P P P
4308 3/3 /NA
4309 3/IR /NA P P P
4310 3/IR /NA P P P
4311 3/3 /NA
4312 3/IR /NA P P P
4313 3/IR /NA P P P
4314 3/3 /NA
4315 3/IR /NA P P P
4316 3/IR /NA P P P
4317 3/3 /NA
ITEM NAME
TURNBUCKLE
TURNBUCKLE
LOCKER REMOVAL TOOL
IFM BRKT BOX INPUT POWER CONN
IFM BRKT BOX INPUT POWER CONN
IFM BRKT BOX AUX ON/OFF SW
IFM BRKT BOX AUX ON/OFF SW
IFM BRKT BOX OUTPUT POWER CONN
IFM BRKT BOX OUTPUT POWER CONN
IFM BREAKOUT BOX FUSE
IFM BREAKOUT BOX FUSE HOLDER
IFM BRKT BOX AWG OUTPUT SEL SW
IFM BRKT BOX AWG OUTPUT SEL SW
IFM BRKT BOX PIN CONN OUTLET
IFM BRKT BOX PIN/WIRE HLDG BRAK
IFM BRKT BOX VAR VOLT POWER SUP
IFM BRKT BOX VAR VOLT PWR
IFM BRKT BOX 28 V/VAR SWITCH
IFM BRKT BOX 28 V/VAR SWITCH
IFM BRKT BOX AWG OUTPUT SEL SW
IFM BRKT BOX AWG OUTPUT SEL SW
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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MDAC-ID
FOOD ASSEMBLIES ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
m--mm----m
5101 3/3 /NA
5102 3/3 /NA
5103 3/3 /NA
5104 3/3 /NA
5105 3/3 /NA
5106 3/3 /NA
5107 3/3 /NA
5108 3/3 /NA
5109 3/3 /NA
5110 3/2R /NA
5111 3/3 /NA
5112 3/3 /NA
5113 3/3 /NA
5114 3/3 /NA
5115 3/3 /NA
5116 3/3 /NA
5117 3/3 /NA
5118 3/3 /NA
5119 3/3 /NA
5120 3/3 /NA
5121 3/3 /NA
5122 3/3 o/NA
5123 3/3 /NA
5124 3/3 /NA
5125 3/3 /NA
5126 3/3 /NA
5127 3/3 /NA
5128 3/3 /NA
5129 3/3 /NA
5130 3/3 /NA
5131 3/3 3/3
5132 3/3 /NA
5133 3/3 /NA
5134 3/3 /NA
5135 3/3 /NA
5136 3/3 /NA
5137 3/3 /NA
5138 3/3 /NA
5139 3/3 /NA
5140 3/3 /NA
5141 3/3 /NA
5142 3/3 /NA
PPP
ITEM NAME
GALLEY WATER HEATER CB
GALLEY DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
GALLEY DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
GALLEY DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
POTABLE WATER HEATER TELEMETRY
RECIRCULATION PUMP
RECIRCULATION PUMP
RECIRCULATION THERMOSTAT
RECIRCULATION THERMOSTAT
HOT WATER TANK
WATER TANK HEATERS
WATER TANK HEATERS
WATER TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT
WATER TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT
HOT WATER TEMPERATURE GAUGE
GALLEY OVEN CIRCUIT BREAKER
GALLEY DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
GALLEY DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
GALLEY DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
FOOD OVEN TELEMETRY
GALLEY FAN CIRCUIT BREAKERS
GALLEY OVEN FAN SWITCH
GALLEY OVEN FAN SWITCH
OVEN FAN - MOTOR
OVEN FAN - MOTOR
OVEN FAN - MOTOR
OVEN FAN
OVEN THERMOSTAT
OVEN THERMOSTAT
OVEN HEATER
OVEN DOOR LNCH/ENTRY RESTRAINT
OVEN DOOR
OVEN DOOR
OVEN DOOR LATCH
OVEN DOOR LATCH
OVEN DOOR TRACK
OVEN DOOR TRACK
OVEN GASKET
OVEN SHELF ASM - UPPER RA
LOWER SHELF ASSEMBLY
LOWER TRACKS
OVEN SCREEN
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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MDAC- I D
5143
5144
5145
5146
5147
5148
5149
5150
5151
5152
5153
5154
5155
5156
5157
5158
5159
5160
5161
5162
5163
5164
5165
5166
5167
5168
5169
5170
5171
5172
5173
5174
5175
5176
5177
5178
5179
5180
5181
5300
5301
5302
FOODASSEMBLIES ANALYSIS WORKSHEETSUMMARY
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
H/F
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/3
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
REDUNDANCY
ABORT SCREENS
H/F A S C
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
/NA
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
/NA P P P
ITEM NAME
OVEN SCREEN
SPRING LOADED PLATE
OVEN SPRING CLIP
OVEN FINNED PLATE HEAT SINK
GALLEY CONTROL ELECTRONICS
WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
REHYDRATION PUMP
REHYDRATION PIMP
RHS LEVER ARM CONTROL
RHS LEVER ARM CONTROL
REHYDRATION STATION SWITCH
REHYDRATION STATION SWITCH
COLD WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SW
COLD WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SW
COLD WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
COLD WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
RHS CHILLED H20 FEED SOLENOID
RHS CHILLED H20 FEED SOLENOID
RHS OUTLET SOLENOID VALVE
RHS OUTLET SOLENOID VALVE
RHS BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE
RHS BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE
HOT WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SW
HOT WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SW
HOT WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
HOT WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
COLD H20 RECIRCULATION SOLENOID
COLD H20 RECIRCULATION SOLENOID
RHS NEEDLE
RHS CUP RETAINER
RHS CUP RETAINER PARALLEL RODS
RHS CUP RETAINER PARALLEL RODS
RHS "TRANSPARENT CHAMBER"
INLET WATER CONNECTIONS
INLET WATER CONNECTIONS
MANUAL SHUT OFF VALVE
AUXILIARY PORT - POTABLE WATER
OWDA QD
OWDA QD
OWDAAM
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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MDAC-ID
5303
5304
5305
5306
5307
5308
5309
5310
5311
5312
5313
5314
5315
5316
5317
5318
5319
5320
5321
5322
5400
5401
5402
FOOD ASSEMBLIES ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA P P P
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/2R /NA P P P
3/3 /NA
OWDA AMB/CHILL/OFF VLV
OWDAAMB/CHILL/OFF VLV
OWDA PRES REGU.
OWDA PRES REGU.
OWDA BYPASS VALVE
OWDA BYPASS VALVE
OWDA SOLEN VLV
OWDA SOLEN VLV
OWDA ROTARY SEL SW
OWDA REHYDR. NEEDLE
OWDA MICRO. CK. VLV.
OWDA MICRO. CK. VLV.
OWDA MICRO. CK. VLV.
OWDA PERS HYG VLV
OWDA PERS HYG VLV
OWDA PERS HYG VLV
OWDA HDLG CLPS
OWDA POWER CON
OWDA FLEX LINE
OWDA FLEX LINE
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-II
MDAC-I D
6100
6101
6102
6103
6104
6105
6106
6107
6108
6109
6110
6111
6112
6113
6114
6200
6201
6300
6301
6302
6303
6400
6401
6402
6403
6404
6405
6406
6407
6408
6500
6501
6502
6503
6504
6505
6506
6507
6508
6509
6510
6511
ORBITER HARDWARE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/3
3/3
3/1R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3 'IR
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
3/IR
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
3/IR
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
SLEEPING BAG-ADJUSTABLE STRAP
SLEEPING BAG-HELICAL SPRING
SLEEPING BAG-CLOTH TUNNEL
SLEEPING BAG-SPRING CLIP
SLEEPING BAG-SPRING CLIP
SLEEPING BAG-PIP PIN
SLEEPING BAG-MOUNTING LOCATION
SLPG. BAG RSTRNTS. BUCKLE FLAP
ATTACHMENT ZIPPER(S)
CLOSURE ZIPPER
BODY RESTRAINTS
4-TIER SLEEP STATION SLDG DOOR
4-TIER SLEEP STATION WING NUT
4-TIER SLEEP STATION AIR DIFF.
4-TIER SLEEP STATION LIGHT
ORB. SIDE HATCH SAFETY LOCK
ORB. SIDE HATCH SAFETY LOCK
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
COAS INTENSITY CONTROL
COAS INTENSITY CONTROL
COAS LIGHT BULB
COAS MOUNTING BASE
COAS FORWARD ADAPTER BRACKET
COAS FORWARD ADAPTER BRACKET
COAS AFT ADAPTER BRACKET
COAS FORWARD MOUNTING BRACKET
COAS APERTURE STOP
COAS APERTURE STOP
COAS COMBINER LENS ASMBLY.
COAS BARREL LOCK
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-12
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6/Ol/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
Ii00
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SCISSORS - SPRING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) EVA SCISSORS
3 ) SPRING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AIRLOCK
10159-20001-02
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SPRING BREAKS. ONE PAIR OF SCISSORS FLOWN FOR EACH PRIME EMU.
SCISSORS CAN STILL FUNCTION WITH BROKEN SPRING. OTHER REDUNDANT
EVA/IVA HARDWARE ITEMS AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPLISH SAME TASK.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, EVA PREP/POST 2102 TRAINING BOOK
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/Ol/B7
CREW EQUIPMENT
ii01
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SCISSORS - BLADE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_JNC
3/2R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA SCISSORS
3) BLADE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AIRLOCK
PART NUMBER: 10159-20001-02
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADE BREAKS. ONE PAIR OF SCISSORS FLOWN FOR EACH PRIME EMU.
OTHER EVA/IVA REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPLISH
THE SAME TASK.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, EVA PREP/POST 2102 TRAINING BOOK
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SCISSORS - BLADES
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA SCISSORS
3) BLADES
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AIRLOCK
i0159-20001-02
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADES HAVE TROUBLE CLOSING. ONE PAIR OF SCISSORS FLOWN FOR EACH
PRIME EMU. OTHER EVA/IVA REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS AVAILABLE TO
ACCOMPLISH THE SAME TASK.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, EVA PREP/POST 2102 TRAINING BOOK
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SCISSORS LOCKING BAR
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA SCISSORS
3) LOCKING BAR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AIRLOCK
10159-20001-02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCKING BAR BREAKS. ONE PAIR OF SCISSORS FLOWN FOR EACH PRIME
EMU. WORST CASE: EVA SCISSORS CANNOT BE STOWED AFTER USE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, EVA PREP/POST 2102 TRAINING BOOK
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SCISSORS HINGE PIN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA SCISSORS
3) HINGE PINS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AIRLOCK
PART NUMBER: 10159-20001-02
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HINGE PIN JOINING BLADES BREAKS. ONE PAIR OF SCISSORS FLOWN FOR
EACH EMU. OTHER EVA/IVA REDUNDANT HARDWARE ITEMS AVAILABLE TO
ACCOMPLISH SAME TASK.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, EVA PREP/POST 2102 TRAINING BOOK
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
1200 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQUENCING CIRCUIT BATTERY
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) SEQUENCER CIRCUIT
BATTERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
BATTERY FOR 10161-60029
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SEQUENCER CIRCUIT FOR THE EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY IS POWERED BY
ITS OWN WATCH SIZE BATTERY. FAILURE OF THIS BATTERY CAUSES A
FAILURE OF THE SEQUENCER CIRCUIT AND HENCE A FAILURE OF THE LIGHT
ASSEMBLY ON THE AFFECTED SIDE. THE CREWMEMBER WILL STILL HAVE
THE LIGHTS ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE ASSEMBLY.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061, 10161-60029
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
1201 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQUENCING CIRCUIT THERMOSTAT
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3 ) SEQUENCER CIRCUIT
4 ) THERMOSTAT
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
THERMOSTAT FOR 10161-60029
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SEQUENCING CIRCUIT CONTROLS THE LIGHT SELECTION FOR THE EMU
LIGHT ASSEMBLY. THE THERMOSTAT PROTECTS AGAINST CASES WHERE TWO
LIGHTS ARE LEFT ON FOR PERIODS OF TIME LONGER THAN THE DESIGN
LIMITS. THE LIGHTS CAN STILL BE TURNED OFF BY THE SWITCH.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061, 10161-60029
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
1202 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQUENCING CIRCUIT THERMOSTAT
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) SEQUENCER CIRCUIT
4) THERMOSTAT
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: THERMOSTAT FOR 10161-60029
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE THERMOSTAT IN AN OPEN CONFIGURATION MEANS THE
SEQUENCING CIRCUIT WILL NO LONGER OPERATE. THE LIGHTS ON THE
UNAFFECTED SIDE OF THE ASSEMBLY WILL STILL BE AVAILABLE TO THE
EVA CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061, 10161-60029
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
1203 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQUENCING CIRCUIT SWITCH
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) SEQUENCER CIRCUIT
4 ) SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SWITCH FOR 10161-60029
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SEQUENCING CIRCUIT SWITCH ALLOWS THE EVA CREWMEMBER TO SELECT
WHICH LIGHTS ARE LIT ON EACH SIDE OF THE HELMET. FAILURE OF THE
SWITCH MEANS THAT INCORRECT LIGHTS ARE LIT OR THAT NO LIGHTS ARE
LIT. THE OPPOSITE SIDE LIGHTS WILL STILL BE AVAILABLE TO
THE EVA CREW-MEMBER.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061, 10161-60029
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/15/sv
CREW EQUIPMENT
1204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - SEQUENCING CIRCUIT
FAILS TO OPERATE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) SEQUENCER CIRCUIT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA: °
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10161-60029
] B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TOTAL FAILURE OF THE SEQUENCER CIRCUIT MEANS THE EMU LIGHTS ON
ONE SIDE OF THE HELMET ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO THE EVA
CREWMEMBER. THE LIGHTS ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE ARE STILL AVAILABLE
AS ARE ALTERNATE SOURCES OF LIGHTING. IF THE SWITCH FAILS SUCH
BOTH LIGHTS ARE ON, THEN THE THERMOSTAT WILL PROTECT AGAINST
POSSIBLE THERMAL OVERLOAD.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061, 10161-60029
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - BULB
BURNS OUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3 ) BULB
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
BULBS FOR 10161-10061
CAUSES: OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF ONE EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY BULB STILL LEAVES THREE BULBS
ON THE ASSEMBLY AS OPERATIONAL, AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF
LIGHTING.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-23
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/lS187
CREW EQUIPMENT
1206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-GIMBAL
PHYSICAL BINDING
HDW/F[_C
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) GIMBAL
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10161-20033
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE GIMBAL ASSEMBLY MEANS THAT THE EMU LIGHTS ON ONE
SIDE OF THE HELMET WILL BE FROZEN IN ONE CONFIGURATION. THE
LIGHTS ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE HELMET WILL STILL BE
POSITIONABLE.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061, 10161-20033
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
711s187
CREW EQUIPMENT
1207
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-GIMBAL
ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) GIMBAL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10161-20033
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE GIMBAL IN A "FREE" POSITION MEANS THAT THE EMU
LIGHTS ON THE AFFECTED SIDE OF THE HELMET CANNOT BE POSITIONED AS
DESIRED. THE LIGHTS ON THE AFFECTED SIDE CAN STILL BE
POSITIONED.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061, 10161-20033
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/lS/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1208
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-GIMBAL
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/_3NC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) GIMBAL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10161-20033
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE GIMBAL MEANS THAT PART OF THE EMU
LIGHT ASSEMBLY (THE PART WITH THE BULBS) WILL NO LONGER BE
ATTACHED TO THE REST OF ASSEMBLY. THE FAILURE COULD EXPOSE WIRES
THAT NORMALLY RUN FROM THE BULBS TO THE BATTERY. THE
COMPLETE ASSEMBLY WOULD BE UNUSABLE AFTER SUCH A FAILURE.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061, 10161-20033
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
711s187
CREW EQUIPMENT
1209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-HELMET LATCH
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3 ) HELMET LATCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10161-10061
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE HELMET LATCH TO CLOSE MEANS THE EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
CANNOT BE ATTACHED TO THE HELMET. THE FLIGHT SPECIFIC
GROUNDRULES STATE THAT THE EMU LIGHTS ARE NOT MANDATORY EVA
ITEMS.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-27
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
711s18 
CREW EQUIPMENT
1210
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
313
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-HELMET LATCH
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3 ) HELMET LATCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
10161-10061
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE HELMET LATCH TO OPEN MEANS THE EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
CANNOT BE RELEASED FROM THE HELMET. CURRENT RULES CALL FOR THE
LIGHTS TO BE REMOVED DURING ENTRY FOR CRASH LOAD RESTRICTIONS.
THERE IS NO AFFECT ON CREW SAFETY OR MISSION DURATION.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-28
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/lS/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-CROSS MEMBER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) CROSS MEMBER
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10161-10061
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY CROSS MEMBER MEANS
THE LIGHT ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE ATTACHED TO THE HELMET. ALTERNATE
SOURCES OF LIGHTING ARE STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/is/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY-BATTERY
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3 ) BATTERY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10161-20001
] B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL DISCHARGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY BATTERY FAILS, THEN POWER WILL NO
LONGER BE AVAILABLE TO THE LIGHTS ON ONE SIDE OF THE ASSEMBLY.
SPARE BATTERIES ARE CARRIED ON BOARD AND THE FAILED BATTERY CAN
BE CHANGED AT THE END OF THE EVA.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061, 10161-20001
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-30
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/is/By
CREW EQUIPMENT
1213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY BATTERY-INTERNAL FUSE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3 ) BATTERY
4 ) INTERNAL FUSE
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
I0161-20001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE INTERNAL FUSE IN THE BATTERY OPENS, THEN THE BATTERY WILL
NO LONGER BE OPERATIONAL AND THE LIGHTS ON THE AFFECTED SIDE WILL
FAIL OFF. SPARE BATTERIES ARE CARRIED ON BOARD AND THE FAILED
BATTERY WILL BE CHANGED AT THE COMPLETION OF THE EVA.
REFERENCES: 10161-I0061, 10161-20001
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
711518v
CREW EQUIPMENT
1214
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY - BATTERY CONTACTS
ERRATIC OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EMU LIGHT ASSEMBLY
3) BATTERY CONTACTS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10161-10061
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC OPERATION FROM THE BATTERY CONTACTS MEAN THE EMU LIGHTS
MAY BE FLICKERING ON/OFF. WORST CASE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT
CONTAMINATION SUCH THAT THE LIGHTS FAIL COMPLETELY OFF.
REFERENCES: 10161-10061, 10161-20001
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-32
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/17/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1300
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:,
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
TBD
CAUSES: ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FROM THE OBS SIGNAL CONDITIONER MEANS THAT
INCORRECT DATA WILL BE RECEIVED AND RECORDED. A SECOND OBS IS
FLOWN IN THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL LOCKER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-33
J
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7117187
CREW EQUIPMENT
1301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - BATTERY
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
BATTERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, ELECTRICAL DISCHARGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE BATTERY OF THE OBS SIGNAL CONDITIONER FAILS, THE SIGNAL
CONDITIONER AND HENCE THE OBS WILL NO LONGER BE OPERATIONAL.
SPARE BATTERIES AND A SECOND OBS ARE FLOWN.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/17/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1302
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - ON/OFF SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
ON/OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ON/OFF SWITCH IS BUILT INTO THE OBS AND IS AUTOMATICALLY
ACTIVATED WHEN THE IVA BIOMED CABLE IS ATTACHED. A FAILURE SUCH
THAT THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION MEANS THE IVA CABLE
CANNOT BE ATTACHED. A FAILURE OF THE SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION
MEANS THE SIGNAL CONDITIONER IS NO LONGER OPERATIONAL AND SHOULD
BE EXCHANGED FOR THE SPARE SIGNAL CONDITIONER OR THE SPARE OBS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1303
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - GAIN
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
VARIABLE GAIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VARIABLE GAIN FUNCTION IS PRE-SET BEFORE LAUNCH. AN EXTERNAL
FORCE WHICH CAUSES THE GAIN TO BE CHANGED WILL RESULT IN
INCORRECT LEVELS BEING REFLECTED IN THE OUTPUT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1304
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - INPUT PORT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
INPUT PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE INPUT PORT OF THE SIGNAL CONDITIONER IS THE CONNECTION POINT
FOR THE ELECTRODE HARNESS. A DESTRUCTION OF ONE OR MORE PINS OR
A DISRUPTION OF THE PIN CONFIGURATION WOULD PREVENT THE HARNESS
FROM BEING CONNECTED TO THE SIGNAL CONDITIONER AND HENCE THE
OBS FROM SERVICING ITS FUNCTION. A SECOND OBS IS CARRIED IN THE
MEDICAL LOCKER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-37
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEMz
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1305
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - OUTPUT PORT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
3) SIGNAL CONDITIONER
4) OUTPUT PORT
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OUTPUT PORT OF THE OBS SIGNAL CONDITIONER IS THE CONNECTION
POINT FOR EITHER THE IVA OR EVA BIOMED CABLES. A DESTRUCTION OF
ONE OR MORE PINS OR A DISRUPTION OF THE PIN CONFIGURATION MEANS
THE BIOMED CABLES CANNOT BE ATTACHED AND THE OBS CANNOT
PERFORM ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION. A SECOND OBS IS CARRIED IN THE
MEDICAL LOCKER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-38
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v12OlSV
CREW EQUIPMENT
1306
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - SIGNAL CONDITIONER - ESP
ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
ELECTRO SHOCK PROTECTION SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ELECTRO SHOCK PROTECTION CIRCUIT IS A PART OF THE OBS SIGNAL
CONDITIONER CIRCUITRY. FAILURE OF THE CIRCUIT WILL MEAN A
FAILURE OF THE SIGNAL CONDITIONER AND HENCE A FAILURE OF THE OBS.
A SECOND OBS IS CARRIED IN THE MEDICAL LOCKER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1307
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - BIOMED BELT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
BIOMED BELT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE BIOMED BELT WILL HAVE NO AFFECT ON FUTURE
OPERATIONS. ALTERNATE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE OR CREW INGENUITY
CAN COMPENSATE FOR THE FAILED BIOMED BELT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-40
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1308
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - ELECTRODE HARNESS WIRES
BROKEN WIRE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
ELECTRODE HARNESS
WIRES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE WITHIN THE ELECTRODE HARNESS WIRING MEANS THE OBS WILL
NO LONGER BE CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION. A
SECOND OBS IS CARRIED IN THE MEDICAL LOCKER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1309
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - ELECTRODES
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
ELECTRODE HARNESS
ELECTRODES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAIL[_E
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE ELECTRODES, EITHER FROM THE WIRE CONNECTION
POINT, OR AT THE ATTACH MECHANISM WILL MEAN A COMPLETE FAILURE OF
THE OBS. A SECOND OBS IS CARRIED IN THE MEDICAL LOCKER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1310
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - ELECTRODE HARNESS
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
ELECTRODE HARNESS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE WITHIN THE ELECTRODE HARNESS WHICH CAUSES A LOSS OF
OUTPUT WILL MEAN THE OBS IS NO LONGER OPERATIONAL. A SECOND OBS
IS CARRIED IN THE MEDICAL LOCKER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-43
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1311
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - ELECTRODE HARNESS - PIN CONNECTOR/PINS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
ELECTRODE HARNESS
PIN CONNECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ELECTRODE HARNESS PIN CONNECTOR IS THE MEANS BY WHICH THE
HARNESS IS CONNECTED TO THE OBS SIGNAL CONDITIONER. A
DESTRUCTION OF THE PINS OR A DISTORTION OF THE PIN CONFIGURATION
MEANS THE SIGNAL WILL NOT GET TO THE SIGNAL CONDITONER AND THE
OBS IS NOT OPERATIONAL. A SECOND OBS IS CARRIED IN THE MEDICAL
LOCKER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-44
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1312
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAII//REMODE:
OBS - EVA BIOMED CABLE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
EVA BIOMED CABLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE EVA BIOMED CABLE MEANS THE OBS WILL BE NON-
OPERATIONAL. DURING EVA, THE OBS IS DETERMINED TO BE A NON-
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT AND THEREFORE, LOSS OF THE EVA BIOMED CABLE
WILL NOT MEAN THE TERMINATION OF A MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SED42100961
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7120187
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1313
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FI/NC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: OBS - EVA BIOMED CABLE - PINS/PIN CONNECTOR
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
EVA BIOMED CABLE
PINS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A DESTRUCTION OF THE PINS OR A DISTORTION OF THE PIN
CONFIGURATION AT EITHER END OF THE EVA BIOMED CABLE MEANS THE
CABLE WILL NOT WORK. THE OBS IS NOT A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT
DURING EVA OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SED42100961
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1314
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - IVA BIOMED CABLE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
IVA BIOMED CABLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW "COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE IVA BIOMED CABLE MEANS THE SIGNAL WILL NO LONGER
GET FROM THE SIGNAL CONDITIONER TO THE ORBITER BIOMED CABLE. A
SECOND OBS AND IVA BIOMED CABLE ARE CARRIED IN THE MEDICAL
LOCKER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1315
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OBS - IVA BIOMED CABLE - PINS/PIN CONNECTOR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
IVA BIOMED CABLE
PINS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A DESTRUCTION OF THE PINS OR A DISTORTION OF THE PIN
CONFIGURATION AT EITHER END OF THE IVA BIOMED CABLE MEANS THE
CABLE WILL NO LONGER WORK. A SECOND OBS AND IVA BIOMED CABLE ARE
CARRIED IN THE MEDICAL LOCKER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1316
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BIOMED CHANNEL SWITCH
MECHANICALLY JAMS IN ONE POSITON
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
BIOMED CHANNEL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /N A
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI0
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A MECHANICAL JAM OF ONE OF THE BIOMED CHANNEL SWITCHES IN A
SINGLE POSITION MEANS THAT THE OBS IS ONLY OPERATIONAL WHEN IT IS
HOOKED TO THAT POSITION. THERE IS A SECOND BIOMED CHANNEL SWITCH
WHICH IS AVAILABLE FOR SELECTING THE REMAINING OBS INTERFACE
LOCATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1317
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BIOMED CHANNEL SWITCH
ONE POSITION PERMANENTLY SELECTED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
BIOMED CHANNEL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTAMINATION CAUSES ONE POSITION ON THE BIOMED CHANNEL SWITCH TO
BE PERMANENTLY SELECTED. THIS CAUSES NO PERCEIVABLE PROBLEM
SINCE THE SELECTION OF ONE POSITION DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF
THE REMAINING SWITCH POSITIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/2o/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1318
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BIOMED PANEL CABLE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
BIOMED PANEL CABLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI0
CAUSES:
FIELDS
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ELECTROMAGNETIC
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE BIOMED PANEL CABLE GOES BETWEEN THE IVA BIOMED CABLE AND THE
BIOMED INTERFACE PANELS. A LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM THIS CABLE MEANS
THE OBS WILL BE CONSIDERED NON-OPERATIONAL. ADDITIONAL PANEL
CABLES ARE AVAILABLE FOR USE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1319
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BIOMED PANEL CABLE - PINS/PIN CONNECTOR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
BIOMED PANEL CABLE
PINS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI0
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A DESTRUCTION OF THE PINS OR A DISTORTION OF THE PIN
CONFIGURATION AT EITHER END OF THE BIOMED PANEL CABLE MEANS THE
CABLE WILL BE NO LONGER OPERATIONAL. SPARE CABLES ARE CARRIED
ONBOARD.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-52
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
1320
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BIOMED PANEL CABLE - SHUTTLE INTERFACES
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
BIOMED PANEL CABLE
SHUTTLE INTERFACES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS AI5, All, M062M
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SHUTTLE INTERFACES PROVIDE THE PLACES WHERE THE BIOMED PANEL
CABLE IS PLUGGED INTO. FAILURE OF THESE INTERFACES MEANS THE OBS
DATA WILL NOT REACH THE DOWNLINK. THIS, IN TURN, MEANS THE OBS
MUST BE CONSIDERED NON-OPERATIONAL. MORE THAN ONE "PLUG-IN" SLOT
IS AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1400
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/}_NC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT PLATFORM ASSEMBLY
ADJUSTMENT KNOB
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
PLATFORM ASSEMBLY
ADJUSTMENT KNOB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10159-10034-02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
KNOB FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN DUE TO: I) BROKEN KNOB, 2) STRIPPED
THREADS, OR 3) CONTAMINATED THREADS. IF PLATFORM CANNOT BE
ADJUSTED, THE CREWMEMBER MAY EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTY IN PERFORMING
EVA TASK, WHICH COULD ULTIMATELY MEAN AN OMITTED OR INCOMPLETE
EVA TASK. THE SECOND PFR COULD BE USED AS REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10159-10034
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-54
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1401 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
PLATES
FAILURE MODE:
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT PLATFORM ASSEMBLY LOCKING
LOCKING PLATES SLIP
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
PLATFORM ASSEMBLY
LOCKING PLATES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI-FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10159-10034-02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOCKING PLATES MAY SLIP BECAUSE THE SERRATIONS ARE
CONTAMINATED OR GALLED. FAILURE OF THE LOCKING PLATES TO HOLD
MEANS THAT THE PLATFORM CANNOT BE ADJUSTED. A CREWMEMBER MAY
EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTY IN PERFORMING EVA TASK, WHICH COULD RESULT
IN EVA TASK BEING OMITTED OR NOT COMPLETED. THE SECOND PFR COULD
BE USED AS REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10159-10034
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
1402 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT PLATFORM ASSEMBLY TOE BAR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
PLATFORM ASSEMBLY
TOE BAR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10159-10034-02
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A TOE BAR REDUCES THE CREWMEMBER'S CONSTRAINTS.
CREWMEMBER CAN STILL PERFORM TASKS, BUTNOT AS EFFECTIVELY.
THE
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10159-10034
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-56
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1403 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
LOCK
FAILURE MODE:
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT PLATFORM ASSEMBLY HEEL
FAILS TO HOLD BOOT HEEL
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
PLATFORM ASSEMBLY
HEEL LOCK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10159-10034-02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREWMEMBER MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PERFORM EVA TASK AS EFFICIENTLY.
THE HEEL LOCK MAY BE REPAIRED OR THE SECOND PFR MAY BE USED.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10159-10034
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1404 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
LOCK
FAILURE MODE:
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT PLATFORM ASSEMBLY HEEL
FAILS TO RELEASE BOOT HEEL
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
PLATFORM ASSEMBLY
HEEL LOCK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10159-10034-02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREWMEMBER FREES BOOT FROM PFR PLATFORM EITHER WITH TOOLS OR WITH
HELP FROM OTHER CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10159-10034
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-58
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1410 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
INBOARD CLAMP
FAILURE MODE:
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
INBOARD CLAMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10155-20003-01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
KNOB FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN DUE TO: I) BROKEN KNOB, 2) STRIPPED
THREADS, OR 3) CONTAMINATED THREADS. CREWMEMBER WILL BE UNABLE
TO ATTACH OR REMOVE BOOM ASSEMBLY FROM BULKHEAD HANDRAILS.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20003
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-59
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1411 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
OUTBOARD CLAMP
FAILURE MODE :
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6.)
7)
8)
9)
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
3) TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
OUTBOARD CLAMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10155-20003-01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
KNOB FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN DUE TO: i) BROKEN KNOB, 2) STRIPPED
THREADS, OR 3) CONTAMINATED THREADS. CREWMEMBER WILL BE UNAB_
TO ATTACH OR REMOVE BOOM ASSEMBLY FROM BULKHEAD HANDRAILS.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20003
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1412 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
PLATFORM CLAMP
FAILURE MODE:
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
PLATFORM CLAMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10155-20003-01
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLAMPS FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN DUE TO: I) BROKEN KNOB, 2)
STRIPPED THREADS, OR 3) CONTAMINATED THREADS. THE CLAMP CANNOT
BE MOVED OR SECURED TO THE BOOM ASSEMBLY.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20003
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-61
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1413 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
PLATFORM CLAMP
FAILURE MODE:
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
PLATFORM CLAMP
EYE BOLT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10155-20003-01
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE EYE BOLT ALLOWS THE PLATFORM ASSEMBLY TO SEPARATE
FROM THE BOOM ASSEMBLY. OTHER CLAMPS OR THE OTHER PFR COULD BE
USED AS NEEDED.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20003
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-62
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1414 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
QUICK RELEASE PIN
FAILURE MODE: CANNOT INSERT PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
QUICK RELEASE PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
i0155-20003-01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
QUICK RELEASE PIN CANNOT BE INSERTED TO ATTACH THE PLATFORM
ASSEMBLY AND THE BOOM ASSEMBLY. OTHER CLAMPS OR THE OTHER PFR
COULD BE USED AS NEEDED.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20003
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_NC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1415 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
QUICK RELEASE PIN
FAILURE MODE: CANNOT REMOVE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
3) TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
QUICK RELEASE PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10155-20003-01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
QUICK RELEASE PIN CANNOT BE REMOVED.
DETACHED FROM THE BOOM ASSEMBLY.
PLATFORM ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20003
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1416 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
INNER AND OUTER TUBES
FAILURE MODE: CANNOT EXTEND/RETRACT TUBES
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
INNER AND OUTER TUBES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10155-20003-01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE BOOM DOES NOT TELESCOPE, I.E. THE TUBES DO NOT EXTEND OR
RETRACT, THE PLATFORM CANNOT BE POSITIONED AS REQUIRED. OTHER
CLAMPS OR THE OTHER PFR MAY BE USED.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20003
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-65
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_/NC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1417 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
TORQUE LIMITER
FAILURE MODE:
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
UNDER LIMITS TORQUE
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: I0155-20003-01
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, MISADJUSTMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TORQUE LIMITER PREVENTS THE BOOM ASSEMBLY BEING SECURED IN
PLACE. THE PLATFORM ASSEMBLY WILL NOT REMAIN AS POSITIONED.
OTHER CLAMPS OR THE SECOND PFR ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20003
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-66
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1418 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
TORQUE LIMITER
FAILURE MODE:
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
OVER LIMITS TORQUE
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
TELESCOPING BOOM ASSEMBLY
TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
i0155-20003-01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, MISADJUSTMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TORQUE LIMITER PERMITS EXCESSIVE TORQUE. HANDRAILS OR BULKHEAD
COULD BE DAMAGED. OTHER CLAMPS OR THE SECOND PFR ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20003
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-67
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1420 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT CENTERLINE CLAMP ASSEMBLY
QUICK RELEASE PIN
FAILURE MODE: CANNOT INSERT PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
CENTERLINE CLAMP ASSEMBLY
QUICK RELEASE PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10155-20004-04
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PLATFORM ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE SECURED IN THE CENTERLINE CLAMP.
OTHER CLAMPS OR THE OTHER PFR ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20004
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-68
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1421 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT CENTERLINE CLAMP ASSEMBLY
QUICK RELEASE PIN
FAILURE MODE: CANNOT REMOVE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
CENTERLINE CLAMP ASSEMBLY
QUICK RELEASE PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10155-20004-04
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
QUICK RELEASE PIN CANNOT BE REMOVED.
DETACHED FROM THE CENTERLINE CLAMP.
PLATFORM ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20004
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_JNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
1422 ABORT: /_
ITEM:
ALIGNMENT TABS
FAILURE MODE:
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT CENTERLINE CLAMP ASSEMBLY
MISADJUSTMENT
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
CENTERLINE CLAMP ASSEMBLY
ALIGNMENT TABS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10155-20004-04
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALIGNMENT TABS FAIL TO ALIGN CENTERLINE CLAMP ONTO CENTERLINE
LATCH SUCH THAT CAPTURE JAWS ARE NOT POSITIONED FOR FASTENING.
ALIGNMENT MAY BE PERFORMED VISUALLY.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20004
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1423 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
CAPTURE JAWS
FAILURE MODE:
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT CENTERLINE CLAMP ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
3) CENTERLINE CLAMP ASSEMBLY
CAPTURE JAWS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10155-20004-04
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PLATFORM ASSEMBLY COULD SLIP OR SEPARATE FROM THE CENTERLINE
CLAMP. OTHER CLAMPS AND THE SECOND PFR ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20004
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-71
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
1424 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
CLAMP KNOB
FAILURE MODE :
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT CENTERLINE CLAMP ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
CENTERLINE CLAMP ASSEMBLY
CLAMP KNOB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10155-20004-04
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
KNOB FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN DUE TO: I) BROKEN KNOB, 2) STRIPPED
THREADS, OR 3) CONTAMINATED THREADS. UNABLE TO ATTACH/REMOVE THE
CENTERLINE CLAMP FROM THE CENTERLINE LATCH.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-20004
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-72
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1430
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT ARTICULATING SOCKET
ASSEMBLY ADJUSTMENT KNOB
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
ARTICULATING SOCKET ASSEMBLY
ADJUSTMENT KNOB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10159-10035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
KNOB FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN DUE TO: i) BROKEN KNOB, 2) STRIPPED
THREADS, 3) CONTAMINATED THREADS. THE SOCKET ASSEMBLY NOT
ADJUSTED AND THE PLATFORM ASSEMBLY NOT POSITIONED AS REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-10035
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-73
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 1431
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT ARTICULATING SOCKET
ASSEMBLY LOCKING PLATES
FAILURE MODE: LOCKING PLATES SLIP
SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIRLEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
ARTICULATING SOCKET ASSEMBLY
LOCKING PLATES
CRITICALITIES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /NA
TAL: /NA
AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
B [ P ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10159-10035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SOCKET ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE SECURED IN THE DESIRED POSITION.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-10035
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-74
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT , FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1432 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT ARTICULATING SOCKET
ASSEMBLY QUICK RELEASE PIN
FAILURE MODE: CANNOT INSERT PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PORTABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
ARTICULATING SOCKET ASSEMBLY
QUICK RELEASE PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10159-10035
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PLATFORM ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE ATTACHED TO THE SOCKET ASSEMBLY.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10155-10035
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-75
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7106187
CREW EQUIPMENT
2100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SLIDE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA SLIDEWIRE
3) SLIDE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CARGO BAY
V617-544722
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SLIDE IS THE PART TO WHICH THE EVA TETHER HOOK IS ATTACHED.
IF THE SLIDE PHYSICALLY JAMS IN ONE SPOT THEN THE EVA CREWMAN'S
MOBILITY AROUND THE PAYLOAD BAY IS AFFECTED. THIS WOULD RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF A PLANNED EVA REQUIRING THE USE OF THE
SLIDEWIRE. A CONTINGENCY EVA, SUCH AS CLOSING PAYLOAD DOORS,
WOULD BE PERFORMED USING ALTERNATE MEANS OF TETHER.
REFERENCES: V617-544720, M072-544700
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-76
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SLIDE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA SLIDEWIRE
3) SLIDE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: V617-544702
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE SLIDE WHILE AN EVA CREWMAN IS
TETHERED IN PLACE WILL RESULT IN THE CREWMAN FLOATING FREE.
CREWMAN CAN BE "CAPTURED" USING THE ORBITER/ALTERNATE EVA
CREWMAN.
THE
REFERENCES: V617-544720, M072-544700
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-77
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SLIDE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE-CRIMPED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY
SLIDE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
V617-544702
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A CRIMP IN THE EVA SLIDEWIRE SLIDE WILL RESULT IN THE EVA CREWMAN
NOT BEING ABLE TO USE IT AS A TETHER SPOT. THERE ARE ADDITIONAL
SLIDES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ORBITER WHICH CAN BE USED AS BACKUP.
IF NONE OF THE SLIDES WERE AVAILABLE, THEN ANY PLANNED
EVA WOULD BE CANCELLED. CONTINGENCY EVAS COULD STILL BE
PERFORMED USING ALTERNATE MEANS OF TETHER.
REFERENCES: V617-544720, M072-544700
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
VlO lSV
CREW EQUIPMENT
2103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-STOP
BREAKS FREE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY
STOP
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
2/2 AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
V617-544723
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE ALLOWS THE STOP/SLIDE COMBINATION TO STRIKE THE
SLIDEWIRE END ASSEMBLIES PLUS ALLOW THE SLIDES TO TRAVEL FURTHER
THAN DESIGNED. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT SUFFICIENT FORCE WILL BE
GENERATED TO PULL THE ROPE FROM THE END FITTINGS. HOWEVER, THE
WHIP END COULD BE DAMAGED AND FURTHER EVA ACTIVITIES CURTAILED.
REFERENCES: V617-544720
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-79
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o6187
CREW EQUIPMENT
2104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SLIDEWIRE-END FITTINGS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA SLIDEWIRE
3) END FITTING
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
V617-544721
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-
PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE SLIDEWIRE END FITTING WILL RESULT IN
THE SLIDEWIRE BEING FREE AT ONE END. THE SLIDES, WITH THE EVA
TETHERS ATTACHED, ARE STILL RESTRAINED BY THE STOPS. THEREFORE,
THE FIRST FAILURE SHOULD BE A LOSS OF MISSION. THE LOSS
OF ALL UNLIKE REDUNDANCY INCLUDING THE STOPS CAN RESULT IN AN
UNRESTRAINED EVA CREWMAN.
REFERENCES: V617-544720, M072-544700
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-80
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-COTTER PIN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA SLIDEWIRE
3) COTTER PIN
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: MS24665-153
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE COTTER PIN, IN ADDITION TO THE CHEMICAL ADHESIVE, ANCHORS THE
KEVLAR ROPE ON THE END FITTING. A FAILURE OF THE COTTER PIN
REMOVES ONE LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY IN THE ANCHORING SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: M072-544700
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-81
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY - QUICK DISCONNECT PIN
COMES OUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA SLIDEWIRE
SUPPORT STRUCTURE ASSEMBLY
QUICK DISCONNECT PIN
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS : /NA
/ NA TAL: / NA
3/1R AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
ME122-0014-5098
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF THE QUICK DISCONNECT PIN IN THE EVA SLIDEWIRE MEANS
UNEXPECTED AND UNANTICIPATED LOADING ON THE REMAINDER OF THE
SUPPORT STRUCTURE DURING AN EVA. WORST CASE WOULD RESULT IN THE
SUPPORT STRUCTURE CONTACTING THE RADIATOR AND POSSIBLE
DEFORMATION OF THE PAYLOAD BAY DOOR.
REFERENCES: M072-544700
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-82
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY - QUICK DISCONNECT PIN
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA SLIDEWIRE
SUPPORT STRUCTURE ASSEMBLY
QUICK DISCONNECT PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
ME122-0014-5098
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE QUICK DISCONNECT PIN APPEARS TO BE USED WHEN THE MECHANISM
"JAMS" AND A RELEASE MECHANISM IS REQUIRED. FAILURE OF THE PIN
TO RELEASE MEANS THE JAM CANNOT BE CLEARED. THIS PREVENTS THE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR FROM CLOSING. THE PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY
REMOVING A BOLT FROM ANOTHER LOCATION IN THE SUPPORT STRUCTURE OR
USING THE HACKSAW.
REFERENCES: M072-544700
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-83
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY-SUPPORT STRUCTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/_INC
2/IR
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA SLIDEWIRE
3) SUPPORT STRUCTURE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: VARIOUS PIECES INCLUDING V617-544701; V617-544702;
V617-544704; V617-544705
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF ANY PIECE OF THE SLIDEWIRE SUPPORT STRUCTURE MEANS A
LOSS OF EVA CAPABILITY ON THE AFFECTED SIDE OF THE PAYLOAD. IT
ALSO OPENS THE POSSIBILITY FOR THE DAMAGED STRUCTURE TO CONTACT
THE RADIATOR AND/OR CAUSE DEFORMATION OF THE PAYLOAD BAY DOOR.
REFERENCES : M072-544700
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-84
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o6/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA SLIDEWIRE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA SLIDEWIRE ASSEMBLY
SLIDEWIRE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: V617-544720
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-
PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE SLIDEWIRE BREAKS WHILE IN USE, THE EVA CREWMAN WILL NO
LONGER BE RESTRAINED. THIS WILL REQUIRE ORBITER MANEUVERS TO
"CAPTURE" AND RETRIEVE THE CREWMAN.
REFERENCES: M072-544700
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-85
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: i/i
2200 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-SMALL HOOK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) ERCM TETHER
3 ) SMALL HOOK
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
ST201-II009
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE SMALL HOOK WILL RESULT IN AN
UNRESTRAINED EVA CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
2201 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-SMALL HOOK
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) ERCM SAFETY TETHER
3) SMALL HOOK
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
ST201-II009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE TETHER HOOK MEANS THAT THE ERCM SAFETY TETHER
CANNOT BE USED. THERE ARE NO SAFETY IMPLICATIONS SINCE THE
TETHER IS NOT IN USE WHEN THE FAILURE OCCURS. CREW ACTIONS CAN
DEVISE ALTERNATE MEANS OF RESTRAINT IN THE EVENT OF A FAILURE OF
THIS TYPE.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT : 3/'3
2202 ABORT : /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-SMALL HOOK
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) ERCM SAFETY TETHER
3) SMALL HOOK
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
3/3 AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
ST201-II009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE HOOK IN A CLOSED POSITION WILL MEAN THE TETHER
CANNOT BE USED TO RESTRAIN EVA CREWMEN (IF THE TETHER IS NOT IN
USE WHEN THE FAILURE OCCURS). IF THE TETHER IS ATTACHED TO THE
SLIDE WHEN THE HOOK FAILS CLOSED, IT CANNOT BE RELEASED. CREW
ACTIONS CAN PREVENT ANY FURTHER PROBLEMS.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-88
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 2203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
ITEM: EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-CABLE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) ERCM SAFETY TETHER
3 ) CABLE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
I/i AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10162-20037
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE CABLE WILL MEAN AN UNRESTRAINED,
FREE-FLOATING EVA CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-89
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-CABLE ATTACH POINTS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
1/1.
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) ERCM SAFETY TETHER
3) CABLE
4) ATTACHMENTS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: /NA
"LANDING/SAFING: /NA
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/NA RTLS:
/NA TAL:
I/i AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10162-10062
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-
PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE CABLE ATTACH POINTS AT EITHER THE
HOOK OR THE REEL ASSEMBLY MEANS A BROKEN CABLE AND AN
UNRESTRAINED EVA CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-90
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: i/i
2205 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-REEL CASE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) ERCM SAFETY TETHER
3) REEL CASE HOUSING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: i/i AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10162-20021; 10162-20022
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE CABLE TAKE UP REEL HOUSING WILL ALLOW
THE CABLE TO COME FREE (NO LONGER ATTACHED TO THE TAKE UP REEL).
THIS MEANS THE EVA CREW-MEMBER WILL BE UNRESTRAINED.
REFERENCES: i0162-I0062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-91
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o8/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/P_NC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
ERCM SAFETY TETHER
CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
I2%NDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10162-20025
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY CEASES TO TURN, THE CABLE LENGTH
WILL REMAIN AT THE FAILED POSITION. THERE ARE NO SAFETY
IMPLICATIONS, ONLY REDUCED CREWMEMBER MOBILITY.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-92
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o8/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2207
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
FAILS "UNLOCKED"
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
ERCM SAFETY TETHER
CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER :
PAYLOAD BAY
10162-20025
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE WITHIN THE CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY SUCH THAT THE TAKE-UP
REEL CANNOT BE RESTRAINED MEANS THAT THE CABLE CANNOT BE STOPPED
AT A GIVEN LENGTH. THE "UNLOCKED" CONDITION STILL ALLOWS THE
TETHER TO REEL OUT AND RETRACT AS REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-93
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2208
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
INADVERTENT RELEASE OF BRAKE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
ERCM SAFETY TETHER
CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10162-20025
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INADVERTENT RELEASE OF THE TAKE UP REEL BRAKE WHILE THE TETHER
IS IN USE MEANS THAT THE CABLE WILL EXTEND/RETRACT UNEXPECTEDLY.
THIS SHOULD NOT CAUSE ANY PROBLEM.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-94
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
INADVERTENT OPERATION OF BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
ERCM SAFETY TETHER
CABLE TAKE UP ASSEMBLY
BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10162-20025
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENT OPERATION OF THE BRAKE MEANS THE CABLE WILL SUDDENLY
BE RESTRAINED. NO SAFETY IMPLICATIONS.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-95
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/'3
2210 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-LOCK/UNLOCK SELECTOR SWITCH
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING IN LOCK POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
ERCM SAFETY TETHER
LOCK/UNLOCK SELECTOR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10151-20034; 10151-20038
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILING THE SELECTOR SWITCH IN THE LOCK POSITION WILL RESULT IN
THE CABLE BEING STUCK AT ONE LENGTH. THIS MEANS REDUCED MOBILITY
FOR THE EVA CREWMEMBER BUT NO SAFETY IMPLICATIONS.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-96
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
2211 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-LOCK/UNLOCK SELECTOR SWITCH
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING IN UNLOCK POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
ERCM SAFETY TETHER
LOCK/UNLOCK SELECTOR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10151-20034; 10151-20038
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SELECTOR SWITCH IN THE UNLOCKED POSITION MEANS THE
CABLE WILL RETRACT AND RELEASE WITH THE CREWMAN - IT CANNOT BE
LOCKED INTO ONE POSITION. NO SAFETY IMPLICATIONS.
REFERENCES: i0162-i0062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-97
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-"D" RING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) ERCM SAFETY TETHER
3) "D" RING
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10162-10062
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE INTEGRAL "D" RING WILL RESULT IN AN
UNRESTRAINED EVA CREW-MEMBER.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-98
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-"D" RING
CRIMPING OF "D" RING
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) ERCM SAFETY TETHER
3) "D" RING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10162-10062
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A "CRIMPING" OF THE INTEGRAL "D" RING MEANS THE WAIST TETHER HOOK
CANNOT BE CONNECTED. THE TETHER CANNOT THEN PERFORM ITS FUNCTION
BUT THERE ARE NO SAFETY IMPLICATIONS.
REFERENCES: 10162-10062
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-99
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o8/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2300
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) WAIST TETHER
3) HOOKS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH : /NA RTLS :
LIFTOFF : /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: i/I AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: LARGE-ST20HI009-04; SMALL-ST20HI009-01
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE HOOK WHILE IN USE WILL RESULT IN AN UNRESTRAINED
EVA CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES: 10151-20040, JSC-20466
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-100
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) WAIST TETHER
3 ) HOOKS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
LARGE-ST20HI009-04; SMALL-ST20HI009-01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A MECHANICAL JAM OF THE HOOK IN THE OPEN POSITION MEANS THE
TETHER IS NO LONGER USABLE. NO SAFETY ISSUES INVOLVED SINCE
TETHER IS NOT IN OPERATION AT THE TIME THE FAILURE OCCURS.
REFERENCES: 10151-20040, JSC-20466
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
71o8/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2302
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
FAILS CLOSED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) WAIST TETHER
3) HOOKS
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: LARGE-ST20HI009-04; SMALL-ST20HI009-01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE HOOKS FAIL CLOSED, THE TETHER CAN NO LONGER BE USED (IF
NOT YET IN USE) OR BE RELEASED FROM THE EQUIPMENT IF (.NIRRENTLY IN
USE. CREW ACTIONS CAN PROVIDE ALTERNATIVE WORK-AROUNDS.
REFERENCES: i0151-20040, JSC-20466
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-i02
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 2303
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
/NA
ITEM: WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPENING
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) WAIST TETHER
3) HOOKS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
LARGE-ST20HI009-04; SMALL-ST20HI009-01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN INADVERTENT OPENING OF EITHER OF THE HOOKS ON THE WAIST TETHER
MEANS AN UNRESTRAINED EVA CREW'MEMBER.
REFERENCES: 10151-20040, JSC-20466
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-103
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
71o8/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2304
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX WEBBING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
I/i
/_
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) WAIST TETHER
3) NOMEX WEBBING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
STI3N981
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE NOMEX WEBBING RESULTS IN AN
UNRESTRAINED EVA CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES: 10151-20040, JSC-20466
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-i04
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 2305
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM: WAIST TETHER-NOMEX WEBBING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TEARAWAY AS DESIGNED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) WAIST TETHER
3) NOMEX WEBBING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
STI3N981
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE NOMEX WEBBING IS DESIGNED TO TEAR INTO ADDITIONAL LENGTHS AS
EXCESSIVE LOADS ARE APPLIED. IF THIS FEATURE DOES NOT OPERATE
CORRECTLY, THEN EXCESSIVE LOADS CAN BE APPLIED TO THE EMU BEFORE
ANTICIPATED.
REFERENCES: 10151-20040, JSC-20466
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-105
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
2306
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX WEBBING
TEARS AT ATTACH POINTS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) WAIST TETHER
3 ) NOMEX WEBBING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: STI3N981
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAII_RE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TEARING OF THE NOMEX WEBBING AT THE ATTACH POINTS TO THE HOOK CAN
BE CAUSED BY OVERLOAD, SHARP EDGES ON THE ATTACHMENT, ETC. A
COMPLETE TEARING WILL RESULT IN AN UNRESTRAINED EVA CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES: 10151-20040, JSC-20466
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I06
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6/o6/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
3100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING WHEEL
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) TUBE CUTTER
3 ) CUTTING WHEEL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101368
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CUTTING WHEEL BREAKS. USED TO CUT DRIVE TUBES ON PLBD.
REDUNDANT ITEMS ARE IVA HACKSAW AND WIRE SAW. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS AND DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I07
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING WHEEL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) TUBE CUTTER
3 ) CUTTING WHEEL
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED33101368
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CUTTING WHEEL UNABLE TO ROTATE. USED TO CUT DRIVE TUBES ON PLB.
REDUNDANT ITEMS ARE IVA HACKSAW AND WIRE SAW. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CLOSE DOORS AND DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-i08
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
, SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING WHEEL SLIDE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) TUBE CUTTER
3) CUTTING WHEEL SLIDE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101368
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CUTTING WHEEL SLIDE (CARRYING CUTTING WHEEL) IS UNABLE TO DESCEND
WHEN SMALL RATCHET HANDLE IS TRIED. USED TO CUT DRIVE TUBES ON
PLBD. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE DOORS THE VEHICLE IS UNABLE TO DEORBIT.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-i09
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER RATCHET WHEEL (ON SMALL RATCHET)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) TUBE CUTTER
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SMALL RATCHET WHEEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101368
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET WHEEL IN SMALL SCREW RATCHET ASSEMBLY FAILS TO TURN AND
CUTTING WHEEL WILL NOT TOUCH TUBE BEING CUT. USED TO CUT DRIVE
TUBES ON PLBD. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE DOORS THE VEHICLE IS UNABLE TO
DEORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF
LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-II0
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM:
SELECTION TAB
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER SMALL RATCHET ASSEMBLY DIRECTION
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TUBE CUTTER
DIRECTION SELECTION TAB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED3101368
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET ASSEMBLY DIRECTION SELECTION TAB FAILS. UNABLE TO CHANGE
RATCHET DIRECTION. WORST CASE WOULD NOT ALLOW CUTTING WHEEL TO
CONTACT TUBE. USED TO CUT DRIVE TUBES ON PLBD. IF UNABLE TO
CLOSE DOORS THE VEHICLE IS UNABLE TO DEORBIT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-lll
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM:
SELECTION TAB
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER SMALL RATCHET ASSEMBLY DIRECTION
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TUBE CUTTER
DIRECTION SELECTION TAB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101368
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET ASSEMBLY DIRECTION SELECTION TAB FAILS. UNABLE TO ENGAGE
RATCHET WHEEL OR UNABLE TO STAY AT SELECTED RATCHET DIRECTION.
WORST CASE WOULD NOT ALLOW CUTTING WHEEL TO CONTACT TUBE. USED
TO CUT DRIVE TUBES ON PLBD. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE DOORS THE
VEHICLE IS UNABLE TO DEORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT
IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
FAILS TO ENGAGE NOTCHES
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) TUBE CUTTER
3) PAWL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101368
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PAWL FAILS TO ENGAGE NOTCHES. UNABLE TO ROTATE TUBE CUTTER
AROUND TUBE. FAILURE OF FIRST AND SECOND PAWL UNDETECTABLE BY
CREWMAN. TOOL STILL FUNCTIONS. FAILURE OF ALL 3 PAWLS RESULT IN
LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION. USED TO CUT DRIVE TUBES ON PLBD. IF
UNABLE TO CLOSE DOORS THE VEHICLE IS UNABLE TO DEORBIT. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) TUBE CUTTER
3) PAWL
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101368
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PAWL BREAKS. UNABLE TO ROTATE TUBE CUTTER AROUND TUBE. FAILURE
OF FIRST AND SECOND PAWL UNDETECTABLE BY CREWMAN. TOOL STILL
FUNCTIONS. FAILURE OF ALL 3 PAWLS RESULTS IN LOSS OF TOOL
FUNCTION. USED TO CUT DRIVE TUBES ON PLBD. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE
DOORS THE VEHICLE IS UNABLE TO DEORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I14
QINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
3108 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
ROLLER LINK)
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER SPRING-ASSISTED RETENTION ROLLER (ON
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TUBE CUTTER
SPRING-ASSISTED RETENTION ROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101368
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RETENTION ROLLER FAILS TO MAINTAIN TENSION ON PIPE BEING CUT.
MOST PROBABLE CAUSE IS FAILURE OF TORSION SPRING(S) OR DOWEL PIN
(ON LINK) BEING PUSHED ON BY TORSION SPRINGS. USED TO HOLD PLBD
DRIVE TUBES DURING CUTTING.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER ROLLER LINK
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/_mC
2/1R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) TUBE CUTTER
3 ) ROLLER LINK
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED33101368
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROLLER LINK STICKS IN "DOWN" POSITION UNABLE TO SPRING "UP" AND
AWAY FROM TUBE BEING CUT. USED TO HOLD PLBD DRIVE TUBES DURING
CUTTING. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE DOORS THE VEHICLE IS UNABLE TO
DEORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o6/s7
CREW EQUIPMENT
3110
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER IDLER ROLLER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) TUBE CUTTER
3) IDLER ROLLER
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101368
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IDLER ROLLER(S) UNABLE TO TURN. LOSS OF IDLER ROLLER WILL NOT
CAUSE LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION. TOOL WILL BE MUCH HARDER TO ROTATE
AROUND TUBE BUT SHOULD STILL FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-117
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o6/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
3111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER LARGE RATCHET HANDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) TUBE CUTTER
3) RATCHET HANDLE
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101368
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HANDLE BREAKS. CREW ACTIONS REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE
TO A "2". TOOL IS USED TO CUT DRIVE TUBES ON PLBD. IF UNABLE TO
CLOSE DOORS THE VEHICLE IS UNABLE TO DEORBIT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-i18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o6/s7
CREW EQUIPMENT
3112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER SMALL RATCHET HANDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TUBE CUTTER
SMALL RATCHET HANDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENs: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101368
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SMALL RATCHET HANDLE USED TO SNUG CUTTING WHEEL TO TUBE BREAKS.
CREW ACTIONS REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "2". TOOL
IS USED TO CUT DRIVE TUBES ON PLBD. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE DOORS THE
VEHICLE IS UNABLE TO DEORBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT
IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-I19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TUBE CUTTER SOFT-TIP SET SCREW
FAILS TO CONTACT SHAFT
HDW/mUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) TUBE CUTTER
3) SOFT-TIP SET SCREW
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101368
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SOFT TIP SET SCREW USED TO "SNUG-UP" SLIDE DRIVE SHAFT DOES NOT
CONTACT SHAFT. SET SCREW PREVENTS BOTH CUTTING WHEEL SLIDE AN[)
DRIVE SHAFT FROM BACK DRIVING DURING CUTTING WHEEL CONTACT.
FAILURE OF SET SCREW SHOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION.
BACK DRIVING IS NOT NORMALLY A PROBLEM.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101368
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-120
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL SAFETY RELEASE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL
SAFETY RELEASE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101621
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAFETY RELEASE IS UNABLE TO MOVE TO ENABLE TRIGGER. TWO TOOLS
FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. OPERATION OF RATCHET WILL RELEASE LATCH
BYPASSING SAFETY RELEASE FAILURE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101621
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-121
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL LATCH
INADVERTENT OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL
LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101621
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCH MAY RELEASE DUE TO MISHANDLING BY CREW. TWO TOOLS FLOWN
EACH FLIGHT. CREW CAN MANUALLY RESET TOOL IF ACCIDENTLY
TRIGGERED OR MANUALLY HOLD TOOL IN STOWED CONFIGURATION UNTIL
PLACED IN CORRECT POSITION/ATTITUDE FOR USE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101621
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-122
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3202
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL LATCH
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL
LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101621
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCH FAILS TO OPEN WHEN RELEASED, THEREFORE THE TOOL WILL FAIL
TO CAPTURE THE LATCH ROLLER OF THE PAYLOAD BAY DOOR. TWO TOOLS
FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. FAILURE OF THE SECOND HARDWARE ITEM WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101621
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-123
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL LATCH
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL
LATCH
PIVOT PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO : /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101621
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PIVOT PIN (SDD33101625-001 OR SDD33101625-005) FAILS THEREBY
BREAKING LATCH. TOOL IS UNABLE TO FUNCTION. LOSS OF VEHICLE OR
LIFE POSSIBLE WITH LOSS OF FUNCTION. THERE IS A SECOND TOOL
ONBOARD BUT IS NOT REDUNDANT DURING OPERATION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101621
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-124
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6106/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL RATCHET WHEEL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL
RATCHET WHEEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101621
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TWO TOOLS FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. RATCHET BEING UNABLE TO OPERATE
RESULTS IN A TOOL UNABLE TO FUNCTION. LOSS OF VEHICLE POSSIBLE
WITH LOSS OF FUNCTION. FAILURE OF FIRST HARDWARE ITEM RESULTS IN
LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE SINCE THERE IS NO OPERATIONAL
REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. THIS FAILURE COULD PREVENT USE OF
REDUNDANT TOOL.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101621
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL RELEASE TRIGGER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL
SAFETY RELEASE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101621
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELEASE TRIGGER JAMMED. TWO TOOLS FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT.
OPERATION OF RATCHET WILL FORCE RELEASE OF LATCH THEREBY
BYPASSING FAILURE OF RELEASE TRIGGER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101621
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-126
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL RATCHET HANDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL
RATCHET HANDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101621
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET HANDLE BREAKS. TWO TOOLS FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. ASSUMING
TOOL BREAKS WHILE UNDER TENSION AND AT A POINT ALONG SHAFT HANDLE
WHERE EVA TOOLS (PLIERS, ETC.) WOULD NOT BE USEFUL. EVA CREWMAN
WOULD BE UNABLE TO REVERSE TOOL. SECOND TOOL COULD NOT
BE INSTALLED IF FIRST TOOL CANNOT BE REMOVED.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101621
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3207
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL RELEASE CATCH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL
RELEASE CATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101628
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TWO TOOLS FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. IF TOOL RELEASE CATCH BREAKS
TOOL LATCH WILL RELEASE (DEPLOY). CREW CAN MANUALLY HOLD TOOL IN
STOWED CONFIGURATION UNTIL PLACED IN CORRECT POSITION/ATTITUDE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101621
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-128
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
3208 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL SAFETY RELEASE TAB
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CENTERLINE LATCH BYPASS TOOL
SAFETY RELEASE TAB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101621
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TWO TOOLS FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. WORST CASE WOULD HAVE EVA
CREWMAN INADVERTENTLY ACTIVATING LATCH RELEASE. CREWMAN CAN
MANUALLY RESET TOOL.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101621
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3300
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RATCHET HANDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) 3-POINT LATCH TOOL
3 ) RATCHET HANDLE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101327
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET HANDLE BREAKS. TWO TOOLS FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. WORST
CASE PRECLUDES USE OF EVA TOOLS TO REPAIR/REPLACE HANDLE. NO
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF LATCHING FUNCTION
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101327
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-130 _ _
?
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o6/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
3-POINT LATCH TOOL HOOK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
I/i
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) 3-POINT LATCH TOOL
3) HOOK
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED33101327
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOOK BREAKS. TWO TOOLS FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. NO OPERATIONAL
REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. WORST CASE PRECLUDES USE OF EVA TOOLS
AND PROCEDURES TO REPAIR/REPLACE HOOK. LOSS OF LATCHING FUNCTION
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101327
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-131
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o6/sv
CREW EQUIPMENT
3302
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/I_JNC
1/i
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RATCHET WHEEL SELECTOR TAB
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
B)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
3-POINT LATCH TOOL
RATCHET WHEEL SELECTOR TAB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: ° /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101327
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET WHEEL DIRECTION SELECTOR TAB CANNOT CHANGE. TWO TOOLS
FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. WORST CASE PRECLUDES FUNCTIONING OF TOOL.
NO OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF LATCHING
FUNCTION RESULTS IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101327
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-132
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3303
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RATCHET WHEEL SELECTOR TAB
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
3-POINT LATCH TOOL
RATCHET WHEEL SELECTOR TAB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101327
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET WHEEL DIRECTION SELECTOR TAB CANNOT CHANGE. TWO TOOLS
FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. WORST CASE PRECLUDES FUNCTIONING OF TOOL.
NO OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF LATCHING
FUNCTION RESULTS IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101327
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3304
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
3-POINT LATCH TOOL RATCHET WHEEL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) 3-POINT LATCH TOOL
3 ) RATCHET WHEEL
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101327
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET WHEEL IS UNABLE TO ROTATE. TWO TOOLS FLOWN ON EACH
FLIGHT. WORST CASE PRECLUDES USE OF EVA TOOLS AND PROCEDURES TO
REPAIR/REPLACE GEAR. NO OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL.
LOSS OF LATCHING FUNCTION WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101327
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-134
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3305
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
LATCH
FAILURE MODE:
3-POINT LATCH TOOL ROLLER SHOE RELEASE HANDLE
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
3-POINT LATCH TOOL
ROLLER SHOE RELEASE HANDLE LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101327
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELEASE HANDLE LATCH FAILS OR CREWMAN ACCIDENTLY RELEASES ROLLER
SHOE BY LIFTING LATCH. TWO TOOLS FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. CREWMAN
CAN MANUALLY RESET TOOL IF LATCH IS INTACT. IF LATCH HAS BROKEN
CREWMAN CAN MANUALLY HOLD AND PLACE TOOL TO THE CORRECT
POSITION AND ATTITUDE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101327
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3306
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/F_JNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
3-POINT LATCH TOOL ROLLER SHOE RELEASE HANDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
3-POINT LATCH TOOL
ROLLER SHOE RELEASE HANDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101327
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROLLER SHOE RELEASE HANDLE(S) FAIL. TWO TOOLS FLOWN ON EACH
FLIGHT. WORST CASE WOULD PRECLUDE USE OF EVA TOOLS AND
PROCEDURES TO REPAIR/REPLACE. NO OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS
TOOL. LOSS OF FUNCTION RESULTS IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101327
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-136
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6106/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3307
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
3-POINT LATCH TOOL COMPENSATOR ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) 3-POINT LATCH TOOL
3 ) COMPENSATOR ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101327
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TWO TOOLS FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. COMPENSATOR ASSEMBLY FAILS. NO
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF LATCHING FUNCTION
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101327
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-137
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3308
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
3-POINT LATCH TOOL ROLLER SHOE ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
3-POINT LATCH TOOL
ROLLER SHOE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101327
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PIVOT PIN FAILS. ROLLER SHOE CANNOT STAY DEPLOYED. NO
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY AVAILABLE FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF FUNCTION
RESULTS IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101327
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-138
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o8/8 
CREW EQUIPMENT
3400
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY HOOK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
HOOK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EVA WINCH HOOK BREAKS. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY OF
WINCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLBD
OR RESTOW RMS AND DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-139
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3401
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
CONTROL LEVER
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY RATCHET HANDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
RATCHET HANDLE CONTROL LEVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET HANDLE CONTROL LEVER BREAKS. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL
REDUNDANCY OF WINCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO CLOSE PLB DOORS AND DEORBIT. CREW HANDLE REPAIR CAN REDUCE
HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "2".
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-140
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3402
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
CONTROL LEVER
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY RATCHET HANDLE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
RATCHET HANDLE CONTROL LEVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATE): /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET HANDLE CONTROL LEVER JAMS/BINDS. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL
REDUNDANCY OF WINCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO CLOSE PLB DOOR AND DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-141
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 2/IR
3403 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY LARGE CONTROL HANDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BRE_DOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
LARGE CONTROL HANDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LARGE CONTROL HANDLE (REEL SELECTOR) BREAKS. LOSS OF ALL
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY OF WINCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB DOORS AND DEORBIT. CREW HANDLE REPAIR CAN
REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "2". FAILURE
OF REDUNDANT WINCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-142
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 2/IR
3404 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY LARGE CONTROL HANDLE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
LARGE CONTROL HANDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LARGE CONTROL HANDLE (REEL SELECTOR) JAMS/BINDS. LOSS OF ALL
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB DOORS AND DEORBIT. CREW HANDLE REPAIR CAN
REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "2". FAILURE OF
REDUNDANT WINCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-143
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3405
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT RATCHET HANDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
RATCHET HANDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET HANDLE BREAKS. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB DOORS AND
DEORBIT. CREW HANDLE REPAIR CAN REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY
ONE TO A "2". FAILURE OF REDUNDANT WINCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-144
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3406
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY ROPE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
ROPE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROPE JAMS/BINDS. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB DOORS AND DEORBIT.
CREW ACTIONS REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "2".
FAILURE OF REDUNDANT WINCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-145
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3407
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY ROPE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
ROPE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROPE BREAKS. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WOULDCAUSE LOSS
OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB DOORS AND DEORBIT. CREW
ACTIONS REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "2". FAILURE OF
REDUNDANT WINCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-146
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3408
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY TORQUE LIMITER
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TORQUE LIMITER FAILS TO SLIP. LOSS OF TORQUE LIMITER SHOULD NOT
PRECLUDE WINCH OPERATION. LIMITER IS USED TO AVOID OVERLOAD
CAUSED (MOST PROBABLY) BY OBSTRUCTION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-147
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3409
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY RATCHET WHEEL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
RATCHET WHEEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET WHEEL JAMS/BINDS. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONALREDUNDANCY
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB DOORS
AND DEORBIT. CREW ACTIONS REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO
A "2". FAILURE OF REDUNDANT WINCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
LIFE ORVEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-148
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3410
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY ROPE ROLLER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
ROPE ROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROPE ROLLER(S) BREAK.
FUNCTION.
EVA WINCH SHOULD STILL BE ABLE TO
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-149
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3411
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HD_/FUNC
3,/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY ROPE ROLLER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
ROPE ROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED33101570
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROPE ROLLER(S) JAM/BIND.
FUNCTION.
EVA WINCH SHOULD STILL BE ABLE TO
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-150
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3412
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY HANDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
HANDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOLDING HANDLE FOR EVA CREWMAN BREAKS. HANDLE BREAKAGE DOES NOT
PREVENT OPERATION OF EVA WINCH. EVA CREWMAN CAN HOLD HANDRAIL
WHILE OPERATING WINCH.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-151
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE:
6/o9/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
3413
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY MOUNTING PLATE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
MOUNTING PLATE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED33101570
B [ P ] c[P]
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOUNTING PLATE ASSEMBLY SEPARATES FROM EVA WINCH ASSEMBLY. LOSS
OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB DOORS OR RESTOW RMS AND DEORBIT. CREW
ACTIONS REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "2".
FAILURE OF REDUNDANT WINCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-152
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/lO/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3414
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY GEARS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
GEARS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TAKE UP GEAR(S) BREAK. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB DOORS AND
DEORBIT. CREW ACTIONS REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A
"2". FAILURE OF REDUNDANT WINCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/lO/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3415
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY GEARS
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
HDW/F_]NC
2/IR
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
3) GEARS
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TAKE UP GEARS BIND/JAM. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB DOORS AND
DEORBIT. CREW ACTIONS REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A
"2". FAILURE OF REDUNDANT WINCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE
OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-154
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/io/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3416
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY PIP PIN
FAILS TO REMAIN ATTACHED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCHAND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
PIP PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PIP PIN MAY WORK LOOSE DURING ATMOSPHERIC MANEUVERS. COULD COME
LOOSE AND CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE FROM EVA WINCH IMPACTING CABLE
BUNDLES, ETC. CREW WOULD HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF FAILURE UNTIL
VEHICLE WENT OUT OF CONTROL. LOSS OF SECOND PIP PIN COULD
RESULT IN CRIT 1 SITUATION THUS A HARDWARE CRIT 2 IS ASSIGNED.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-155
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/20/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3417
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2 / IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY ROPE SPOOL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY
ROPE SPOOL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33101570
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROPE SPOOL WILL NOT REEL OUT/TAKE IN ROPE. INABILITY OF SPOOL TO
ROTATE AND LET OUT/TAKE UP ROPE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TOOL
FUNCTION. POSSIBLE TO USE SECOND EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY AS
A REDUNDANT ITEM. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 15, JSC-20466, SED33101570
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-156
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o6/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
3500
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY
3) ROPE
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102348
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROPE BREAKS. EVA WINCH ADAPTER IS USED AS AN EXTENSION TO THE
EVA WINCH TO RESTOW RMS. ONLY ONE WINCH ADAPTER CARRIED PER
FLIGHT. INABILITY TO STOW OR JETTISON RMS WOULD PREVENT VEHICLE
DEORBIT. MAY BE POSSIBLE TO USE SECOND EVA WINCH AND MOUNT
ASSEMBLY AS REDUNDANT ITEM. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, LIKE AND
UNLIKE, COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102348
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-157
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY
ROPE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /N
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: . /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING. /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102348
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROPE JAMS. EVA WINCH ADAPTER IS USED AS AN EXTENSION TO THE EVA
WINCH TO RESTOW RMS. ONLY ONE WINCH ADAPTER CARRIED PER FLIGHT.
INABILITY TO STOW OR JETTISON RMS WOULD PREVENT VEHICLE DEORBIT.
MAY BE POSSIBLE TO USE SECOND EVA WINCH AND MOUNT
ASSEMBLY AS REDUNDANT ITEM. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, LIKE AND
UNLIKE, COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102348
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-158
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY HOOK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY
3) HOOK
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102348
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOOK BREAKS. MAY BE ABLE TO USE SECOND EVA WINCH AND MOUNT
ASSEMBLY ALONG WITH FIRST EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY TO
ACCOMPLISH THE SAME FUNCTION AS FIRST EVA WINCH AND MOUNT
ASSEMBLY AND EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY. CREW MAY BE ABLE TO TIE
ROPE AROUND RMS TO REPLACE FUNCTION OF HOOK. INABILITY TO STOW
OR JETTISON RMS WOULD PREVENT VEHICLE DEORBIT.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102348
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-159
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY
HOOK LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED33102348
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOOK LATCH JAMS OPEN OR CLOSED. EVA CREWMAN CAN BEND LATCH
CLOSED OR OPEN (AS NEEDED) TO ALLOW EVA WINCH ADAPTER TO FUNCTION
CORRECTLY. CREWMAN CAN ALSO TIE ROPE AROUND RMS TO AVOID USING
HOOK AND FAILED LATCH.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102348
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-160
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/06/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 3504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM: EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE CAM CLEAT
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY
ROPE CAM CLEAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102348
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAM CLEAT BREAKS. ROPE CAN BE HELD IN PLACE BY ACTION OF ONE CAM
CLEAT. LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION MAY PREVENT STOWAGE OF FAILED RMS
THUS RESULTING IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE. EVA CREW ACTIONS MAY
BE ABLE TO REPAIR TOOL.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102348
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE CAM CLEAT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY
ROPE CAM CLEAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102348
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAM CLEATS JAM. ROPE CAN BE HELD IN PLACE BY ACTION OF ONE CAM
CLEAT. LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION MAY PREVENT STOWAGE OF FAILED RMS
THUS RESULTING IN LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE. EVA CREW MAY BE ABLE
TO REPAIR TOOL.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102348
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-162
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/06/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 3506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM: EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE GUIDE PLATE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY
ROPE GUIDE PLATE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102348
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROPE GUIDE PLATE FAILS AND SEPARATES FROM SPOOL. WHEN ROPE IS
UNDER TENSION GUIDE PLATE MAY STRUCTURALLY FAIL THUS PREVENTING
TOOL FROM FUNCTIONING. EVA WINCH LATCH ATTACHES TO GUIDE PLATE.
LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION PREVENTS RESTOWING OF DISABLED RMS.
INABILITY TO CLOSE PLBD CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
MAY BE ABLE TO USE SECOND EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY TO REPLACE
FUNCTION. CREW ACTIONS COULD REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE
TO A "2".
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102348
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-163
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
61o61s7
CREW EQUIPMENT
3507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE ROLLER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/:3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY
ROPE ROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102348
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROLLER BREAKS. WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY (RMS ROPE REEl,) CAN STILL
FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102348
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-164
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o6/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
3508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE ROLLER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY
ROPE ROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102348
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROPE ROLLER FAILS TO TURN.
REEL) CAN STILL FUNCTION.
WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY (RMS ROPE
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102348
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-165
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/06/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/'IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY ROPE SPOOL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
EVA WINCH ADAPTER ASSEMBLY
ROPE SPOOL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: _NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102348
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROPE SPOOL WILL NOT REEL OUT/IN ROPE. INABILITY OF SPOOL TO
ROTATE AND LET OUT/TAKE UP ROPE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TOOL
FUNCTION. MAY BE POSSIBLE TO USE SECOND EVA WINCH AND MOUNT
ASSEMBLY AS REDUNDANT ITEM. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102348
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-166
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 2/IR
3600 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET HANDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
RATCHET HANDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HANDLE BREAKS. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT.
FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
CAN REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "2".
LOSS OF TOOL
CREW ACTIONS
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-167
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3601
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
, FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY HOOK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
HOOK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOOK(S) BREAKS. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. NO
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-168
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/lO/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3602
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
HOOK LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOOK LATCH BREAKS. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. LOSS OF
TOOL FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE. CREW
ACTIONS CAN REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "2".
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-169
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6110187
CREW EQUIPMENT
3603
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
HOOK LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOOK LATCH FAILS TO CLOSE. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT.
LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
CREW ACTIONS CAN REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "2".
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-170
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
,CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: i/i
3604 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET GEAR
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
RATCHET GEAR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET GEAR BINDS/JAMS. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT.
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-171
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: i/I
3605 ABORT : /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET GEAR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
RATCHET GEAR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET GEAR BREAKS. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. NO
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-172
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: I/i
3606 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY KEVLAR WEB STRAP
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST : L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
KEVLAR WEB STRAP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
KEVLAR WEB STRAP BREAKS. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT.
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-173
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_JNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
3607 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY REACTION HANDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
REACTION HANDLE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REACTION HANDLE ASSEMBLY BREAKS. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH
FLIGHT. LOSS OF REACTION HANDLE WILL NOT CAUSE LOSS OF TOOL
FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-174
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: i/i
3608 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
PIN
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET SHAFT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
RATCHET SHAFT PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10163-10063-03
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET SHAFT PIN BREAKS. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT.
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
NO
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-175
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/lO/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3609
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY WEB ROLLER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
WEB ROLLER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROLLER GUIDE ASSEMBLY FOR KEVLAR WEB STRAP BINDS/JAMS.
FUNCTION TO TIE DOWN RMS.
CAN STILL
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-176
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/lO/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3610
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
_/3
/NA
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY WEB ROLLER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
WEB ROLLER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROLLER GUIDE ASSEMBLY FOR KEVLAR WEB STRAP BREAKS.
FUNCTION TO TIE DOWN RMS.
CAN STILL
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-177
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
3611 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
REEL
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY SPRING STORAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
SPRING STORAGE REEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SPRING STORAGE REEL BINDS/JAMS. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH
FLIGHT. LOSS OF SPRING STORAGE REEL COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TOOL
FUNCTION. LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
IF NEITHER TOOL IS EFFECTIVE AS A TIEDOWN - THE DEVICE BEING
RESTRAINED MAY HAVE TO BE JETTISONED PRIOR TO REENTRY.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-178
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: i/i
3612 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET LATCH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
RATCHET LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET LATCH BREAKS. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. NO
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/P_NC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: I/i
3613 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET LATCH
FAILS TO CONTACT RATCHET WHEEL
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
RATCHET LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 10163-10063-03
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET LATCH FAILS TO CONTACT GEAR. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH
FLIGHT. NO OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF TOOL
FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-180
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: I/i
3614 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
RELEASE
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
RATCHET ASSEMBLY RELEASE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET ASSEMBLY RELEASE IS UNABLE TO CLOSE (ENGAGE RATCHET
WHEEL). TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. NO OPERATIONAL
REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF TOOL FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-181
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_/NC
CRE_ EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: I/I
3615 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
RELEASE
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY RATCHET ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
RATCHET ASSEMBLY RELEASE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
10163-10063-03
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATCHET ASSEMBLY RELEASE BINDS/JAMS. TWO DEVICES FLOWN ON EACH
FLIGHT. NO OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF TOOL
FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-182
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: i/i
3616 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
PIN
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY HOOK/WEB CONNECT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE ASSEMBLY
LATCH/WEB CONNECT PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
i0163-i0063-03
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FIALURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOOK/WEB CONNECT PIN BREAKS. PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE LOSES
FUNCTION. NO OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR THIS TOOL. LOSS OF TOOL
FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, 10163-10063
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-183
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/14/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3700
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA CABLE CUTTER
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) EVA CABLE CUTTER
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED39117075-301
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CUTTERS JAM AND CREWMEN IS UNABLE TO OPEN/CLOSE (AS NEEDED TO
COMPLETE THE MISSION). BACKUP TOOL IS DIAGONAL CUTTER (WHICH IS
NORMALLY MANIFESTED).
REFERENCES: JSC-20466
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-184
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/14/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3701
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA CABLE CUTTER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA CABLE CUTTER
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED39117075-301
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HANDLE BREAKS THEREBY RENDERING CREWMAN UNABLE TO COMPLETE
ORBITER MISSION. BACKUP TOOL IS DIAGONAL CUTTER (WHICH IS
NORMALLY MANIFESTED).
REFERENCES: JSC-20466
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-185
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/14/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3702
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA CABLE CUTTER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) EVA CABLE CUTTER
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SEC39117075-301
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JAWS DEFORMED, UNABLE TO CUT CABLE. BACKUP TOOL IS DIAGONAL
CUTTER (WHICH IS NORMALLY MANIFESTED).
REFERENCES: JSC-20466
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-186
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3800
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY
HOOK LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102357
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NORMALLY MANIFESTED ON EVERY FLIGHT. TWO SNATCH BLOCKS CARRIED
ON EACH FLIGHT. FAILURE OF BOTH PRIMARY AND REDUNDANT BLOCK MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE WHEN BEING USED TO STOW FAILED RMS OR
RESTOW IUS TILT CRADLE. FAILURE TO OPEN LATCH WOULD PREVENT
SNATCH BLOCK BEING ATTACHED TO ORBITER OR AEROSPACE SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT ON-ORBIT.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102357
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-187
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3801
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK SWIVEL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY
HOOK SWIVEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102357
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SWIVEL COULD PREVENT SUCCESSFUL OPERATION OF SNATCH
BLOCK. TWO SNATCH BLOCKS FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102357
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-188
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/8?
CREW EQUIPMENT
3802
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY RIGHT SPRING PLUNGER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY
RIGHT SPRING PLUNGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102357
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SPRING PLUNGER BALL FAILS TO TRAVEL UP/DOWN THUS PREVENTING UPPER
RIGHT CHEEK BLOCK FROM CONTACTING HOOK/LATCH ASSEMBLY. TWO
SPRING PLUNGERS USED ON RIGHT SIDE, ANY ONE OF WHICH WILL PROVIDE
SUFFICIENT PUSHING FORCE ON CHEEK BLOCK. SHOULD NOT RELEASE
HOOK/LATCH ASSEMBLY DUE TO TENSION ON DEVICE.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102357
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-189
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6104187
CREW EQUIPMENT
3803
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY LEFT SPRING PLUNGER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY
LEFT SPRING PLUNGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102357
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SPRING PLUNGER FAILS TO TRAVEL UP/DOWN THUS PREVENTING LEFT CHECK
BLOCK FROM PUSHING AGAINST HOOK/LATCH ASSEMBLY. SHOULD NOT
RELEASE DUE TO TENSION ON DEVICE. TWO SPRING PLUNGERS USED ON
LEFT SIDE, ANY ONE OF WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PUSHING
FORCE ON CHEEK BLOCK,
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102357
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-190
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 3804
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY PULL WIRE BALL END
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY
PULL WIRE BALL END
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102357
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BALL COMES OFF ALLOWING EVA PULL WIRE TO DRIFT OUT AND AWAY
(LOST). EVA CREWMAN CAN STILL OPERATE RELEASE BLOCK BY MANUALLY
PULLING ON "EARS" OF LATCH RELEASE BLOCK. TWO SNATCH BLOCKS
FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102357
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-191
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 2/IR
3805 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK ASSEMBLY LATCH BLOCK
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY
HOOK ASSEMBLY LATCH BLOCK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102357
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TWO SNATCH BLOCKS FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. IF LATCH BLOCK FAILS TO
STAY CLOSED THE HOOK/LATCH ASSEMBLY COULD COME LOOSE, THEREBY
RELEASING ROPE DURING CRIT 1 EVA ACTIVITIES.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102357
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-192
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6104187
CREW EQUIPMENT
3806
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY PULLEY WHEEL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY
PULLEY WHEEL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
SED33102357
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROPE CAN STILL TRAVEL OVER JAMMED PULLEY WHEEL THUS ALLOWING
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY TO CONTINUE TO FUNCTION. ROPE MAY,
HOWEVER, SUFFER SUFFICIENT WEAR TO PRECLUDE REPEATED USE. TWO
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLIES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102357
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-193
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6104/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
3807
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/_3NC
2/IR
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY
HOOK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /_
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: SED33102357
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOOK BREAKS. UNABLE TO ATTACH SNATCH BLOCK TO ORBITER OR
AEROSPACE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ON-ORBIT. TWO SNATCH BLOCKS FLOWN ON
EACH FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC-20466, SED33102357
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-194
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 4100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: TURNBUCKLE
FAILURE MODE: QUICK RELEASE PIN FAILS, UNABLE TO ATTACH TO
ORBITER STRUCTURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) TURNBUCKLE
3) QUICK RELEASE PIN
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
V602-660302
CAUSES: WEAR, MISHANDLING BY CREWMAN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREWMEN CAN BEND PIN PRONGS BACK. ALSO, CREWMAN CAN DEVELOP
ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO MAINTAIN STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY DURING
FORWARD AVIONICS BAY REPAIR TASKS. THREE TURNBUCKLES FLOWN ON
EACH FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 VOL. 12, V602-660302
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 4101 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: TURNBUCKLE
FAILURE MODE: HINGES FAIL TO MAINTAIN POSITION WHEN TURNBUCKLE
SET IN PLACE DUE TO STRIPPED THREADS
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) TURNBUCKLE
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/PI;NC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: V602-660302
CAUSES: WEAR, MISHANDLING BY CREW
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREWMAN CAN TAPE HINGES IN PLACE TO MAINTAIN POSITIONING. ALSO
CREWMAN CAN DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO MAINTAIN STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY DURING FORWARD AVIONICS BAY REPAIR TASKS. THREE
TURNBUCKLES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 VOL. 12, V602-660302
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-196
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4200 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: LOCKER REMOVAL TOOL
FAILURE MODE: HEX HEAD IS ROUNDED OFF, UNABLE TO ENGAGE LOCKER
HOLDERS TO REMOVE LOCKERS.
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) LOCKER REMOVAL TOOL
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
V625-650899
CAUSES: CREW MISHANDLING, WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF CREW IS UNABLE TO REMOVE LOCKERS FOR ACCESS TO FORWARD
AVIONICS BAY, LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE MAY RESULT. MORE THAN ONE
REMOVAL TOOL CARRIED ON EACH FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 VOL. 12, V625-650899
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-197
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6104187
CREW EQUIPMENT
4300
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_X/NC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX INPUT POWER CONNECTOR
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
INPUT POWER CONNECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INPUT POWER CONNECTOR SHORTS. TWO IFM BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON
EACH FLIGHT. CREW CAN ALSO PERFORM AN IN-FLIGHT REPAIR ON BROKEN
INPUT CONNECTOR. CREW ACTIONS CAN THEREBY REDUCE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY ONE LEVEL TO "3". BOX SUPPLIES POWER FOR VARIOUS
CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-198
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
 1o418 
CREW EQUIPMENT
4301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX INPUT POWER CONNECTOR
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
INPUT POWER CONNECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INPUT POWER CONNECTOR HAS AN OPEN CIRCUIT. TWO IFM BREAKOUT
BOXES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. CREW CAN ALSO PERFORM AN IN-FLIGHT
REPAIR ON BROKEN INPUT CONNECTION. CREW ACTIONS CAN THEREBY
REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY ONE LEVEL TO "3". BREAKOUT BOX
SUPPLIES POWER FOR VARIOUS CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS THAT COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-199
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6104187
CREW EQUIPMENT
4302
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX AUXILIARY ON/OFF SWITCH (SWI)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
AUXILIARY ON/OFF SWITCH (SWl)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAII//RE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWI SHORTS. TWO BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. SWITCH
ONLY PROVIDES POWER TO OUTPUT POWER CONNECTOR. OUTPUT CONNECTOR
IS INTENDED TO BE USED AS POWER SOURCE FOR SECOND IFM BREAKOUT
BOX USE. CURRENT IFM PROCEDURES NO LONGER REQUIRE USE OF 2
BREAKOUT BOXES SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-200
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 4303
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: IFM BREAKOUT BOX AUXILIARY ON/OFF SWITCH (SWI)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
AUXILIARY ON/OFF SWITCH (SWI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWI HAS AN OPEN CIRCUIT. TWO IFM BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH
FLIGHT. SWITCH ONLY PROVIDES POWER TO OUTPUT POWER CONNECTOR.
OUTPUT CONNECTOR IS INTENDED TO BE USED AS POWER SOURCE FOR
SECOND IFM BREAKOUT BOX USE. CURRENT IFM PROCEDURES NO LONGER
REQUIRE USE OF 2 BREAKOUT BOXES SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-201
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o41s7
CREW EQUIPMENT
4304
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/]_rNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX OUTPUT POWER CONNECTOR
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
OUTPUT POWER CONNECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUTPUT POWER CONNECTOR SHORTS. TWO BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH
FLIGHT. OUTPUT CONNECTOR IS INTENDED TO BE USED AS _)WER SOURCE
FOR SECOND IFM BREAKOUT BOX USE. CURRENT IFM PROCEDURES NO
LONGER REQUIRE USE OF 2 BREAKOUT BOXES SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-202
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
4305
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX OUTPUT POWER CONNECTOR
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
OUTPUT POWER CONNECTOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
3/3 AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUTPUT POWER CONNECTOR HAS OPEN CIRCUIT. TWO IFM BREAKOUT BOXES
FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. OUTPUT CONNECTOR IS INTENDED TO BE USED AS
POWER SOURCE FOR SECOND IFM BREAKOUT BOX USE. CURRENT IFM
PROCEDURES NO LONGER REQUIRE USE OF 2 BREAKOUT BOXES
SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-203
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87
CREW EQUIPMENT,
4306
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX FUSE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) IFM BREAKOUT BOX
3) FUSE
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE OPENS. TWO IFM BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. SPAKE
FUSE CARRIED IN PIN KIT. CREW REPAIRS CAN REDUCE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY TO "3". BOX SUPPLIES POWER FOR VARIOUS CONTINGENCY
SITUATIONS THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-204
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6104187
CREW EQUIPMENT
4307
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX FUSE HOLDER
INADVERTENT OPERATION, CAP COMES LOOSE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) IFM BREAKOUT BOX
3) FUSE HOLDER
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE HOLDER CAP COMES LOOSE AND FUSE LEAVES BOX DURING
CONTINGENCY OPERATION. TWO IFM BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH
FLIGHT. WORST CASE WOULD PRECLUDE REATTACHMENT OF FUSE HOLDER
CAP. CREW CAN USE SECOND BREAKOUT BOX OR TAPE BROKEN CAP INTO
POSITION. CREW ACTION CAN REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO
A "3". LOSS OF FUSE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF BREAKOUT BOX
FUNCTION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE
AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/9_NC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
4308 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX AWG OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW3)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
AWG OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SW3 SHORTS. TWO IFM BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. SWITCH
SHORTS (28 V) TO ONE OF FOUR SETS OF AWG PIN HOLES. CREW IS
UNABLE TO TURN SWITCH OFF OR SET TO ANOTHER PIN HOLE SET. CREW
CAN OVERCOME FUNCTION OF BROKEN SWITCH BY USING ORBITER-SIDE
POWER OUTLET SWITCH.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-206
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/IR
4309 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX AWG OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW3)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
AWG OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SW3 HAS OPEN CIRCUIT OR SHORT CIRCUIT TO "OFF" SETTING. TWO IFM
BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. CREW CAN USE VARIABLE POWER
CIRCUIT (LIGHTING) SET TO 28 V, TO OVERCOME LOSS OF SWITCH
FUNCTION. CREW CAN ALSO USE SECOND BREAKOUT BOX AS
REPLACEMENT. AS A LAST RESORT CREW CAN PERFORM IFM ON BREAKOUT
BOX. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-207
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
4310
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX PIN CONNECTION OUTLET
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
PIN CONNECTION OUTLET
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: 10134-20001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
12 HOLE PIN CONNECTION OUTLET HAS NO ELECTRICAL OUTPUT DUE TO
CONTAMINATED (PLUGGED) HOLES OR BROKEN CONNECTION. TWO IFM
BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. CREW COULD USE OTHER PIN
CONNECTION OUTLET ON SAME BOX (ASSUMING 28V NEEDED) OR USE SECOND
BREAKOUT BOX. CREW CAN ALSO PERFORM IFM ON BREAKOUT BOX TO
REPAIR PIN CONNECTION OUTLET. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-208
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
4311
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX PIN/WIRE HOLDING BRACKET
PHYSICAL BINDING JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) IFM BREAKOUT BOX
3) PIN/WIRE HOLDING BRACKET
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PIN/WIRE HOLDING BRACKET BINDS/JAMS. UNABLE TO BE ADJUSTED TO
HOLD PIN/WIRE STRUCTURE IN PLACE IN THE PIN CONNECTION OUTLET.
TWO IFM BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. NOT REALLY NEEDED
SINCE PIN AND HOLE HAVE A POSITIVE SNUG FIT. CREW CAN ALSO
USE TAPE TO HOLD PIN IN PLACE.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_3NC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/IR
4312 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX VARIABLE VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
I FM BREAKOUT BOX
VARIABLE VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VARIABLE VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY SHORTS. TWO IFM BOXES FLOWN ON
EACH FLIGHT. CREW CAN USE SECOND BREAKOUT BOX FOR REPLACEMENT OF
VARIABLE VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY FUNCTION. CREW CAN USE PIN KIT AND
VARIABLE LIGHTING RHEOSTAT AS ANOTHER REPLACEMENT. THIS
CREW ACTION REDUCES HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "3". LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-210
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/IR
4313 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX VARIABLE VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
VARIABLE VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VARIABLE VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY HAS AN OPEN CIRCUIT. TWO IFM
BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. CREW CAN USE SECOND
BREAKOUT BOX FOR REPLACEMENT OF VARIABLE VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY
FUNCTION. CREW CAN USE PIN KIT AND VARIABLE LIGHTING RHEOSTAT
AS REPLACEMENT. THIS CREW ACTION REDUCES HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY
ONE TO A "3". LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-211
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
4314
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/F[_C
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX 28 V/VARIABLE SWITCH (SW2)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
28 V/VARIABLE SWITCH (SW2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SW2 SHORTS. TWO IFM BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. UNABLE
TO OPEN SWITCH AND TURN POWER OFF. CREW CAN USE ORBITER-SIDE
POWER OUTLET SWITCH TO OVERCOME LOSS OF SWITCH FUNCTION.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-212
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
61o4187
CREW EQUIPMENT
4315
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX 28 V/VARIABLE SWITCH (SW2)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
28 V/VARIABLE SWITCH (SW2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR _OA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO.: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SW2 HAS AN OPEN CIRCUIT. TWO IFM BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH
FLIGHT. CREW CAN USE SECOND BREAKOUT BOX AS REPLACEMENT OR
PERFORM IFM TO REPAIR BROKEN SWITCH. CREW CAN ALSO USE PIN KIT
AND VARIABLE LIGHTING RHEOSTAT AS REPLACEMENT. THIS CREW ACTION
REDUCES CRITICALITY BY ONE TO A "3". LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE ANDVEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-213
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/IR
4316 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX AWG OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW4)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) IFM BREAKOUT BOX
3) AWG OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW4)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SW4 HAS AN OPEN CIRCUIT OR SHORTS IN "OFF" POSITION. TWO IFM
BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. CREW CAN USE SECOND
BREAKOUT BOX OR PERFORM IFM ON BROKEN BREAKOUT BOX. CREW CAN
ALSO USE PIN KIT AND VARIABLE LIGHTING RHEOSTAT FOR REPLACEMENT
FUNCTION. CREW ACTIONS REDUCE HARDWARE CRITICALITY BY ONE TO
"3". LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-214
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
4317 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IFM BREAKOUT BOX AWG OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW4)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
IFM BREAKOUT BOX
OUTPUT SELECT SWITCH (SW4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10134-20001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TWO IFM BREAKOUT BOXES FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT. SWITCH SHORTS TO
ONE OF FOUR AWG PIN SETS. UNABLE TO SWITCH TO DIFFERENT AWG
SETTING. CREW CAN USE SW2 OR ORBITER-SIDE POWER OUTLET SWITCH TO
TURN POWER OFF. CREW CAN USE SECOND BREAKOUT BOX OR PIN KIT TO
PROVIDE REPLACEMENT FUNCTION FOR DIFFERENT AWG SETTING.
REFERENCES:
SCHEMATIC
10134-20001, JSC-17321, IFM BREAKOUT BOX ELECTRICAL
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-215
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY WATER HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
INA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY EPD&C
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
WATER HEATER
CIRCUIT BREAKER
SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86B
CB24
CAUSES: OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILING THE WATER HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN WILL ELIMINATE FIVE
OF THE SIX WATER HEATERS. ONE HEATER IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO HEAT
THE WATER TO REQUIRED TEMPERATURE. WORST CASE WOULD MEAN
ALTERNATE MEANS OF HEATING BEVERAGES WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND AND
THAT IT MAY TAKE LONGER TO HEAT OTHER FOOD IN THE OVEN (ASSUMING
REHYDRATION WITH AMBIENT WATER).
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-216
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
FAILS "OFF"
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
3/3 AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILING THE GALLEY POWER BUS SWITCH "OFF" WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS
OF FIVE OF THE SIX WATER HEATERS. ONE HEATER IS NOT SUFFICIENT
TO HEAT THE WATER TO THE REQUIRED TEMPERATURES. WORST CASE WOULD
REQUIRE ALTERNATE MEANS OF HEATING BEVERAGES.
ALSO, HEATING FOOD IN THE OVEN MIGHT TAKE LONGER DUE TO
REHYDRATION WITH AMBIENT AS OPPOSED TO HEATED WATER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
B/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
FAILS "ON"
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
B)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILING THE HEATER SWITCH "ON" MEANS THAT WATER WILL ALWAYS BE
HEATING. ASSUMING THAT THE THERMOSTATS AND RECIRCULATION PUMP
CONTINUE TO WORK PROPERLY, THE FAILURE SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
THE OPERATION OF THE GALLEY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-218
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8103187
CREW EQUIPMENT
5104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
DC POWER BUS B SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTAMINATION OF THE SWITCH MEANS THAT A SUBSET OF THE WATER
HEATERS WILL ALWAYS BE ON OR ALWAYS OFF (DEPENDING UPON THE
CONTAMINATON PATTERN AND SWITCH POSITION). SINCE TOTAL FAILURE
OF THE SWITCH DOES NOT PRESENT CRITICAL FAILURES, A PARTIAL
FAILURE OF THE SWITCH IS ALSO NOT CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-219
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/:3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POTABLE WATER HEATER TELEMETRY
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY EPD&C
3) WATER HEATER STATUS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
V62S0706E
CAUSES: ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON THE TELEMETRY MEANS AN INCORRECT STATUS WILL
BE REFLECTED. IT HAS NO AFFECT ON ACTUAL OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-220
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RECIRCULATION PUMP
FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) HOT WATER SYSTEM
4 ) RECIRCULATION PUMP
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: P1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RECIRCULATION PUMP IS A PART OF THE WATER HEATING SYSTEM
MIXING HOT AND COLD WATER TO ENSURE EVEN AND EFFICIENT HEATING.
FAILURE OF THE PUMP TO START MEANS THE WATER WILL NOT BE HEATED
AND ALTERNATE METHODS OF HEATING BEVERAGES/REHYDRATABLE FOOD
MUST BE FOUND. ALSO, THERE MAY NOT BE ENOUGH PRESSURE TO
DISPENSE HOT WATER TO THE REHYDRATION STATION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-221
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5107
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RECIRCULATION PUMP
FAILS TO STOP
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_JNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) HOT WATER SYSTEM
4 ) RECIRCULATION PUMP
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: P1
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RECIRCULATION PUMP IS DESIGNED TO OPERATE WHEN THE WATER
TEMPERATURE IS BETWEEN 145 DEGREES AND 165 DEGREES F, AND AS HOT
WATER IS DISPENSED. THE PUMP REMAINS RUNNING AT OTHER THAN
DESIRED TEMPERATURES, AN INCREASE IN HEATER DUTY CYCLES COULD
OCCUR.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-222
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RECIRCULATION THERMOSTAT
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) HOT WATER SYSTEM
4) RECIRCULATION PUMP
5) THERMOSTAT
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT_ /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE RECIRCULATION PUMP THERMOSTAT TO OPEN WILL CAUSE
THE RECIRCULATION PUMP TO CONTINUE RUNNING AT HIGHER THAN DESIRED
TEMPERATURE. THIS WILL RESULT IN INEFFICIENT HEATING OF THE
WATER AND INCREASED HEATER DUTY CYCLES.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-223
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RECIRCULATION THERMOSTAT
FAILS TO CLOSE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) HOT WATER SYSTEM
RECIRCULATION PUMP
THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE RECIRCULATION PUMP THERMOSTAT TO CLOSE MEANS THE
PUMP WILL NOT TURN ON TO RECIRCULATE WATER. THIS MEANS THE WATER
HEATING CANNOT BE GUARANTEED AND ALTERNATE METHODS MUST BE USED.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-224
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5110
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HOT WATER TANK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) HOT WATER SYSTEM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE HOT WATER TANK WILL RESULT IN FREE
WATER IN THE CABIN AND ONLY CHILLED WATER REMAINING THRU THE
GALLEY. WATER CAN BE OBTAINED THRU THE EMERGENCY WATER DISPENSER
ASSEMBLY. THE MISSION CAN BE AFFECTED IF REDUNDANT MEANS OF
CONTAINING WATER (i.e. SHUT OFF VALVES) FAIL. WITH THE ADDITION
OF THE ACCUMULATOR THIS FAILURE IS UNLIKELY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5111
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER TANK HEATERS
FAIL OFF
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/F[_C
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) HOT WATER SYSTEM
4 ) HEATER
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE WATER TANK HEATERS MEANS THAT ALTERNATE MEANS OF
HEATING BEVERAGES/REHYDRATABLE FOOD MUST BE FOUND.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-226
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER TANK HEATERS
FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) HOT WATER SYSTEM
4 ) HEATER
s)
6)
?)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILING ALL THE WATER TANK HEATERS "ON" WILL RESULT IN CONTINUOUS
HEAT BEING APPLIED TO THE WATER/TANK AND POSSIBLE
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE TANK. IF JUST ONE HEATER FAILS "ON",
THE REQUIRED CYCLING OF THE HEATERS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY
THE REMAINING HEATERS. THE ADDITION OF THE ACCUMULATOR WILL
PREVENT DAMAGE IN THE CASE OF OVERPRESSURIZATION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-227
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: WATER TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) HOT WATER SYSTEM
4) HEATER
5) THERMOSTAT
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE THERMOSTAT TO OPEN WILLHAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS A
HEATER FAILING ON. EACH HEATER HAS TWO REDUNDANT THERMOSTATS SO
THAT BOTH THERMOSTATS MUST FAIL TO OPEN FOR THE HEATER TO REMAIN
ON. A SERIES OF TWELVE THERMOSTATS MUST FAIL TO HAVE ALL
SIX HEATERS REMAINING ON.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-228
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: WATER TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) HOT WATER SYSTEM
4) HEATER
5) THERMOSTAT
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A THERMOSTAT FAILING TO CLOSE WILL HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS A
HEATER FAILING OFF.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-229
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
elO318 
CREW EQUIPMENT
5115
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/F_JNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HOT WATER TEMPERATURE GAUGE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
HOT WATER TEMPERATURE GAUGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS DISPLAY OF THE WATER TEMPERATURE MEANS THE CREW WILL
THINK THE HOT WATER IS A DIFFERENT TEMPERATURE THAN IT ACTUALLY
IS. ALL OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE AND THE ACUTAL WATER
TEMPERATURE CAN BE DETERMINED BY SAMPLING THE WATER OUTLET.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-230
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o3/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY OVEN CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) OVEN
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86B
CB20
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GALLEY OVEN CIRCUIT BREAKER PROVIDES POWER TO THE OVEN
HEATERS AND TO THE GALLEY CONTROL ELECTRONICS. ALL FUNCTIONS OF
THE GALLEY ARE LOST DUE TO THE ELECTRONICS FAILURE. WATER WILL
STILL BE AVAILABLE THRU THE CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-231
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/04/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5117
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
FAILS "OFF"
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JAMMING THE GALLEY POWER BUS IN THE "OFF" POSITION WILL PREVENT
POWER FROM REACHING THE OVEN HEATERS AND THE GALLEY CONTROL
ELECTRONICS. THE CONTROL ELECTRONICS ELIMINATE ALL GALLEY
FUNCTIONS - LEAVING WATER TO BE OBTAINED THROUGH THE CWDA.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-232
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
 /o4/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5118
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
FAILS "ON"
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILING THE SWITCH "ON" SIMPLY MEANS POWER WILL CONTINUOUSLY BE
APPLIED TO THE OVEN HEATERS AND CONTROL. THE THERMOSTATS SHOULD
CONTINUE TO CYCLE TO MAINTAIN TEMPERATURE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-233
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3 ,
ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
DC POWER BUS A SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SINCE THERE ARE 3 SETS OF CONTACTS, THIS FAILURE COULD HAVE
VARYING RESULTS. IT COULD MEAN LOSS OF POWER TO: i) ONE OF SIX
HEATERS IN THE WATER HEATER WHICH WOULD NOT ADVERSELY EFFECT
NORMAL OPERATIONS, HOWEVER WOULD INDICATE LOSS OF POWER TO THE
GALLEY VIA TELEMETRY, 2) TO THE HEATER COILS, WHICH WOULD
ELIMINATE THE USE OF THE OVEN, 3) TO THE CONTROL ELECTRONICS
WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE USE OF THE ENTIRE GALLEY. WATER WOULD
STILL BE AVAILABLE TO THE CREW.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-234
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
5120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FOOD OVEN TELEMETRY
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) FOOD OVEN STATUS
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V62S0702E
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL GIVE AN INCORRECT INDICATION OF WHETHER THE OVEN IS "ON" BUT
WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE ACTUAL OPERATION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-235
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY FAN CIRCUIT BREAKERS
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) FAN
4 ) CIRCUIT BREAKERS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL MA73C
PHASE A - CB26; PHASE B - CB27; PHASE C - CB28
CAUSES: OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF THE FANS WHICH CIRCULATE AIR
IN THE OVEN FOR EVEN HEATING. OVEN PERFORMANCE WOULD BE DEGRADED
AND COULD EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE THE USE OF THE OVEN FOR
CONVECTIVE HEATING.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-236
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
5122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
, FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY OVEN FAN SWITCH
FAILS "ON"
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) OVEN FAN SWITCH
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF THE FANS WHICH CIRCULATE AIR
IN THE OVEN FOR EVEN HEATING. OVEN PERFORMANCE WOULD BE
DEGRADED. THIS FAILURE COULD EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE THE USE OF
THE OVEN FOR CONVECTION HEATING.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8124187
CREW EQUIPMENT
5123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY OVEN FAN SWITCH
FAILS "ON"
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) OVEN FAN SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN CONTINUOUS OPERATION OF THE FANS.
THIS WOULD HAVE NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE OPERATION OF THE OVEN.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-238
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24//87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN FAN - MOTOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
) OVEN
4) FAN MOTOR
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY OVEN
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF 3 FANS WOULD HAVE MINIMAL EFFECT ON THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE OVEN.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-239
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/:3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN FAN - MOTOR
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) OVEN
4) FAN MOTOR
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ONE OF 3 FANS. THIS WOULD HAVE A
MINIMAL EFFECT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OVEN.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-240
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN FAN - MOTOR
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) OVEN
4 ) FAN MOTOR
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS WILL RESULT IN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF 1 OF 3 OVEN FANS, AND WILL
PROBABLY TRIP THE BREAKERS WHICH WILL SHUT DOWN THE OTHER 2 FANS
RESULTING IN LOSS OF CONVECTION HEATING IN THE OVEN.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-241
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5127
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN FAN
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) OVEN
4) FAN
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF 3 FANS WILL HAVE MINIMAL EFFECT ON THE PERFORMANCE
OF THE OVEN.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-242
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: OVEN THERMOSTAT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) OVEN
4 ) THERMOSTAT
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE ARE REDUNDANT THERMOSTATS IN EACH OF THE 4 HEATING ELEMENTS
IN THE OVEN. FAILURE OF ONE WILL NOT EFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF
THE OVEN.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-243
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN THERMOSTAT
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) OVEN
4 ) THERMOSTAT
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1 OF 4 HEATING ELEMENTS IN
THE OVEN. THIS WILL INCREASE THE DUTY CYCLES OF THE OTHER 3
ELEMENTS AND COULD RESULT IN MORE TIME REQUIRED TO HEAT FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-244
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN HEATER
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) OVEN
4) HEATER
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A SINGLE HEATING ELEMENT WILL RESULT IN LESS EFFICIENT
OVEN PERFORMANCE AND INCREASED DUTY CYCLE OF OTHER 3 ELEMENTS.
LOSS OF ALL HEATING ELEMENTS ELIMINATES USE OF THE OVEN FOR
HEATING FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-245
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN DOOR LAUNCH/ENTRY RESTRAINING STRAP
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
OVEN DOOR
LAUNCH/ENTRY RESTRAINING STRAP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE LAUNCH/ENTRY RESTRAINING STRAP CAN RESULT IN THE
OVEN DOOR SWINGING OPEN DURING LAUNCH AND POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO THE
DOOR. IF THE DAMAGE IS SEVERE ENOUGH, IT WILL ADVERSELY EFFECT
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OVEN. THE CREW CAN SECURE THE DOOR
FOR REENTRY WITH TAPE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-246
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITS: OVEN DOOR
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURALFAIL_E
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) OVEN DOOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTENT OF DAMAGE WILL DETERMINE THE EFFECT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF
THE OVEN. IF THE DOOR CANNOT BE USED AT ALL IT WILL ELIMINATE
THE USE OF THE OVEN FOR HEATING FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-247
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN DOOR
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) OVEN DOOR
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE DOOR CANNOT BE CLOSED IT WILL ELIMINATE USE OF THE OVEN
FOR HEATING FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-248
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN DOOR LATCH
FAILS TO RELEASE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) OVEN DOOR
4 ) LATCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HAND TOOLS ON-BOARD CAN BE USED TO FORCE THE SPRING LATCHES OPEN
IF THE LATCH PUSH MECHANISM FAILS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5135
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN DOOR LATCH
FAILS TO LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) OVEN DOOR
4) LATCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c C ]
LOCATION: GALLEY OVEN
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOOR CAN BE TAPED SHUT IF LATCH WILL NOT WORK.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-250
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: OVEN DOOR TRACK
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) OVEN DOOR
4 ) DOOR TRACK
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DOOR _OT BE STORED IN TRACK IT WILL HAVE LITTLE EFFECT AS
LONG AS THE DOOR CAN BE OPENED. IF FAILURE PREVENTS THE DOOR
FROM BEING USED TO CLOSE THE OVEN IT WILL ELIMINATE THE USE OF
THE OVEN.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-251
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5137
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN DOOR TRACK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) OVEN DOOR
4 ) DOOR TRACK
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TRACK IS NOT NECESSARY TO THE OPERATION OF THE OVEN, HOWEVER
IF IT PREVENTS THE DOOR FROM BEING USED TO CLOSE THE OVEN, IT
WILL ELIMINATE THE USE OF THE OVEN.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-252
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8124187
CREW EQUIPMENT
5138
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN GASKET
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) OVEN
4 ) GASKET
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /N A
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREVENT THE OVEN DOOR FROM SEALING AND REDUCE
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OVEN. IT WILL TAKE LONGER TO HEAT FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-253
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5139
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN SHELF ASSEMBLY - UPPER RACK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
OVEN
UPPER RACK SHELF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DAMAGE TO THIS RACK CAN EFFECT THE PLACEMENT OF FOOD PACKETS IN
THE OVEN AND RESTRICT CIRCULATION. THIS COULD CAUSE UNEVEN
HEATING OF THE FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-254
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5140
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOWER SHELF ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) OVEN
4) LOWER SHELF ASSEMBLY
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DAMAGE TO THE SHELF CAN EFFECT PLACEMENT OF PACKETS IN THE OVEN
AND RESTRICT CIRCULATION. THIS CAN CAUSE UNEVEN HEATING OF THE
FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-255
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5141
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOWER TRACKS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) OVEN
4 ) LOWER TRACKS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DAMAGE TO THE RACK CAN EFFECT PLACEMENT OF THE FOOD PACKETS IN
THE OVEN AND RESTRICT CIRCULATION. THIS CAN CAUSE UNEVEN HEATING
OF THE FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-256
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN SCREEN
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) OVEN
4 ) SCREEN
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFiNG: /NA
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
3/3 AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEBRIS FILTER PROTECTS THE REST OF OVEN IN CASE OF PACKAGE
BREAKAGE. RESTRICTED CIRCULATION WILL CAUSE UNEVEN HEATING OF
FOOD. THIS PROBLEM CAN BE FIXED BY CLEANING THE SCREEN.
REFERENCES : JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-257
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5143
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN SCREEN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) OVEN
4 ) SCREEN
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
I2tNDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEVERELY BENT SCREEN COULD IMPINGE ON ONE OR MORE FANS WHICH
WOULD LIMIT AIR CIRCULATION IN THE OVEN. A LARGE HOLE IN THE
SCREEN WOULD PERMIT ANY CONTAMINANTS TO CIRCULATE IN THE OVEN AND
POSSIBLY DAMAGE THE FANS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-258
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5144
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SPRING LOADED PLATE
FAILS MID-TRAVEL
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) OVEN
4 ) SPRING LOADED PLATE (S)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SPRING LOADED PLATE WOULD MEAN PARTIAL LOSS OF
CONDUCTIVE HEATING FOR HEATING FOOD IN THE OVEN. THERE ARE 4
SPRING LOADED PLATES. REHYDRATED FOODS COULD STILL BE HEATED
WITH CONVECTIVE HEAT IN THE LOWER RACK.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-259
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5145
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN SPRING CLIP
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) OVEN
4 ) SPRING PLATE
5) RETAINING CLIP
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE RETAINING CLIP WILL HAVE NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE OVEN, EVEN THOUGH IT MIGHT MAKE IT MORE
DIFFICULT FOR THE CREW TO LOAD FOOD POUCHES ONTO THE SPRING
PLATES.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-260
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5146
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OVEN FINNED PLATE HEAT SINK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) OVEN
4) FINNED PLATE HEAT SINK
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY OVEN
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKS AIR FLOW - CONVECTIVE HEATING OF FOOD IN OVEN IS REDUCED -
IT WILL TAKE LONGER TO HEAT FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-261
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5147
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GALLEY CONTROL ELECTRONICS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY EPD&C
3) RHS
4) CONTROL ELECTRONICS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD RESULT IN INCORRECT VOLUME OF WATER BEING DISPENSED AT
REHYDRATION STATION OR PHS; OR COMPLETE LOSS OF GALLEY WATER
SYSTEM. WATER WOULD STILL BE AVAILABLE TO CREW THRU THE
AUXILIARY PORT.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-262
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5148
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
JAMS IN ONE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FALURE MEANS THAT THE CREW WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SELECT THE
AMOUNT OF WATER TO BE DISPENSED, AND WILL HAVE TO SETTLE FOR THE
AMOUNT INDICATED BY THE SELECTOR. THIS MAY AFFECT THE
CONSISTENCY OR TASTE OF THE FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-263
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
5149
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE AN ACCURATE MEASURE OF WATER TO THE
REHYDRATION STATION FOR ADDING WATER TO FOOD PACKAGES. ALTERNATE
METHODS WILL HAVE TO BE USED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-264
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5150
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: MULTIPLE OUTPUTS
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
WATER QUANTITY SELECTOR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE MEANS AN INCORRECT VOLUME OF WATER MAY BE ADDED TO
FOOD WHICH WILL EFFECT ITS CONSISTENCY AND TASTE. WORST CASE -
TOO MUCH WATER MAY BE ADDED TO PACKAGE RESULTING IN WATER
LEAKAGE.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-265
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5151
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REHYDRATION PUMP
FAILS "ON"
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
REHYDRATION STATION PUMP (P2)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
3/3 AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: P2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ERRONEOUS INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTINUOUS RUNNING OF THE PUMP SHOULD NOT EFFECT THE OPERATION OF
THE REHYDRATION STATION, HOWEVER IT MAY SHORTEN THE LIFE OF THE
PUMP. THIS PUMP IS NOW USED TO RECIRCULATE COLD WATER BACK TO
AMBIENT - IF THE COLD WATER CONTINUES TO CIRCULATE, IT
COULD EFFECT THE EFFICIENCY OF THE HEATING COILS IN THE HOT WATER
LOOP SINCE THEY WILL HAVE TO HEAT COLD WATER INSTEAD OF AMBIENT.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-266
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5152
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REHYDRATION PUMP
FAILS "OFF"
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
REHYDRATION STATION PUMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: P2
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE PUMP OFF THERE MAY NOT BE ADEQUATE PRESSURE IN THE LINE
TO PROPERLY REHYDRATE THE FOOD PACKAGES WITH COLD WATER. HOT
WATER WILL STILL BE AVAILABLE TO REHYDRATE THE FOOD. ALSO, COLD
WATER WILL NOT BE RECIRCULATED, SO THE COLD WATER LOOP WILL
WARM UP.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-267
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS LEVER ARM CONTROL
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) RHS
4) LEVER ARM CONTROL
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDWIFUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ACTIVATES INTERLOCK SWITCH. SWITCH MUST ALSO BE OPENED BETWEEN
EACH SUCCESSIVE WATER DISPENSING. IF FAILURE PREVENTS SWITCH
FROM CYCLING, THE REHYDRATION STATION WILL NOT DISPENSE WATER.
ALTERNATE MEANS WILL HAVE TO BE USED TO REHYDRATE FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-268
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8124187
CREW EQUIPMENT
5154
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS LEVER ARM CONTROL
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) RNs
4) LEVER ARM CONTROL
5)
6)
7)
8)
a)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREVENT ACTIVATION OF THE INTERLOCK SWITCH AND
THE HYDRATION STATION WILL NOT DISPENSE WATER. ALTERNATE MEANS
WILL HAVE TO BE USED TO REHYDRATE FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-269
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8124187
CREW EQUIPMENT
5155
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REHYDRATIONSTATION SWITCH
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY EPD&C
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REHYDRATION SYSTEM
INTERLOCK SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE REHYDRATION SWITCH IS AN INTEGRAL INTERLOCK SWITCH WHICH
CLOSES WHEN THE FOOD PACKET IS CORRECTLY INSERTED. IF IT DOES
NOT CYCLE TO "CLOSED" AND BACK TO "OPEN" WATER WILL NOT BE
DISPENSED. ALTERNATE MEANS WILL BE REQUIRED TO REHYDRATE FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-270
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5156
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REHYDRATION STATION SWITCH
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY EPD&C
3) REHYDRATION SYSTEM
4) INTERLOCK SWITCH
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE REHYDRATION STATION WILL NOT DISPENSE WATER IF THIS SWITCH IS
CLOSED. ALTERNATE MEANS WILL HAVE TO BE USED TO REHYDRATE FOOD.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-271
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/24/57
CREW EQUIPMENT
5157
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLD WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SWITCH
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
COLD WATER FILL SYSTEM
PUSH BUTTON SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THIS SWITCH FAILS OPEN, THE REHYDRATION STATION CANNOT
DISPENSE COLD WATER. HOT WATER WILL NOT BE EFFECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-272
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5158
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLD WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SWITCH
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
COLD WATER FILL SYSTEM
PUSH BUTTON SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THIS SWITCH FAILS CLOSED, THE SOLENOID VALVE ON THE CHILLED
WATER WILL REMAIN OPEN ALL THE TIME. THE CREW WILL NOT BE ABLE
TO REGULATE THE WATER TEMPERATURE AT THE REHYDRATION STATION.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-273
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
5159
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLD WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
COLD WATER FILL SYSTEM
INDICATOR LIGHT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF THE
SYSTEM, HOWEVER IT WILL INCORRECTLY INDICATE THAT THE COLD WATER
VALVE IS STUCK OPEN.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-274
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5160
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/,3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLD WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY EPD&C
3) COLD WATER FILL SYSTEM
INDICATOR LIGHT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF THE
SYSTEM, HOWEVER, IT WILL INCORRECTLY INDICATE THAT COLD WATER IS
NOT AVAILABLE AT THE REHYDRATION STATION.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-275
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5161
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT¢
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS CHILLED WATER FEED SOLENOID/VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
RHS WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM
CHILLED WATER FEED SOLENOID/VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SV4
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COLD WATER WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THE REHYDRATION STATION.
THIS WILLHAVE NO EFFECT ON THE HOT WATER.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-276
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5162
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: RHS CHILLED WATER FEED SOLENOID/VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
RHS WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM
CHILLED WATER FEED SOLENOID/VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SV4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE MEANS THAT CHILLED WATER CANNOT BE ELIMINATED FROM
THE DISPENSER AT THE REHYDRATION STATION. THE CREW CAN STILL
SELECT HOT WATER, BUT WILL GET A MIXTURE.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-277
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5163
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS OUTLET SOLENOID VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
RHS WATER SUPPLY
OUTLET SOLENOID/VALVE
SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SV3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREVENT HOT WATER FROM BEING DISPENSED AT THE
REHYDRATION STATION. COLD WATER WILL STILL BE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-278
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5164
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS OUTLET SOLENOID VALVE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
RHS WATER SUPPLY
OUTLET SOLENOID/VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SV3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN SOME LEAKAGE. HOWEVER, THE WATER
CAN BE SHUT OFF UPSTREAM USING THE HOT WATER SOLENOID VALVE AND
THE COLD WATER SOLENOID VALVE.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-279
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW 'EQUIPMENT
5165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
RHS WATER SUPPLY
BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SV2
A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPLY WATER BY BY-PASSING THE ELECTRONIC
FILLING MECHANISM. IF THE ELECTRONIC MECHANISM HAS ALSO FAILED,
AN ALTERNATE METHOD OF REHYDRATING FOOD WILL BE REQUIRED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-280
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5166
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: RHS BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
RHS WATER SUPPLY
BYPASS SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SV2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WATER WILL CONTINUOUSLY BY-PASS THE ELECTRONIC FILLING MECHANISM
AND WATER HEATER. THIS WILL AFFECT THE TEMPERATURE OF THE HOT
WATER BEING DISPENSED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-281
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5167
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HOT WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SWITCH
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
HOT WATER FILL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THIS SWITCH FAILS OPEN, THE REHYDRATION STATION CANNOT
DISPENSE HOT WATER. THE COLD WATER WILL NOT BE EFFECTED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-282
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5168
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HOT WATER FILL PUSH BUTTON SWITCH
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
HOT WATER FILL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THIS SWITCH FAILS CLOSED, THE HOT WATER SOLENOID VALVE WILL
REMAIN OPEN CONTINUOUSLY. THE HOT WATER LOOP WILL HAVE TO BE
CLOSED TO PREVENT LEAKAGE. COLD WATER WILL STILL BE AVAILABLE AT
THE REHYDRATION STATION.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-283
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5169
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HOT WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
HOT WATER FILL SYSTEM
INDICATOR LIGHT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF THE
SYSTEM, HOWEVER, IT WILL INCORRECTLY INDICATE THAT THE HOT WATER
VALVE IS STUCK OPEN.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-284
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5170
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/3
/NA
ITEM: HOT WATER FILL SWITCH - LIGHT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
HOT WATER FILL SYSTEM
INDICATOR LIGHT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, BURNS OUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF THE
SYSTEM, HOWEVER, IT WILL INCORRECTLY INDICATE THAT HOT WATER IS
NOT AVAILABLE AT THE REHYDRATION STATION.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-285
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8124187
CREW EQUIPMENT
5171
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLD WATER RECIRCULATION SOLENOID/VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY EPD&C
RHS WATER SUPPLY
HOT WATER FEED SOLENOID/VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SVI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COLD WATER WILL NOT BE RECIRCULATED WHICH WILL ALLOW THE WATER IN
THE LINE TO WARM UP BETWEEN DISPENSING CYCLES.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-286
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5172
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLD WATER RECIRCULATION SOLENOID/VALVE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
RHS WATER SUPPLY
HOT WATER FEED SOLENOID/VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: SVI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MEANS THAT COLD WATER WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY RECYCLED.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6,6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-287
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5173
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS NEEDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) REHYDRATION SYSTEM
4 ) NEEDLE
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PLUGGED NEEDLE WILL PREVENT DISPENSING WATER AT THE REHYDRATION
STATION. SPARE NEEDLES ARE ALWAYS FLOWN AND EASILY CHANGED OUT
BY CREWMEN.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-288
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5174
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS CUP RETAINER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) RHS
4 ) CUP RETAINER
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE CUP RETAINER IS DAMAGED SO THAT FOOD PACKAGES CANNOT BE
INSTALLED IN IT, THE REHYDRATION STATION WILL BE UNUSABLE AND
ALTERNATE METHODS OF REHYDRATING FOOD WILL HAVE TO BE USED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-289
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS CUP RETAINER PARALLEL RODS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) RHS
4) CUP RETAINER
5) PARALLEL RODS
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE ACTUAL OPERATION OF
THE REHYDRATION STATION, HOWEVER IT WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT
FOR CREWMEN TO ALIGN THE FOOD PACKAGES WITH THE REHYDRATION
NEEDLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-290
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5176
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: RHS CUP RETAINER PARALLEL RODS
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) RHS
4 ) CUP RETAINER
5) PARALLEL RODS
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE COULD PREVENT INSERTION OF THE NEEDLE INTO THE FOOD
PACKAGES RENDERING THE REHYDRATION STATION UNUSABLE. ALTERNATE
METHODS OF REHYDRATION WOULD HAVE TO BE USED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-291
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5177
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RHS "TRANSPARENT CHAMBER"
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) RHS
4 ) TRANSPARENT CHAMBER
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A CRACKED CHAMBER COULD ALLOW SOME WATER LEAKAGE IF FREE WATER
RESULTS FROM THE REHYDRATION PROCEDURE.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-292
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 8/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5178
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: INLET WATER CONNECTIONS
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) GALLEY
3) WATER SUPPLY
4) CONNECTIONS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN INADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY TO THE
GALLEY. IF THE CHILLED WATER CONNECTOR WAS PLUGGED, THERE WOULD
BE NO COLD WATER.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-293
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5179
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET WATER CONNECTIONS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3 ) WATER SUPPLY
4 ) INLET CONNECTIONS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WATER LEAKAGE AT THE CONNECTION OF THE GALLEY TO THE WATER SUPPLY
LINES WILL RESULT IN FREE WATER IN THE CABIN. THE WATER CAN BE
SHUT-OFF UPSTREAM OF THE CONNECTIONS, BUT IT WILL MEAN NO WATER
WILL BE AVAILABLE TO THE GALLEY. IF ALTERNATE WATER
SUPPLIES ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO THE CREW, THE MISSION MAY HAVE TO
BE TERMINATED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-294
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5180
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANUAL SHUT OFF VALVE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
GALLEY
WATER SUPPLY
MANUAL SHUT OFF VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
3/2R AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: GALLEY
PART NUMBER: M_3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE SHUTS OFF AMBIENT WATER TO THE GALLEY IF THE GALLEY
WATER SYSTEM LEAKS HOT WATER ON ORBIT. IF THE VALVE CANNOT BE
CLOSED THE SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO LEAK UNTIL THE SUPPLY IS
CLOSED UPSTREAM OF THE GALLEY. IF LEAKAGE IS SEVERE IT COULD
EFFECT THE LENGTH OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-295
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/24/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5181
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AUXILIARY PORT - POTABLE WATER
RESTRICTED FLOW
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: B. RICHARD
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) GALLEY
3) WATER SUPPLY
4 ) AUXILIARY PORT
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GALLEY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREVENT USE OF THE AUXILIARY PORT FOR POTABLE
WATER. OTHER MEANS WILL HAVE TO BE USED.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, SSSH 6.6
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-296
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/28/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5300
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER QUICK DISCONNECTS
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTIONS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF EITHER QUICK DISCONNECT FAILS (ON AMBIENT OR CHILLED WATER
INPUTS) THE CREWMAN CAN DISCONNECT THAT LINE AND USE THE OTHER
FOR REHYDRATION USES, ETC. IF THE PERSONAL HYGIENE CONTROL VALVE
DISCONNECT FAILS, IFM PROCEDURES WILL RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. AS
A LAST RESORT THE CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER CAN BE USED.
MISSION ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-297
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER QUICK DISCONNECTS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTIONS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF EITHER QUICK DISCONNECT FAILS (ON AMBIENT OR CHILLED WATER
INPUTS) THE CREWMAN CAN DISCONNECT THAT LINE AND USE THE OTHER
FOR REHYDRATION USES, ETC. IF THE PERSONAL HYGIENE CONTROL VALVE
DISCONNECT FAILS, IFM PROCEDURES WILL RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. AS A
LAST RESORT THE CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER CAN BE USED. MISSION
ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-298
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
5302 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
WATER VALVE
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER AMBIENT/CHILLED/OFF
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
AMBIENT/CHILLED/OFF WATER VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF VALVE TO MOVE FROM "OFF" POSITION WOULD NOT PRECLUDE
USE OF PERSONAL HYGIENE VALVE OR CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER.
MISSION ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-299
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
5303 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
WATER VALVE
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER AMBIENT/CHILLED/OFF
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
X)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
AMBIENT/CHILLED/OFF WATER VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MISSION ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY. CREW IFM
PROCEDURES WOULD BE USED TO REPAIR LEAKING COMPONENT/CONNECTION.
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WOULD BE CONTAINED IN WATER DISPENSER ASSEMBLY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-300
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
5304 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
WATER VALVE
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER AMBIENT/CHILLED/OFF
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
AMBIENT/CHILLED/OFF WATER VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF VALVE TO MOVE FROM AMBIENT TO CHILLED (OR VICE VERSA)
WOULD STILL ALLOW USE OF THE OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER,
PERSONAL HYGIENE VALVE, OR CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER. MISSION
ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-301
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
5305 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO ALLOW WATER TO REACH END OF DISPENSER FOR NEEDLE VALVE
DISPENSING. CREWMAN CAN STILL OBTAIN WATER THROUGH USE OF BYPASS
VALVE, CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER, OR PERSONAL HYGIENE VALVE.
MISSION ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-302
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 5306 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONSTANT WATER PRESSURE AT
REHYDRATION NEEDLE. CREW IFM PROCEDURES WOULD BE USED TO REPAIR
LEAKING COMPONENT/CONNECTION. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WOULD BE
CONTAINED IN WATER DISPENSER ASSEMBLY. MISSION ABORT NEEDED FOR
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-303
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/oi/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5307
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER BYPASS VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
BYPASS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BYPASS VALVE IS A CONTINGENCY DEVICE ON WATER DISPENSER. MISSION
BORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY. CONTINGENCY WATER
DISPENSER STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-304
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/01/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5308
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER BYPASS VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
BYPASS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BYPASS VALVE IS A CONTINGENCY DEVICE ON WATER DISPENSER. CREW
IFM PROCEDURES WOULD BE USED TO REPAIR LEAKING
COMPONENT/CONNECTION. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WOULD BE CONTAINED IN
WATER DISPENSER ASSEMBLY. MISSION ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-305
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/Ol/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5309
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER SOLENOID VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BYPASS VALVE CAN STILL BE USED TO SUPPLY WATER TO THE REHYDRATION
NEEDLE. CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER ALSO AVAILABLE. MISSION
ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-306
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/Ol/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5310
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER SOLENOID VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
3 ) SOLENOID VALVE
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: SED48101600
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW IFM PROCEDURES WOULD BE USED TO REPAIR LEAKING
COMPONENT/CONNECTION. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WOULD BE CONTAINED IN
WATER DISPENSER ASSEMBLY. BYPASS VALVE CAN STILL BE USED TO
SUPPLY WATER TO THE REHYDRATION NEEDLE. MISSION ABORT NEEDED
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-307
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/Ol/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5311
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER ROTARY SELECTION
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPEATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
ROTARY SELECTION SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
3/2R AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH FAILS OFF (SOLENOID DISPENSING VALVE CLOSED) NO WATER
WILL PASS THROUGH. CREW WILL HAVE TO USE BYPASS VALVE. IF
SWITCH STICKS AT A GIVEN SETTING, CREW CAN STILL USE IT BY MANUAL
TIMING FLOW (I oz./SECOND). CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
ASSEMBLY STILL AVAILABLE. MISSION ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-308
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
5312 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER REHYDRATION NEEDLE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
REHYDRATION NEEDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REPLACEMENT REHYDRATION NEEDLE FLOWN.
DISPENSER ALSO FLOWN ON EVERY MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY.
CONTINGENCY WATER
MISSION ABORT NEEDED FOR
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-309
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
5313 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION OR LOSS OF FUNCTION. USED TO
PREVENT BACTERIAL CONTAMINATION FROM BOTH ORBITER SUPPLY-SIDE AND
BACKFLOW FROM PERSONAL HYGIENE VALVE. ORBITER SUPPLY-SIDE HAS
MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-310
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
5314 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FUNCTION PREVENTS USE OF PERSONAL HYGIENE VALVE (USED TO
WASH HANDS, FACE, ETC.). SHOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. CREW
IFM ACTIONS ABLE TO REPAIR VALVE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-311
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW _QUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R
5315 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IODINE BEADS MAY FAIL THUS ALLOWING BACKFLOW OF CONTAMINATION
WATER (FROM PERSONAL HYGIENE VALVE). ORBITER SUPPLY SIDE HAS
MICROBIAL CHECK VALVE. MISSION ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF POTABLE
WATER SUPPLY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-312
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
5316 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PERSONAL HYGIENE VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
HYGIENE VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PERSONAL HYGIENE VALVE HARDWARE WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION. CREW IFM AND ACTIONS WILL REDUCE AMOUNT OF WATER
SPILLAGE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-313
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
5317 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PERSONAL HYGIENE VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
HYGIENE VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: SED48101600
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PERSONAL HYGIENE VALVE HARDWARE WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WILL NOT RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-314
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
5318 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER PERSONAL HYGIENE VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
HYGIENE VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /NA
TAL: /NA
AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: SED48101600
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF HARDWARE ITEM WILL NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. CREW
IFM PROCEDURES WILL REPAIR LEAK. CREW CAN USE REHYDRATION NEEDLE
AS WATER SOURCE FOR PERSONAL HYGIENE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY FOR
THIS FUNCTION (PERSONAL HYGIENE) WILL NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-315
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5319
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER HOLDING CLIPS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
HOLDING CLIPS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: SED48101600
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WATER DISPENSER STOWED DURING ASCENT AND DESCENT. IF HOLDING
CLIPS FAIL WHILE ON-ORBIT WATER DISPENSER WILL SIMPLY FLOAT
AROUND. ANY 1 OF 4 HOLDING CLIPS WILL HOLD DISPENSER IN PLACE.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-316
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
5320 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER INPUT POWER CONNECTOR
OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
INPUT POWER CONNECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EITHER OPEN OR SHORT WILL CAUSE CONTROLLER TO STOP FUNCTIONING.
CREW IFM CAN REPAIR PHYSICAL DAMAGE (PIN KIT, PLIERS, ETC.). NO
REDUNDANCY FOR POWER INPUT. CONTINGENCY DISPENSER AND PERSONAL
HYGIENE VALVE CAN STILL BE USED DESPITE LOSS OF CONTROLLER.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770, JSC-20466, SED33102348
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-317
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/2R ,
5321 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER FLEX LINE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
FLEX WATER LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN "SWITCH-OUT" FAILED FLEX LINE WITH OTHER FLEX LINES.
MISSION ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-318
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5322
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER FLEX LINES
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL WATER DISPENSER
FLEXIBLE WATER LINES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101600
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN PERFORM IFM TO REPAIR LINES. MULTIPLE REDUNDANT LINES
AVAILABLE FOR SWITCHING OUT. MISSION ABORT NEEDED FOR LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, JSC-20365, SED48101600
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-319
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5400
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
LEAD ANALYT: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: SED48101607
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN PERFORM IFM TO REPAIR THIS DISPENSER, THEREBY REDUCING
HARDWARE CRITICALITY. MISSION ABORT MUST OCCUR UPON LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-20365, SED48101607
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-320
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 5401
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/NA
ITEM: CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101607
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN PERFORM IFM TO REPAIR THIS DISPENSER, THEREBY REDUCING
HARDWARE CRITICALITY. MISSION ABORT MUST OCCUR UPON LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-20365, SED48101607
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-321
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/03/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
5402
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
CONTINGENCY WATER DISPENSER
REHYDRATION NEEDLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
SED48101607
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REHYDRATION NEEDLE BREAKS. CAN STILL DISPENSE WATER.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
REFERENCES: JSC-20365, SED48101607
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-322
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/13/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
6100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEEPING BAG - ADJUSTABLE STRAPS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) SLEEP RESTRAINTS
3) ADJUSTABLE STRAPS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ADJUSTABLE STRAPS ON THE SLEEPING RESTRAINT HOLD THE SLEEPING
BAG IN PLACE ON THE LOCKERS. FAILURE OF ANY STRAP MEANS THE BAG
WILL NOT BE AS SECURELY RESTRAINED AS INTENDED BUT NO SAFETY
IMPLICATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-323
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7113187
CREW EQUIPMENT
6101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEEPING BAG - HELICAL SPRING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) SLEEP RESTRAINTS
3) ADJUSTABLE STRAPS
4) HELICAL SPRING
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
E0360-055-30005
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HELICAL SPRING IS ONE COMPONENT OF THE ADJUSTABLE STRAPS.
FAILURE OF THE SPRING MEANS SIMPLY THAT THE SLEEPING BAG WILL NOT
BE AS SECURELY FASTENED AS INTENDED BUT NO SAFETY IMPLICATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-324
/
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/14/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
6102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEEPING BAG - CLOTH TUNNEL
STRUCTURAL FAILURE TEARS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) SLEEP RESTRAINTS
3 ) ADJUSTABLE STRAPS
4 ) HELICAL SPRING
5) CLOTH TUNNEL
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CLOTH TUNNEL SURROUNDS THE HELICAL SPRING ON THE SLEEPING BAG
ADJUSTED STRAP. A RIP IN THE CLOTH TUNNEL WILL HAVE NO AFFECT.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-325
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7114187
CREW EQUIPMENT
6103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEEPING BAG - SPRING CLIP
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) SLEEP RESTRAINTS
3) ADJUSTABLE STRAPS
4) SPRING CLIP
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: NF 12480
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE SPRING CLIP TO OPEN MEANS THAT THE PIP PIN
CANNOT BE ATTACHED AND THE SLEEPING BAG SECURELY POSITIONED.
EFFECT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS.
NO
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-326
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/14/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
6104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEEPING BAG - SPRING CLIP
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) SLEEP RESTRAINTS
3) ADJUSTABLE STRAPS
4) SPRING CLIP
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
NF 12480
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SPRING CLIP COMING OPEN MEANS THE SLEEPING BAG WILL NOT BE AS
SECURELY RESTRAINED AS DESIGNED. NO AFFECT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-327
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/14/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
6105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEEPING BAG - PIP PIN
PULLS OUT
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) SLEEP RESTRAINTS
3) ADJUSTABLE STRAPS
4) PIP PINS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
TBD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PIP PIN PULLING OUT OF THE MIDDECK LOCKER WALL MEANS THE
SLEEPING BAG WILL NOT BE AS FULLY RESTRAINED AS DESIGNED. NO
IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-328
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/14/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
6106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEEPING BAG - MOUNTING LOCATION
FAILS TO HOLD PIP PIN
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
SLEEP BAG
PIP PIN MOUNTING LOCATION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
TBD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PIP PIN MOUNTS THE SLEEPING BAG ON THE MODULAR MIDDECK
LOCKERS. CONTAMINATION IN THE MOUNTING SPOTS MEANS THE SLEEPING
BAG CANNOT BE PLACED IN ITS DESIGNATED LOCATION AND AN ALTERNATE
LOCATION MUST BE FOUND. NO IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC !2770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-329
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7114187
CREW EQUIPMENT
6107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEEPING BAG RESTRAINTS - BUCKLE FLAP
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) SLEEP RESTRAINTS
3 ) BUCKLE FLAP
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: TBD
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE BUCKLE FLAP HOLDS THE RESTRAINTS ON THE PAD. A FAILURE OF
THE FLAP MEANS THE RESTRAINTS MAY NOT OPERATE COMPLETELY AS
DESIGNED BUT NO IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-330
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 6108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: ATTACHMENT ZIPPER(S)
FAILURE MODE: BREAKS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) SLEEPING BAG
3 ) ATTACHMENT ZIPPERS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
TBD
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A BREAK IN THE ZIPPER THAT ATTACHES THE SLEEPING BAG TO THE NOMEX
PAD MEANS THE TWO ITEMS WILL BE SEPARATED. ALTERNATE MEANS OF
SECURING THE BAG TO THE PAD CAN BE DEVISED; OR THE SLEEPING BAG
CAN BE USED ALONE WITHOUT THE NOMEX PAD.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-331
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7114187
CREW EQUIPMENT
6109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CLOSURE ZIPPER
BREAKS
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) SLEEPING BAG
3) CLOSURE ZIPPER
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
TBD
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE SLEEPING BAG CLOSURE ZIPPER BREAKS, THE CREWMEMBER WILL NO
LONGER BE RESTRAINED IN THE BAG. ALTERNATE PLACES FOR SLEEPING
ARE AVAILABLE. THE FAILURE SHOULD NOT PRESENT ANY PROBLEMS.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-332
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/14/sv
CREW EQUIPMENT
6110
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BODY RESTRAINTS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) SLEEP RESTRAINTS
3 ) BODY RESTRAINTS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRAINT CAN BE REPAIRED BY TAPE OR OTHER EQUIPMENT AS
AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-333
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
6111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATION SLIDING DOOR
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATIONS
SLIDING DOOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER:
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOOR FAILS TO SLIDE OPEN OR CLOSED. IFM TOOLS MAY BE USED TO FREE
THE DOOR.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-334
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
6112 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATION CAPTIVE WING NUT FASTENER
FAILS TO TIGHTEN/LOOSEN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATIONS
CAPTIVE WING NUT FASTENER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WING NUT FASTENERS SECURE THE PANELS COVERING FLOOR COMPARTMENT
VOLUME E, FLOOR COMPARTMENT F, AND THE WET TRASH COMPARTMENT.
IFM TOOLS MAY BE USED TO REMOVE OR REPLACE WING NUT FASTENERS.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-335
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7122187
CREW EQUIPMENT
6113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATION AIR DIFFUSER
FAILS TO START/STOP
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATIONS
AIR DIFFUSER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AIR DIFFUSER IN A SLEEP STATION COULD FAIL TO START OR FAIL TO
STOP. AIR CIRCULATION WOULD BE REDUCED, BUT IS NOT LIFE OR
MISSION THREATENING.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-336
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/s7
CREW EQUIPMENT
6114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATION LIGHT
FAILS TO TURN ON/OFF
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
FOUR-TIER SLEEP STATIONS
LIGHT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
B [ ]
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIGHT IN SLEEP STATION FAILS TO TURN ON/OFF.
TO MISSION OR LIFE.
THIS IS NO THREAT
REFERENCES: JSC 12770, V601-669100
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-337
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
'7/28/8"7
CREW EQUIPMENT
6200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORBITER SIDE HATCH SAFETY LOCK PIP PIN
CANNOT INSERT PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
ORBITER SIDE HATCH SAFETY LOCK
PIP PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: SED33103383
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SAFETY LOCK CANNOT BE INSTALLED. THE SIDE HATCH COULD BE
ACCIDENTALLY OPENED WHICH COULD RESULT IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW.
ANOTHER PIP PIN COULD BE USED OR THE SAFETY LOCK COULD BE SECURED
BY OTHER TOOLS OR TAPE.
REFERENCES: SED33103383
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-338
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
6201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORBITER SIDE HATCH SAFETY LOCK PIP PIN
CANNOT REMOVE PIN
LEAD ANALYST: H. SAXON SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
ORBITER SIDE HATCH SAFETY LOCK
PIP PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW COMPARTMENT
SED33103383
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SAFETY LOCK CANNOT BE REMOVED AND THE HATCH CANNOT BE OPENED.
THE PIP PIN MAY BE REMOVED BY CUTTING.
REFERENCES: SED33103383
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-339
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/29/8?
CREW EQUIPMENT
6300
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER
LOCKER DOOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: V602-660604
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IFM PROCEDURES DETAIL USING IFM PRY BAR OR ESCAPE PRY BAR (WHICH
IS NOT STORED IN LOCKER) TO OPEN STUCK DOOR. FAILURE TO OPEN ON-
ORBIT IS DUE TO SHIFTING OF ORBITER MOUNTING STRUCTURE. FAILURE
TO OPEN DURING PRELAUNCH PHASE IS NO PROBLEM SINCE LOCKER
CHANGEOUT WOULD OCCUR BEFORE LAUNCH IF DOOR FAILED TO OPEN.
ASSUMING LOCKER CONTENTS CONTAIN EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-17321, V602-660604
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-340
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/2s/8v
CREW EQUIPMENT
6301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER
LOCKER DOOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAF_NG: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
V602-660604
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IFM PROCEDURES DETAILS TWO METHODS TO FORCE CLOSURE OF MIDDECK
LOCKER DOORS. CAN ALSO TAPE DOORS CLOSED. FAILURE TO CLOSE
WHILE ON-ORBIT DUE TO SHIFTING OF ORBITER MOUNTING STRUCTURE.
FAILURE TO CLOSE DURING PRELAUNCH PHASE IS NO PROBLEM SINCE
LOCKER CHANGEOUT WOULD OCCUR BEFORE LAUNCH IF DOOR FAILED TO
CLOSE.
REFERENCES: JSC-17321, V602-660604
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-341
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/29/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
6302
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR HINGE PIN
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER
LOCKER DOOR HINGE PIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: V602-660604
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HINGE PIN FAILS. BROKEN PIN CAN STILL FUNCTION AS HINGE PIN.
REFERENCES: JSC-17321, V602-660604
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-342
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/29/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
6303
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER DOOR
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
MIDDECK STOWAGE LOCKER
DOOR LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
V602-660604
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCKER LATCH FAILS TO CATCH/HOLD. TWO CATCHES ON EACH LOCKER
DOOR ANY ONE OF WHICH WOULD PERFORM THE CLOSURE FUNCTION. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PERMIT DOOR TO OPEN AND CONTENTS BE
RELEASED TO CABIN. DURING ASCENT/ENTRY THE CONTENTS COULD INJURE
CREWMEMBER AND/OR DAMAGE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-17321, V602-660604
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-343
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5127187
CREW EQUIPMENT
6400
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
TREADMILL BELT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /NA
TAL: /NA
AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: 10131-10031-02
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TREADMILL BELT WILL STOP ROTATING. CREWMAN MAY STUMBLE BUT
SHOULD NOT BE INJURED SINCE THE HIGHEST SPEED IS NORMALLY A
JOGGING-TYPE PACE. SUDDEN STOP MAY BE CAUSED BY PARTICULATE
CONTAMINATION OR PIECE-PART FAILURE OF RAPID ONSET BRAKING
SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, 10131-10031
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-344
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6401 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY BUNGEE FORCE CORD
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
BUNGEE FORCE CORD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10131-10031
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FORCE CORD (OR BUNGEE CORD) FAILS, HOOK ON END OF FORCE CORD
FAILS AND DETACHES FROM BUNGEE CLEAT, OR SLIP BUCKLE FAILS.
CREWMAN MAY FLOAT OUT OF RESTRAINING RIG BUT NOT AT SUFFICIENT
VELOCITY TO CAUSE INJURY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, 10131-10031
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-345
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: S/27/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 6402
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY SHOULDER STRAP
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
SHOULDER STRAP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: 10131-10031
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHOULDER STRAP FAILS, HOOK CONNECTING SHOULDER STRAP TO WAISTBELT
FAILS. SHOULDER STRAP MATERIAL MAY TEAR BY OVERLOAD, HOOK MAY
FAIL DUE TO PRODUCTION FAILURE. CREWMAN MAY FLOAT OUT OF
RESTRAINING RIG BUT NOT AT SUFFICIENT VELOCITY TO CAUSE INJURY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, 10131-10031
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-346
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/2v/By
CREW EQUIPMENT
6403
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY WAIST BELT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
WAIST BELT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: 10131-10031
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WAIST BELT MATERIAL FAILS, BRASS RING IN WAIST BELT FAILS,
RETAINING PIN FAILS, RING TO HOLD SHOULDER STRAP HOOKS FAIL, SLIP
BUCKLE FAILS. ANY FAILURE MAY OCCUR DUE TO OVERLOAD OR MATERIAL
FAILURE. CREWMAN MAY FLOAT OUT OF RESTRAINING RIG BUT NOT
SUFFICIENT VELOCITY TO CAUSE INJURY.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, 10131-10031
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-347
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
6404 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY PHYSIOLOGICAL MONITOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
PHYSIOLOGICAL MONITOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: 10131-10031
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PHYSIOLOGICAL MONITOR FAILS. REDUCES EFFECTIVENESS OF TREADMILL
BUT DOES NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION STATUS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, 10131-10031
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-348
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/27/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 6405
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY HANDLE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEADANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
HANDLE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10131-10031
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TREADMILL EXERCISER HANDLE ASSEMBLY FAILS. FAILURE WILL REDUCE
USEFULNESS OF TREADMILL. CREWMAN USING TREADMILL DURING FAILURE
WILL NOT BE INJURED.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, 10131-10031
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-349
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/27/87
CREW EQUIPMENT
6406
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TREADMILL EXERCISE ASSEMBLY INFRARED SENSOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
INFRARED SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: • /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: 10131-10031
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INFRARED SENSOR FAILS OFF, SENSOR CABLE FAILS. PHYSIOLOGICAL
MONITOR EFFECTIVENESS REDUCED. LOSS OF SENSOR AND/OR OUTPUT WILL
NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION STATUS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, 10131-10031
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-350
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6407 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY SPEED CONTROL KNOB
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
SPEED CONTROL KNOB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
10131-10031
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SPEED CONTROL KNOB FAILS. UNABLE TO ADJUST PRESET BELT SPEED
LIMIT. TREADMILL USEFULNESS REDUCED. SHOULD NOT AFFECT CREW,
VEHICLE, OR MISSION STATUS.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, 10131-10031
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-351
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/IR
6408 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY ATTACHMENT FITTINGS
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY
ATTACHMENT FITTINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: 10131-10031
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
QUICK DISCONNECT ATTACHMENT FITTINGS FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED OR
LOCKED DURING ASCENT/ENTRY. TREADMILL MAY DETACH ITSELF FROM
MIDDECK FLOOR. CREW AND/OR VECHICLE MAY BE HARMED OR DAMAGED BY
TREADMILL DURING ASCENT/ENTRY MANEUVERING.
REFERENCES: JSC-12770 SFOM VOL. 12, 10131-10031
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-352
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 4/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6500 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) INTENSITY
CONTROL/POWER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: INTENSITY CONTROL/POWER SWITCH FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
COAS
INTENSTY CONTROL OR POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME446-0045-0001
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, WEAR, CONTAMINATION ON ELECTRICAL
CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO LAMP RESULTING IN LOSS OF USE OF COAS. LOSS OF
COAS MAY RESULT IN DELAY FOR RENDEZVOUS AND LOSS OF BACKUP IMU
ALIGNMENT AND VERIFICATION CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: V620-660810, SSSH 9.5
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-353
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
6501 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
CONTROL
FAILURE MODE:
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) INTENSITY
INTENSITY CONTROL FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) COAS
3) INTENSITY CONTROL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: ME446-0045-0001
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, WEAR, CONTAMINATION ON ELECTRICAL
CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO CONTROL BULB INTENSITY. IF INTENSITY CONTROL FAILS AT
LOW INTENSITY COAS HAY BE USELESS DURING SOME RENDEZVOUS
SITUATIONS.
REFERENCES: V620-660810, SSSH 9.5
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-354
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
4/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
6502 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) LIGHT BULB
BULB FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
COAS
BULB HOUSING ASSEMBLY
LIGHT BULB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
V620-660815-003
CAUSES: BULB BURNS OUT OR FAILS DUE TO SHOCK OR VIBRATON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO USE COAS FOR IMU REALIGNMENT. MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION. HOWEVER, 2 SPARE BULBS ARE FLOWN ON EACH FLIGHT WHICH
WOULD ALLOW THE CREWMAN TO REPLACE THE FAILED ONE.
REFERENCES: V620-660810, SSSH 9.5
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-355
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
6503 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
BASE
FAILURE MODE :
BRACKETS
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) MOUNTING
FAILS TO ALLOW COAS TO ATTACH TO OR DETACH FROM
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) COAS
3) MOUNTING BASE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: V620-660830-001
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING BY CREWMAN DAMAGES BASE OR MOUNTING SCREWS
ON COAS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO ATTACH OR TO DETACH COAS FROM BRACKETS. UNABLE TO USE
COAS DURING IMU REALIGNMENT (IF NECESSARY). CREWMAN CAN USE TAPE
TO ATTACH COAS TO BRACKETS THEREBY OVERCOMING FAILURE.
REFERENCES: V620-660730, V620-660720
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-356
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 4/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6504 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) FORWARD
ADAPTER BRACKET
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ATTACH OR DETACH COAS
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
COAS
FORWARD ADAPTER BRACKET
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: V620-660720
CAUSES: MISHANDLING BY CREWMAN DAMAGES ADAPTER BRACKET OR
ATTACHMENT THUMBSCREW ON FORWARD ADAPTER BRACKET.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO ASSIST IN COMPLETE IMU REALIGNMENT. CREWMAN CAN USE
TAPE TO ATTACH COAS TO BRACKET THEREBY OVERCOMING FAILURE.
REFERENCES: V620-660720
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-357
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 4/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6505 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) FORWARD
ADAPTER BRACKET
FAILURE MODE: COAS MISALIGNMENT
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) COAS
3) FORWARD ADAPTER BRACKET
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: V620-660720
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: ACCIDENTAL CONTACT BY CREWMAN OR CONTACT WITH ANOTHER
PIECE OF EQUIPMENT WHILE MOUNTED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ACCIDENTAL CONTACT MAY MISALIGN THE MOUNTED COAS WHEN IT IS ON
THE FORWARD ADAPTER. IF THE MISALIGNMENT IS NOT NOTICED AND
CORRECTED IT MAY CAUSE A PROBLEM DURING RENDEZVOUS/DOCKING OR IMU
ALIGNMENT. CREWMAN CAN MANUALLY ADJUST COAS DURING SIGHTINGS
TO OVERCOME MISALIGNMENT.
REFERENCES: V620-660720
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-358
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 4/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 6506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) AFT
MOUNTING BRACKET
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ATTACH OR DETACH COAS
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
COAS
AFT MOUNTING BRACKET (ATTACHED TO ORBITER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: V620-660730
CAUSES: CREWMAN ACCIDENTLY DAMAGES AFT MOUNTING BRACKET PLATE OR
THREADED HOLES.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO ATTACH OR DETACH COAS. POSSIBLY UNABLE TO ASSIST IN
COMPLETE IMU ALIGNMENT. CREWMAN CAN USE TAPE TO ATTACH COAS TO
BRACKET TO OVERCOME FAILURE.
REFERENCES: V620-660730
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-359
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 4/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6507 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) FORWARD
MOUNTING BRACKET
FAILURE MODE: FAILS_TO ATTACH OR DETACH COAS
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
COAS
FORWARD MOUNTING BRACKET (ATTACHED TO ORBITER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: V620-660720
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CREWMAN ACCIDENTLY DAMAGES FORWARD MOUNTING BRACKET
PLATE OR THREADED HOLES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO ASSIST IN COMPLETE IMU REALIGNMENT. CREWMAN CAN USE
TAPE TO ATTACH COAS TO BRACKET THEREBY OVERCOMING FAILURE.
REFERENCES: V620-660720
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-360
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
4/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
6508 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
STOP
FAILURE MODE:
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) APERTURE
BROKEN APERTURE STOP
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CREW EQUIPMENT
2 ) COAS
3 ) BARREL
4) APERTURE STOP
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CREW MODULE
CAUSES: MISHANDLING BY CREWMAN, SHOCK, OR VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN STOP ALLOWS AN INCREASED AMOUNT OF SIDE-TO-SIDE HEAD
MOVEMENT WHEN OBSERVING THE PROJECTED RETICLE IMAGE. COULD CAUSE
CREWMAN TO MISREAD RANGE, RANGE RATE, OR ALIGNMENT DATA. CREWMAN
CAN USE TAPE TO REPAIR APERTURE STOP.
REFERENCES: V620-660810, SSSH 9.5
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-361
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
6509 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
STOP
FAILURE MODE:
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) APERTURE
BROKEN APERTURE FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
COAS
COMBINER LENS ASSEMBLY
APERTURE FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING BY CREWMAN, SHOCK, OR VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN FILTER ALLOWS GREATER FLARE WHEN VIEWING THE RETICLE IMAGE
ON THE COMBINER LENS DURING FULL SUNLIGHT. POSSIBLE TO RENDER
COAS UNUSABLE DURING FULL SUNLIGHT THEREBY CAUSING A DELAY IN
RENDEZVOUS.
REFERENCES: V620-660810, SSSH 9.5
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-362
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
6510 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
LENS ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE:
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) COMBINER
COMBINER LENS ASSEMBLY BREAKS
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT
COAS
COMBINER LENS ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
CREW MODULELOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING BY CREWMAN, SHOCK, OR VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN COMBINER LENS ASSEMBLY MAY RENDER COAS UNUSABLE DURING
COMPLETE IMU REALIGNMENT. CREWMAN CAN USE TAPE TO REPAIR
COMBINER LENS ASSEMBLY.
REFERENCES: V620-660810, SSSH 9.5
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-363
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CREW EQUIPMENT FLIGHT: 3/3
6511 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CREWMAN OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SIGHT (COAS) BARREL LOCK
BARREL LOCK FAILS IN ONE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM SUBSYS LEAD: S.K. SINCLAIR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CREW EQUIPMENT
2) COAS
3) BARREL
4) BARREL LOCK
5)
6)
7)
8)
a)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: V620-660825-003
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING BY CREWMAN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COAS BARREL WILL BE UNABLE TO ROTATE REQUIRED i0 DEGREES FOR
SHIFTING FROM OVERHEAD WINDOW OPERATIONS TO FORWARD WINDOW
OPERATIONS OR VICE VERSA. THIS WILL RENDER THE COAS UNUSABLE FOR
IMU ALIGNMENT, EXCEPT AT THE SOLE WINDOW OF THE COAS SETTING.
CREWMAN CAN MANUALLY CORRECT FOR THE BARREL MISALIGNMENT.
REFERENCES: V620-660810, SSSH 9.5
REPORT DATE 10/23/87 C-364
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
D-I
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
21o1 1/1
2103 2/2
2104 2/IR
2105 2/1R
2107 2/IR
2108 2/1R
2109 i/i
2200 1/1
2203 1/1
2204 i/I
2205 i/I
2212 1/1
2300 1/I
2303 1/1
2304 1/1
2305 1/1
2306 1/1
3100 2/IR
3101 2/1R
3102 2/1R
3103 2/1R
3104 2/IR
3105 2/IR
3106 3/IR
3107 3/IR
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ASSEMBLY-SLIDE
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ASSEMBLY-STOP
EVA SLIDEWIRE-
END FITTINGS
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ASMBLY-COTTR PIN
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ASSEMBLY - QD PIN
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ASSEMBLY-SUPPORT
EVA SLIDEWIRE
ERCM TETHER-
SMALL HOOK
ERCM TETHER-CABLE
ERCM SAFETY TETHER-
CABLE ATTACH POINTS
ERCM TETHER-
REEL CASE
ERCM SAFETY
TETHER-"D" RING
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
WAIST TETHER-HOOKS
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX
WEBBING
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX
WEBBING
WAIST TETHER-NOMEX
WEBBING
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING
WHEEL
TUBE CUTTER CUTTING
WHEEL
TUBE CUTTER
CUTTING WHEELSLIDE
TUBE CUTTER RATCHET
WHEEL
TUBE CUTTER SMALL
RATCHET ASMB
TUBE CUTTER SMALL
RATCHET ASMB
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
TUBE CUTTER PAWL
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
BREAKS FREE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO OPEN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
INADVERTENT OPENING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO TEARAWAY
AS DESIGNED
TEARS AT ATTACH
POINTS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE
FAILS TO REMAIN
OPEN/CLOSE
FAILS TO ENGAGE NOTCHES
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
D-2
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
3109
3111
3112
3203
3204
3206
3300
3301
3302
3303
3304
3306
3307
3308
3400
3401
3402
3403
3404
3405
3406
3407
3409
3413
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
1/1
1/1
1/1
i/I
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
i/i
1/1
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
211R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
TUBE CUTTER
ROLLER LINK
TUBE CUTTER LRG
RATCHET HANDLE
TUBE CUTTER SML
RATCHET HANDLE
CNTRL LATCH
BYPASS TOOL LATCH
CNTRL LATCH
BYPASS TOOL WHEEL
CNTRL LATCH
BYPASS RATCHET HND
3-POINT LATCH
TOOL RTCHT HANDL
3-POINT LATCH
TOOL HOOK
3-POINT LATCH
TOOL RTCHT WHEEL
3-POINT LATCH
TOOL RTCHT WHEEL
3-POINT LATCH
TOOL RATCHET WHEEL
3-POINTLATCH
TOOL ROLLER SHOE
3-POINT LATCH TOOL
COMPENSATOR
3-POINT LATCH TOOL
ROLLER SHOE
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT
ASMBLY HOOK
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT
ASMBLY RTCHT
EVA WINCH AND MOUNT
ASMBLY RTCHT
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM LRG CON HND
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM LRG CON HND
EVA WINCH AND MNT
RATCHET HANDLE
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASMBLY ROPE
EVA WINCH AND
MOUNT ASMBLY ROPE
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM RTCHT WHEEL
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM MNTG PLATE
D-3
FAILS TO OPEN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
3414
3415
3416
3417
3500
3501
3502
3504
3505
3506
3509
3600
3601
3602
3603
3604
3605
3606
3608
3612
3613
3614
3615
3616
3800
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
1/1
2/1R
2/1R
1/1
1/1
1/1
i/i
i/I
1/1
i/I
i/I
I/I
2/IR
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM GEARS
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM GEARS
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM PIP PIN
EVA WINCH AND MNT
ASM ROPE SPOOL
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM HOOK
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE CAM
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE CAM
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE PLT
EVA WINCH ADAPTER
ASM ROPE SPL
PRD ASM RATCHET
HANDLE
PRD ASM HOOK
PRD ASM HOOK LATCH
PRD ASM HOOK LATCH
PRD ASM RATCHET
GEAR
PRD ASM RATCHET
GEAR
PRD ASM KEVLAR
WEB STRAP
PRD ASM RATCHET
SHAFT PIN
PRD ASM RATCHET
LATCH
PRD ASM RATCHET
LATCH
PRD ASM RATCHET
ASMRELEASE
PRD ASM RATCHET
ASM RELEASE
PRD ASM HOOK/WEB
CONNECT PIN
SNATCH BLOCK
ASM HOOK LATCH
D-4
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
FAILS TO REMAIN ATTACHED
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO CLOSE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO CONTACT RATCHET
WHEEL
FAILS TO CLOSE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO OPEN
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM FAILURE MODE
3801 2/IR
3805 2/IR
3807 2/IR
4200 2/IR
SNATCH BLOCK
ASM HOOK SWIVEL
SNATCH BLOCK ASM
HOOK ASSEMBLY LATCH
BLK
SNATCH BLOCK
ASSEMBLY HOOK
LOCKER REMOVAL TOOL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HEX HEAD IS ROUNDED OFF,
UNABLE TO ENGAGE LOCKER
HOLDERS TO REMOVE LOCKERS.
D-5
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